- 无标题文档
查看论文信息

中文题名:

 政策性农业保险的跨期溢出效应研究——以江苏小麦完全成本保险实施为例    

姓名:

 张颖初    

学号:

 2022106045    

保密级别:

 公开    

论文语种:

 chi    

学科代码:

 120301    

学科名称:

 管理学 - 农林经济管理 - 农业经济管理    

学生类型:

 硕士    

学位:

 管理学硕士    

学校:

 南京农业大学    

院系:

 经济管理学院    

专业:

 农业经济管理    

研究方向:

 农业经济理论与政策    

第一导师姓名:

 易福金    

第一导师单位:

 浙江大学    

第二导师姓名:

 胡杨    

完成日期:

 2025-03-25    

答辩日期:

 2025-05-21    

外文题名:

 Research on the Intertemporal Spillover Effects of Policy-Oriented Agricultural Insurance —— Taking the Implementation of Jiangsu Wheat Full Cost Insurance as an Example     

中文关键词:

 政策性农业保险 ; 溢出效应 ; 跨期决策 ; 收入效应    

外文关键词:

 Policy-oriented agricultural insurance ; Spillover effects ; Intertemporal decisions ; Income effect    

中文摘要:

在全球粮食安全风险加剧与农业现代化转型的背景下,政策性农业保险的功能已从单一风险分散工具演化为保障农业生产、稳定农户收入的重要政策手段。然而,农户长期面临着流动性约束,从而导致生产要素投入受限,制约农业的高质量发展。政策性农业保险通过保费补贴形成收入效应,为破解这一难题提供了新路径。作为理性经济人,农户在当期农业收入提升后,可能将新增资金用于优化跨期生产要素配置,形成“保险收入效应—跨期生产决策”的良性循环。然而,现有研究多聚焦政策性农业保险对农户风险预期及当期生产要素投入行为的影响,对跨期生产激励效应及其传导机制缺乏系统性探讨。为此,本文以江苏省2021年小麦完全成本保险试点为切入点,基于跨期决策视角,采用准自然实验法,基于2019—2022年盐城、淮安、宿迁三市664户农户追踪数据,系统探究政策性农业保险对生产要素投入的跨期溢出效应及其作用机制。

本研究主要关注的内容涵盖三个方面:首先,识别小麦完全成本保险对下期水稻生产要素投入的跨期溢出效应。具体来说,将一年的农业生产进程划分为两个紧密关联的生产期,其中农户本年度内的小麦种植期设定为第一期,水稻种植期设定为第二期,通过构建双重差分模型,识别政策实施前后试点地区和非试点地区之间生产要素投入的差异,从而检验小麦完全成本保险的跨期溢出效应;其次,识别完全成本保险跨期溢出效应的作用机制。通过构建相应的计量模型,验证小麦完全成本保险的实施是否会对收入产生直接影响,并探究这种收入效应是否将间接作用于下一期农户的生产要素投入行为;最后,进行相应的异质性分析。从经营规模、户主风险偏好、保险认知、地区收入水平、地区种植结构等维度考察政策效果的异质性。

研究发现:第一,政策性农业保险具有显著的跨期溢出效应,能够发挥生产激励的功能。完全成本保险试点政策实施后,试点地区农户在下一生产周期中的亩均生产要素投入成本较非试点地区显著增加17.06元。其中,对化学品投入与种苗投入的影响最为显著。第二,收入效应是政策性农业保险跨期溢出效应发挥作用的核心机制。完全成本保险通过“保险收入效应—跨期生产决策”的路径对农户的生产要素投入起到激励作用。小麦完全成本保险政策实施后,试点地区农户的小麦亩均净利润增加了76.60元,而小麦亩均净利润增加将进一步强化政策对生产要素投入的促进效应。第三,政策效果存在显著的群体异质性。生产规模方面,政策对经营面积在50亩以下的小农户的促进作用是规模户的4.1倍;风险偏好方面,非风险规避型农户的政策响应强度显著高于风险规避型农户;保险认知方面,熟悉条款与理赔流程的高保险认知水平农户的投入增量是低认知组的1.9倍;地区收入水平方面,政策对较低收入地区的跨期生产要素投入具有显著促进作用,而对于中等收入和较高收入地区没有显著影响;地区种植结构方面,政策对于单一种植地区的影响不显著,但在种植结构多样地区显著提升了农户的亩均生产要素投入。

基于此,本文提出了四个方面的政策建议:其一,完善农业保险制度设计,强化生产激励功能。通过扩大作物种类、试点范围等方式,提升农业保险普惠性,并充分发挥农业保险的生产激励功能。同时尝试实施差异化补贴机制,通过精准激励,引导农业向高质量发展转型。其二,推动“保险+”政策协同机制,破解农户流动性约束。通过创新“保险+信贷”、“保险保单质押融资”、“保险+社会化服务”等多种经营模式,拓宽农户的资金来源、降低技术采纳门槛。其三,优化政策实施环境,提升农户响应能力。加强基层保险教育与精准宣传,组建驻村保险顾问团队、在村级单位设立保险服务站点,强化农户的保险认知,确保政策落地的“最后一公里”畅通。其四,创新技术应用与监管模式,提升政策效能。扩大天气指数保险、遥感定损等技术的应用范围,探索区块链技术在保单溯源与资金监管中的应用,建立动态评估与反馈机制,从而提升政策性农业保险的效能,提高财政资金利用效率。

外文摘要:

Against the backdrop of increasing global food security risks and agricultural modernization transformation, the function of policy based agricultural insurance has evolved from a single risk diversification tool to an important policy tool for ensuring agricultural production and stabilizing farmers' income. However, farmers have long faced liquidity constraints, which have led to limited input of production factors and hindered the high-quality development of agriculture. Policy based agricultural insurance generates income effects through premium subsidies, providing a new path to solving this problem. As rational economic agents, farmers may use the newly added funds to optimize the allocation of cross period production factors after the current increase in agricultural income, forming a virtuous cycle of "insurance income effect cross period production decision-making". However, existing research mostly focuses on the impact of policy based agricultural insurance on farmers' risk expectations and current production factor input behavior, and lacks systematic exploration of the cross period production incentive effect and its transmission mechanism. Therefore, this article takes the 2021 wheat full cost insurance pilot in Jiangsu Province as the starting point, based on the perspective of intertemporal decision-making, using a quasi natural experimental method, and based on the tracking data of 664 households in Yancheng, Huai'an, and Suqian cities from 2019 to 2022, systematically explores the intertemporal spillover effects and mechanisms of policy based agricultural insurance on production factor inputs.

The main focus of this study is on three aspects: firstly, identifying the cross period spillover effects of wheat full cost insurance on the input of production factors for rice in the next period. Specifically, the agricultural production process of one year is divided into two closely related production periods, with the wheat planting period for farmers in the current year set as the first period and the rice planting period set as the second period. By constructing a double difference model, the differences in production factor inputs between pilot and non pilot areas before and after policy implementation are identified, in order to test the cross period spillover effect of wheat full cost insurance; Secondly, identify the mechanism of the intertemporal spillover effects of full cost insurance. By constructing corresponding econometric models, verify whether the implementation of full cost insurance for wheat will have a direct impact on income, and explore whether this income effect will indirectly affect the production factor input behavior of farmers in the next period; Finally, conduct corresponding heterogeneity analysis. Examine the heterogeneity of policy effects from dimensions such as business scale, household head risk preference, insurance awareness, regional income level, and regional planting structure.

Research has found that firstly, policy based agricultural insurance has significant cross period spillover effects and can play a role in stimulating production. After the implementation of the full cost insurance pilot policy, the average input cost of production factors per mu for farmers in the pilot areas increased significantly by 17.06 yuan in the next production cycle compared to non pilot areas. Among them, the impact on chemical input and seedling input is the most significant. Secondly, the income effect is the core mechanism through which the cross period spillover effect of policy based agricultural insurance plays a role. Full cost insurance incentivizes farmers' input of production factors through the path of "insurance income effect - intertemporal production decision-making". After the implementation of the full cost insurance policy for wheat, the average net profit per mu of wheat for farmers in pilot areas increased by 76.60 yuan, and the increase in average net profit per mu of wheat will further strengthen the policy's promotion effect on production factor inputs. Thirdly, there is significant group heterogeneity in the effectiveness of policies. In terms of production scale, the promotion effect of policies on small farmers with a business area of less than 50 acres is 4.1 times that of large-scale households; In terms of risk preference, the policy response intensity of non risk averse farmers is significantly higher than that of risk averse farmers; In terms of insurance awareness, farmers with high insurance awareness who are familiar with the terms and claims process have an investment increase of 1.9 times that of the low awareness group; In terms of regional income levels, policies have a significant promoting effect on cross period input of production factors in low-income areas, but have no significant impact on middle-income and high-income areas; In terms of regional planting structure, the impact of policies on single planting areas is not significant, but in areas with diverse planting structures, it significantly increases farmers' per mu input of production factors.

Based on this, this article proposes four policy recommendations: firstly, to improve the design of the agricultural insurance system and strengthen the production incentive function. By expanding crop varieties, pilot areas, and other means, we aim to enhance the inclusiveness of agricultural insurance and fully leverage its production incentive function. Simultaneously attempting to implement a differentiated subsidy mechanism, guiding agriculture towards high-quality development through precise incentives. Secondly, promote the "insurance+" policy coordination mechanism and break the liquidity constraints of farmers. By innovating various business models such as "insurance+credit", "insurance policy pledge financing", and "insurance+socialized services", we aim to broaden the funding sources for farmers and lower the threshold for technology adoption. Thirdly, optimize the policy implementation environment and enhance the responsiveness of farmers. Strengthen grassroots insurance education and precise publicity, establish resident insurance consultant teams, set up insurance service stations in village level units, enhance farmers' insurance awareness, and ensure smooth implementation of policies on the "last mile". Fourthly, innovate the application of technology and regulatory models to enhance policy effectiveness. Expand the application scope of weather index insurance, remote sensing loss assessment and other technologies, explore the application of blockchain technology in policy traceability and fund supervision, establish dynamic evaluation and feedback mechanisms, thereby improving the efficiency of policy based agricultural insurance and enhancing the utilization efficiency of fiscal funds.

参考文献:

[1] 黄达,刘鸿儒,张肖.中国金融百科全书[M].北京:经济管理出版社,1990.11.

[2] 黄宗智.华北的小农经济与社会变迁[M].北京:中华书局,1986.

[3] 恰亚诺夫. 农民经济组织 [M]. 萧正洪, 译. 北京: 中央编译出版社, 1996.

[4] 卜范达,韩喜平.“农户经营”内涵的探析[J].当代经济研究,2003,(09):37-41.

[5] 蔡键,林晓珊,米运生.信贷约束真的会制约农户的经营规模吗?——基于农业特性的分析视角[J].世界农业,2019,(08):17-25.

[6] 曹瓅, 杨雨. 不同渠道信贷约束对农户收入的影响. 华南农业大学学报(社会科学版), 2020,19(01):66-76.

[7] 曾庆芬.印度小额信贷的发展及启示[J].商业研究,2007,(06):150-153.

[8] 曾玉珍. 政策性农业保险内涵、功能及作用路径的新诠释.经济问题. 2011(4):96~101.

[9] 陈刚.法官异地交流与司法效率——来自高院院长的经验证据[J].经济学(季刊),2012,11(04):1171-1192.

[10] 陈璐. 我国农业保险业务萎缩的经济学分析. 农业经济问题, 2004(11):32~35

[11] 陈文辉. 完善农业保险制度的几点思考. 人民日报, 2013-12-23

[12] 董彦岭,张兰英.政策性保险及在我国的实现形式[J].山东经济,1998(02):45-47.

[13] 段胜,王伊琳.美国保险理论研究综述:历史与现状[J].保险研究,2010,(09):122-127.

[14] 范子英,田彬彬.税收竞争、税收执法与企业避税.经济研究,2013,48(09):99~111.

[15] 冯文丽. 我国农业保险市场失灵与制度供给. 金融研究, 2004(4):124~129

[16] 付小鹏, 梁平. 政策性农业保险试点改变了农民多样化种植行为吗. 农业技术经济, 2017(9):66~79.

[17] 关伟, 郑适, 马进. 论农业保险的政府支持、产品及制度创新. 管理世界, 2005(6):155~166

[18] 郭凤茹,任金政.完全成本保险对农户耕地质量保护投资的影响及机制[J].资源科学,2023,45(11):2183-2195.

[19] 韩旭东, 刘爽, 王若男等. 农业保险对家庭经营收入的影响效果——基于全国三类农户调查的实证分析. 农业现代化研究, 2020,41(6):946~956.

[20] 郝春虹,刘彦成,张浩.一带一路”倡议是否显著扩展了财政支出的随机前沿面——基于全国272个地市级城市的准自然实验.中央财经大学学报,2024,(03):26~35.

[21] 何文忠.国际原油价格对中国股票市场的“溢出效应”及其传导机制研究[D].复旦大学,2012.

[22] 洪炜杰.正规金融支农能保障粮食安全吗?——基于县域金融机构涉农贷款增量奖励试点的准实验评估[J].中国农业大学学报(社会科学版),2024,41(02):142-161.

[23] 黄英君. 中国农业保险制度的变迁与创新. 保险研究, 2009 (2):52~58.

[24] 黄颖, 吕德宏. 农业保险、要素配置与农民收入. 华南农业大学学报(社会科学版), 2021,20(02):41-53

[25] 黄颖.政府支持、保险认知对苹果种植户政策性农业保险参与影响研究[D].西北农林科技大学,2021.

[26] 姜旭朝、丁昌锋:《民间金融理论分析:范畴、比较与制度变迁》,《金融研究》2004年第8期。

[27] 李超琼.补偿政策对农户地膜污染防控行为的影响及优化研究[D].西北农林科技大学,2024.

[28] 李海军. 我国政策性农业保险发展问题研究. 山东农业大学, 2009.

[29] 李海燕.脱贫地区巩固脱贫攻坚成果的经验、问题与对策——以甘肃省为例[J].发展,2023,(07):35-40.

[30] 李江一. 农业补贴政策效应评估:激励效应与财富效应. 中国农村经济,2016(12): 17~32.

[31] 李棠.农业保险对家庭农场生产行为的影响及收入效应研究[D].山东农业大学,2022.

[32] 李友艺,钱忠好.放松信贷约束何以提升家庭农场的效率——基于上海市松江区家庭农场数据的实证分析[J].农业技术经济,2022,(11):65-77.

[33] 刘福星, 贺娟, 吴汉辉, 冯中朝. 政策性农业保险的收入效应分析——来自华中3省的微观调查. 中国农业资源与区划, 2023,44(8): 202-212.

[34] 刘亚洲, 钟甫宁. 风险管理VS收入支持:我国政策性农业保险的政策目标选择研究.农业经济问题, 2019(4):130~139.

[35] 柳凌韵, 董凯, 周宏. 正规信贷约束降低了农业规模经营绩效吗?农业技术经济, 2020(4):25~37.

[36] 罗向明, 张伟, 丁继锋. 地区补贴差异、农民决策分化与农业保险福利再分配. 保险研究,2011(5):11~17.

[37] 罗向明,张伟,谭莹.政策性农业保险的环境效应与绿色补贴模式[J].农村经济,2016,(11):13-21.

[38] 马改艳,赖永波.政策性农作物保险的生态环境效应研究[J].林业经济,2021,43(08):22-38.

[39] 庞在礼.破解政策性农业保险难点的对策[J].中国保险,2010,(02):23-25.

[40]

[41] 秦国庆, 杜宝瑞, 贾小虎, 马九杰. 政策性农业保险的化肥、农药、农膜减量效应分析. 中国农业大学学报, 2023,28(1):237~251.

[42] 任天驰, 杨汭华. 小农户衔接现代农业生产:农业保险的要素配置作用——来自第三次全国农业普查的微观证据. 财经科学, 2020

[43] 邵全权, 柏龙飞, 张孟娇. 农业保险对农户消费和效用的影响——兼论农业保险对反贫困的意义. 保险研究, 2017 (10):65~78.

[44] 施红. 生猪保险对农户收入的稳定效应研究. 浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版), 2016,46(2):126~135.

[45] 施红.政府介入对政策性农业保险的运作效率影响的分析[J].农业经济问题,2008,(12):56-61+111.

[46] 石文香,陈盛伟. 农业保险促进了农民增收吗?基于省级面板门槛模型的实证检验. 经济体制改革, 2019(2):84~91.

[47] 舒尔茨, 西奥多·W. 1987. 《改造传统农业》. 梁小民, 译. 北京: 商务印书馆.

[48] 粟芳、方蕾:《中国农村金融排斥的区域差异:供给不足还是需求不足?——银行、保险和互联网金融的比较分析》,《管理世界》2016年第9期。

[49] 孙玉竹.园艺作物农户生产行为实证研究[D].中国农业科学院,2018.

[50] 汤颖梅, 徐涛. 规模异质性视角下天气指数保险与农户的技术选择偏好——基于田野经济学实验方法. 保险研究,2021(8): 18~34.

[51] 庹国柱, 李军. 我国农业保险实验的成就、矛盾与出路.金融研究, 2003(9):69~78

[52] 庹国柱, 朱俊生. 建立我国政策性农业保险制度的几个问题. 金融教学与研究, 2004,(5):62~66.

[53] 庹国柱, 朱俊生.关于我国农业保险制度建设几个重要问题的探讨.中国农村经济,2005,(06):46~52+74.

[54] 庹国柱. 我国农业保险政策及其可能走向分析. 保险研究, 2019(1):3~14.

[55] 庹国柱.我国农业保险的发展成就、障碍与前景.保险研究,2012,(12):21~29.

[56] 王春超. 收入波动中的中国农户就业决策——基于湖北省农户调查的实证研究. 中国农村经济, 2007(03):48-57.

[57] 王晶, 毕盛, 李芸等. 正规信贷约束对农户粮食生产的影响分析. 农业技术经济, 2018(05):28-39.

[58] 王立勇, 房鸿宇, 谢付正. 中国农业保险补贴政策绩效评估:来自多期DID的经验证据. 中央财经大学学报, 2020(9):24~34.

[59] 王韧, 陈嘉婧, 周宇婷, 宁威. 农业保险助力农业强国建设:内在逻辑、障碍与推进路径. 农业经济问题, 2023(9): 110~123.

[60] 魏昊.信贷双重约束对农业经营主体绿色生产行为影响研究.中国农业科学院,2021.

[61] 魏华林.保险的本质、发展与监管[J].金融监管研究,2018,(08):1-20.

[62] 魏加威, 杨汭华. 收入风险冲击下农业保险对农户家庭劳动力资源配置影响研究——基于山东、河南、贵州1733户调研数据. 干旱区资源与环境, 2021,35(10):53-59.

[63] 夏会珍,王亚柯,刘东亚.信贷约束与农户收入——基于CHIP数据的实证研究[J].吉林大学社会科学学报,2023,63(06):120-134+233.

[64] 邢鹂, 黄昆. 政策性农业保险保费补贴对政府财政支出和农民收入的模拟分析. 农业技术经济, 2007(3):4~9.

[65] 邢鹂. 中国种植业生产风险与政策性农业保险研究. 南京农业大学, 2004.

[66] 徐斌, 孙蓉.粮食安全背景下农业保险对农户生产行为的影响效应——基于粮食主产区微观数据的实证研究. 财经科学, 2016,(6):97-111.

[67] 徐龙军. 农业保险对农户兼业决策的影响研究——以烟草保险为例.杭州:浙江理工大学, 2013,6.

[68] 徐雯,张锦华.政策性农业保险的碳减排效应——来自完全成本保险和收入保险试点实施的证据[J].保险研究,2023,(02):20-33.

[69] 许圣道、田霖:《我国农村地区金融排斥研究》,《金融研究》2008年第7期。

[70] 闫贝贝,王菲,刘天军.数字经济参与对农户绿色生产转型的影响[J/OL].西北农林科技大学学报(社会科学版),1-10[2025-03-24].

[71] 闫艳:《农村金融服务体系存在的主要问题与解决对策》,《经济纵横》2015年第2期。

[72] 燕菲儿,易福金,张齐家.农业保险的化肥减量效应分析——基于信贷与信息双约束视角的再考察[J].中国农村经济,2024,(10):20-41.

[73] 杨春玲, 周肖肖.农民农业收入影响因素的实证分析. 财经论丛, 2010(2):13~ 18.

[74] 叶朝晖.关于完善我国农业保险制度的思考.金融研究,2018,(12):174~188.

[75] 叶明华, 朱俊生.农业保险微观效用与粮食安全的关联度. 改革, 2017(9):76~86.

[76] 易福金, 燕菲儿, 杨柳. 政策性农业保险的理论演进——兼论中国农业保险研究进展. 保险研究, 2024(3): 3~18.

[77] 尹志超,周洁,岳鹏鹏.生产性信贷约束、金融扶贫与家庭盈利[J].财经问题研究,2020,(07):60-68.

[78] 余新平,熊皛白,熊德平. 中国农村金融发展与农民收入增长. 中国农村经济, 2010(6):77~86,96.

[79] 张伟, 黄颖, 易沛, 李长春. 政策性农业保险的精准扶贫效应与扶贫机制设计. 保险研究, 2017(11):18–32.

[80] 张伟, 罗向明, 曾华盛, 刘心怡.政策性农业保险对不同群体的收入再分配效应. 保险研究, 2021 (6):72~88.

[81] 张旭光, 赵元凤. 畜牧业保险能够稳定农牧民的收入吗?基于内蒙古包头市奶牛养殖户的问卷调查. 干旱区资源与环境, 2016,30(10):40~46.

[82] 张哲晰, 穆月英, 侯玲玲. 参加农业保险能优化要素配置吗?——农户投保行为内生化的生产效应分析. 中国农村经济, 2018,(10):53~70.

[83] 张正平, 何广文. 农户信贷约束研究进展述评. 河南社会科学, 2009,17(2): 44~49+218.

[84] 张祖荣. 我国农业保险保费补贴资金使用效果评价:方法与证据. 财政研究, 2017(8):101~111.

[85] 钟春平,陈三攀,徐长生.结构变迁、要素相对价格及农户行为——农业补贴的理论模型与微观经验证据.金融研究,2013,(05):167~180.

[86] 钟甫宁, 宁满秀, 邢鹂, 苗齐. 农业保险与农用化学品施用关系研究:对新疆玛纳斯河流域农户的经验分析. 经济学(季刊), 2007(1):291

[87] 朱蕊, 江生忠. 我国政策性农业保险的扶贫效果分析. 保险研究, 2019(2):51~62.

[88] Hicks, John R. Value and Capitalm[M]. Oxford University Press, 1939.

[89] Marshall A. Principles of Economics [M]. London: Macmillan, 1890.

[90] Pigou A C. The Economics of Welfare [M]. London: Macmillan and Co., 1920.

[91] Popkin S. The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam[M]. Berkley:University of California Press, 1979.

[92] Wright B D, Hewitt J A. All-risk crop insurance: lessons from theory and experience[M]. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1994: 73-112.

[93] Brick K ,Visser M .Risk preferences, technology adoption and insurance uptake: A framed experiment[J].Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,2015,118: 383-396.

[94] Cai X, Lu Y, Wu M, et al. Does Environmental Regulation Drive Away Inbound Foreign Direct Investment? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China[J]. Journal of development economics, 2016, 123: 73~85.

[95] Carter MR, Olinto P. Getting Institutions "Right" for Whom? Credit Constraints and the Impact of Property Rights on the Quantity and Composition of Investment[J]. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,2003

[96] Chakir R, Hardelin J. Crop Insurance and Pesticides in French agriculture: an empirical analysis of multiple risks management[J]. 2010.

[97] Coase, Ronald H. The Problem of Social Cost [J]. Journal of Law & Economics, 1960, 3(1): 1-44.

[98] Coble KH, Barnett BJ. Why Do We Subsidize Crop Insurance? [J] American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2013,95(2):498~504

[99] Enjolras G, Capitanio F, Adinolfi F. The demand for crop insurance: Combined approaches for France and Italy[J]. Agricultural Economics Review, 2012,13(389):5~22.

[100] Gao Y, Shu Y, Cao H, et al. Fiscal policy dilem main resolving agricultural risks: Evidence from China’s agricultural insurance subsidy pilot[J]. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 2021,18(14):7577.

[101] Ghada Elabed, Michael R. Carter. Compound-risk aversion, ambiguity and the willingness to pay for micro-insurance[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2015

[102] Goodwin BK, Vandeveer ML, Deal JL. An Empirical Analysis of Acreage Effects of Participation in the Federal Crop Insurance Program[J]. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2004,86(4):1058~1077.

[103] Goodwin BK. Problems with Market Insurance in Agriculture[J]. American Journal of Agriculture Economics,2001,83(3):643~649

[104] Guirkinger C, Boucher SR. Credit Constraints and Productivity in Peruvian Agriculture[J]. Agricultural Economics, 2008

[105] Hazell P, Sberro-Kessler R, Varangis P. When and How Should Agricultural Insurance Be Subsidized?[J]. 2017.

[106] Ho Lun Wong. Xiangdong Wei, Haftom Bayray Kahsay; Zenebe Gebreegziabher, Cornelis Gardebroek, DanielE. Osgood, Rahel Diro. Effects of input vouchersand rainfall insurance on agricultural production and household welfare: Experimental evidence from northern Ethiopia[J]. World Development, 2020

[107] Horowitz JK, Lichtenberg E. Insurance, moral hazard, and chemical use in agriculture[J]. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1993, 75(4):926-935

[108] Innes R. Crop insurance in a political economy: An alternative perspective on agricultural policy[J]. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2003, 85(2): 318-335.

[109] Karlan D, Osei R, Osei-Akoto I, et al. Agricultural decisions after relaxing credit and risk constraints[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2014, 129(2): 597-652.

[110] Katie Farrin, Mario J. Miranda. Aheterogeneousagent model of credit-linked index insurance and farm technology adoption[J]. Journal of Development Economics, 2015

[111] Kerri Brick, Martine Visser. Risk preferences, technology adoption and insurance uptake: Aframed experiment[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2015

[112] Kurosaki T, Fafchamps M.Insurance market efficiency and crop choicesin Pakistan[J]. Journal of development economics, 2002,67(2):419-453.

[113] Mavroutsikos C, Giannakas K, Walters C. The role of premium subsidies in crop insurance[J]. Plos one, 2021, 16(4): e0250129.

[114] Michael King, Anuj Pratap Singh. Understanding farmers’ valuation of agricultural insurance: Evidence from Vietnam[J]. Food Policy, 2020

[115] Michael R. Carter, Lan Cheng, Alexandros Sarris. Where and how index insurance can boost the adoption of improved agricultural technologies[J]. Journal of Development Economics, 2016

[116] Miranda MJ, Glauber JW. Systemic Risk,Reinsurance, and the Failure of Crop Insurance Markets[J]. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1997,79(1):206~215

[117] Mishra AK, Barry KG. Income Risk and Allocation of Labor Time: An Empirical Investigation[J]. Applied Economics,1998, 30(12): 1549-1555.

[118] Sherrick BJ, Barry PJ, Ellinger PN, et al. Factors Influencing Farmers’ Crop Insurance Decisions[J]. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2004, 86(1):103~114.

[119] Shiferaw B, Kebede T, Kassie M, Fisher M. Market Imperfections, Access to Information and Technology Adoption in Uganda: Challenges of Overcoming Multiple Constraints[J]. Agricultural Economics, 2015

[120] Skees JR, Reed MR. Rate Making for Farm-level Crop Insurance: Implications for Adverse Selection[J]. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,1986,68(3):653~659.

[121] Smith, V.H., and B.K. Goodwin, Crop Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Agricultural Chemical Use[J]. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1996, 78(2):428-438.

[122] Suk-Bae Kon and David J. Storey. A theory of discouraged borrowers[J]. Small Business Economics, Vol.21, No.1(2003), pp.37-49.

[123] Tronstad R, Emerick M, Sall I. US Cotton Acreage Response to Subsidized Crop Insurance, 1995 to 2011[J]. Agricultural and Applied Economics Association,2014.

[124] Ward D, ZurbrueggR. Does Insurance Promote Economic Growth? Evidence from OECD Countries[J]. Journal ofRiskandInsurance,2000,67(4):489~506

[125] Yamauchi T. Evolution of the crop insurance program in Japan[J]. Crop Insurance for Agricultural Development: Issues and Experience, 1986.

[126] Yanuarti Rizky; Aji Joni Murti Mulyo; Rondhi Mohammad. Risk aversion level influence on farmer’s decision to participate in crop insurance: A review[J]. Agricultural Economics, 2019.

[127] Yu J, Smith A, Sumner DA. Effects of crop insurance premium subsidies on crop acreage[J]. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2018, 100(1):91-114.

中图分类号:

 F84    

开放日期:

 2025-06-12    

无标题文档

   建议浏览器: 谷歌 火狐 360请用极速模式,双核浏览器请用极速模式