我国再融资制度自实施以来，受到了众多企业和投资者的青睐，在促进企业经济发展、优化资本市场资源配置等方面发挥了重要作用。但随着市场情况的不断变化，原有制度也暴露出一些问题，突出表现在上市公司存在过度融资和套利行为、再融资制度明显失衡等。不少企业将募集的资金闲置、用于购买理财产品、频繁变更投向等，使得企业脱离主业、脱实向虚，这不利于市场优化资源配置，也不利于上市公司提升经营质量和投资价值。而我国上市公司主要通过定向增发进行再融资，因此，有必要研究我国上市公司定向增发过度融资的问题。

本文以我国过度融资的上市公司为研究对象，通过统计归纳以及案例分析的方法，对我国上市公司过度融资的现状、原因以及影响等予以研究，并根据研究结论对募资项目可行性分析、公司内部治理结构以及外部监管市场等提出具体建议，以期规范我国上市公司募集资金的使用行为。

首先，本文对过度融资的整体现状做了分析，对2015-2019年上市公司再融资的规模、募集资金投向变更以及募集资金闲置的情况进行了描述统计。研究发现我国上市公司主要利用定向增发进行再融资，且普遍存在变更募集资金投向、募集资金闲置率较高的现象。此外，本文还继续分析了上市公司定向增发后募集资金的使用情况，研究结果表明我国上市公司定向增发普遍存在过度融资的现象。

其次，本文以新潮能源定向增发收购浙江犇宝为例，详细分析了其募集资金的使用情况，主要从募集资金替换自筹资金、变更募集资金投资主体、募集资金闲置率较高以及募集资金用于补充流动资金四个角度进行分析，并判定新潮能源定向增发募集资金属于过度融资。

再次，本文对新潮能源过度融资的原因进行了探析，包括内部原因和外部原因。研究发现公司前期对项目的可行性分析不到位。在考虑行业投资前景时，没有做好风险管控措施；在进行项目分析时，企业没有结合自身的实际情况进行分析，导致项目在实施过程中受阻且收益远不如预期。公司的治理结构也不健全，存在股权过于集中、董事会和监事会不完善等问题。在内部治理有缺陷的情况下，公司高管存在为了自身利益将募集资金用于关联交易或是投资理财产品的行为。内部原因是公司过度融资的主要原因。而外部原因主要体现在外部监管不足，包括相关法律法规的缺失、证监会以及保荐机构的监管不力等，这也纵容了企业过度融资。

接着，本文对新潮能源过度融资的影响进行了研究。研究发现新潮能源在过度融资后存在过度投资的行为。由于募集资金没有按计划投入标的油田开发项目，标的油田无法产生预期收益。企业的盈利能力、营运能力、成长能力以及短期偿债能力较收购前均有所下降，长期偿债压力因股权融资有所缓和，上市公司的经营业绩并没有因为过度融资而得到改善。通过DEA模型分析可知，新潮能源募集资金使用的综合效率在行业中处于落后地位，即企业募集资金使用效率较低。由于上市公司过度投资、募集资金使用效果远不及预期，中小投资者的利益也因此受到了侵害。

最后，本文在分析新潮能源过度融资原因的基础上，从项目可行性分析、公司治理结构、外部市场监管等角度提出了相关建议。以使上市公司正确对待和使用定向增发这一融资手段，合理募集资金、有效配置市场资源；帮助中小股东识别过度融资行为，保护投资者的利益；帮助监管层完善再融资政策，促进资本市场的健康发展。

Since the implementation of China's refinancing system, it has been favored by many enterprises and investors, and has played an important role in promoting the economic development of enterprises and optimizing the allocation of resources in the capital market. However, with the continuous change of the market situation, the original system also exposes some problems, which are manifested in the over financing, Arbitrage Behavior and obvious imbalance of refinancing system of listed companies. Many enterprises leave the raised funds idle, use them to purchase financial products, and frequently change their investment direction, which makes the enterprises separate from the main business and from the real one. This is not conducive to the optimization of resource allocation in the market, nor to the improvement of the operation quality and investment value of listed companies. However, the listed companies in our country mainly refinance through private placement, so it is necessary to study the over financing of private placement.        

This paper takes the over financing listed companies in China as the research object, studies the current situation, causes and influence of over financing of Listed Companies in China through statistical induction and case analysis, and puts forward specific suggestions on the feasibility analysis of fund-raising projects, the internal governance structure of companies and the external regulatory market according to the research conclusions, with a view to regulating the raising of Listed Companies in China The use of funds.            

First of all, this paper analyzes the overall situation of over financing, and describes the scale of refinancing of Listed Companies in 2015-2019, the change of investment direction of raised funds and the idle situation of raised funds. It is found that China's listed companies mainly use private placement for refinancing, and there is a common phenomenon of changing the investment direction of raised funds and high idle rate of raised funds. In addition, this paper continues to analyze the use of funds raised by listed companies after private placement, and the results show that there is a general phenomenon of over financing in private placement.            

Secondly, this paper takes the acquisition of Zhejiang Zhenbao by the directional issuance of new wave energy as an example, analyzes the use of the raised funds in detail, mainly from the four perspectives of replacing the self raised funds by the raised funds, changing the investment subject of the raised funds, high idle rate of the raised funds and using the raised funds to supplement the working capital, and determines that the raised funds of the directional issuance of new wave energy belong to over financing Capital.         

Thirdly, this paper analyzes the reasons for the over financing of new energy, including internal and external reasons. It is found that the feasibility analysis of the project in the early stage of the company is not in place. When considering the investment prospect of the industry, no risk management and control measures are taken; when analyzing the project, the enterprise does not combine its own actual situation for analysis, resulting in the project being blocked in the implementation process and the income is far less than expected. The governance structure of the company is not perfect, and there are some problems, such as the concentration of equity, the imperfection of the board of directors and the board of supervisors. In the case of internal governance defects, the company's executives have the behavior of using the raised funds for related transactions or investment in financial products for their own interests. The internal reason is the main reason of over financing. The external reasons are mainly reflected in the lack of external supervision, including the lack of relevant laws and regulations, the lack of supervision of the CSRC and the sponsor, which also connives at the excessive financing of enterprises.          

Then, this paper studies the impact of over financing of new energy. It is found that the over investment of new energy exists after over financing. As the raised funds are not invested in the target oilfield development project as planned, the target oilfield is unable to generate expected revenue. The profitability, operation ability, growth ability and short-term debt paying ability of enterprises are all decreased compared with those before acquisition. The long-term debt paying pressure is eased due to equity financing, and the operating performance of listed companies is not improved due to over financing. Through DEA model analysis, we can see that the comprehensive efficiency of the use of funds raised by new energy is in a backward position in the industry, that is, the efficiency of the use of funds raised by enterprises is relatively low. Due to the over investment of listed companies and the use effect of raised funds far less than expected, the interests of small and medium-sized investors have also been infringed.            

Finally, based on the analysis of the reasons for the over financing of new energy, this paper puts forward relevant suggestions from the perspective of project feasibility analysis, corporate governance structure, external market supervision, etc. In order to make the listed companies correctly treat and use the financing means of directional additional issuance, raise funds reasonably and allocate market resources effectively; help small and medium-sized shareholders to identify excessive financing behavior and protect the interests of investors; help the regulators to improve the refinancing policy and promote the healthy development of the capital market.

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