结婚时男方支付彩礼在我国农村是一个普遍现象。彩礼是指夫妻双方订婚和结婚时夫方送予妻方的财货和礼品的统称。我国农村地区彩礼金额自上世纪80年代以来持续攀升，形成高价彩礼现象，尤其是2000年以后彩礼水平快速上升，对中低收入家庭正常生活造成一定压力。我国农村普遍代际责任厚重，父母通常将儿子终身大事看作自己必须要完成的任务，因此高彩礼的压力最终由男方父母来承担。高价彩礼使得许多农村家庭拿出几十年积蓄甚至举债成婚。受传统文化习俗的影响，在相当长的时间内，中国农村仍会存在支付彩礼现象。因此，揭示和明确婚嫁彩礼上涨原因及其影响具有重要的现实意义。

既有研究大多从性别比失衡角度解释彩礼上涨，没有充分揭示我国农村彩礼上涨的深层次原因，单纯从性别比失衡角度不能够完全解释我国彩礼上涨的现象。婚配市场男女供需数量固然重要，但女性劳动力内在价值提升同样不容忽视。现有研究更是主要关注彩礼上涨带来的负面影响，忽略了其对于出生性别比降低可能起到的积极作用。本研究旨在为农村彩礼上涨提供一个新颖且较为完整的思路和分析框架，为今后相关研究提供重要借鉴意义。

本研究的总体目标是：基于代际责任与婚姻效用视角检验农村彩礼上涨对农户生计发展的影响，揭示其作用机制，为乡村治理相关政策的制定提供参考；基于婚姻市场女性劳动价值提升视角分析彩礼上涨对家庭生育的影响及女性家庭决策地位的作用机制，全面客观评价彩礼上涨的综合影响；在劳动力市场发展和面子文化背景下，探讨女性劳动价值提升和信息不对称程度提高对农村彩礼上涨的影响及彩礼要价的示范效应，科学认识农村彩礼上涨的深层次原因。本研究分别采用固定效应模型、随机效应模型、二元选择模型、Tobit模型、面板Tobit模型、Ordered logit模型、OLS模型等进行实证分析。主要研究内容与结论包括三个部分。

第一部分研究农村彩礼上涨对农户生计发展的影响。从家庭负债、教育终止与婚姻稳定三个维度，以男方及其父母为主体分析农村彩礼上涨对农户生计发展的影响机制。利用江苏、四川、吉林3个省297个行政村的四期跟踪调研数据以及1110户农户调查数据进行实证检验。结果表明：在彩礼上涨的背景下，我国农村普遍存在的“传宗接代”的传统文化观念与代际责任使得高彩礼的压力最终由男方父母来承担，结婚时的高彩礼支出确实增加了农户陷入负债的概率并导致负债金额增加。高彩礼的压力还会迫使处于学龄阶段的青年终止学业、提前进入劳动力市场工作，以获得更大的物质资本积累来进行未来彩礼的准备。此外，高彩礼还会给男方带来巨大的生活压力和精神压力，易使他们产生负面情绪，导致夫妻关系紧张，加剧夫妻之间的摩擦和冲突，使得婚姻质量下降，婚姻效用降低，进而影响婚姻稳定性。经验证据表明，伴随着彩礼水平上涨，农村离婚率显著上升。因此彩礼上涨对农户生计发展的影响是多维的，既体现在金融资本（负债）、人力资本（教育）上，也包括对资源（婚姻）发展的影响，而这些又会在一定程度上加剧农户返贫的风险。

第二部分分析农村彩礼上涨对家庭生育的影响。本部分在生育经济动机和家庭决策的框架下，讨论农村彩礼上涨对家庭生育的影响及女性家庭决策地位的作用机制。利用各省市《人口普查资料》和《1%人口抽样调查资料》、中国健康与养老追踪调查（CHARLS）、中国家庭追踪调查（CFPS）、《中国区域经济统计年鉴》多期数据进行实证检验。结果显示：彩礼上涨显著降低出生性别比，这是因为在父母为儿子结婚准备彩礼的背景下，彩礼上涨导致养育男孩的相对成本更高，改变养育子女相对收益，彩礼上涨带来的女性家庭决策地位提升会减弱农村居民在生育各胎次子女时的性别偏好程度，最终通过性别替代机制减少期望男孩数量，从而降低出生性别比。与此同时，彩礼上涨使得养育子女成本更高，这会降低家庭对子女数量的需求，女性家庭决策地位提升也会降低其生育意愿，在高胎次出生性别比失衡更严重的情况下，这会通过生育数量机制间接降低出生性别比。此外，女性家庭决策地位提升以后提供给娘家父母的经济和时间转移支付增加也会提高生育女孩的预期收益，从而弱化男孩偏好，降低出生性别比。由于夫权和男孩偏好程度与宗族文化有关，因而本文进一步根据宗族文化强弱将样本地区分组进行检验，结果表明彩礼上涨对女性家庭决策地位提升和出生性别比降低的作用在宗族文化弱的地区更为显著。

第三部分研究女性劳动价值提升和信息不对称程度提高对农村彩礼上涨的影响及其示范效应。在劳动力市场发展和面子文化背景下，分析女性劳动价值提升（非农劳动参与增加、农业生产率提高）和信息不对称程度提高对农村彩礼上涨的影响以及彩礼要价的示范效应，并利用江苏、四川、吉林3个省297个行政村的四期跟踪调研数据以及1110户农户调查数据进行实证检验。研究发现：首先，女性劳动价值提升显著促进农村彩礼上涨。一方面，大规模的打工经济兴起使得适婚年龄女性非农劳动参与增加，女性对男性的传统依赖下降，女性变得经济独立；另一方面，外包服务的发展改变留在农村从事农业女性的家庭劳动分工参与程度，相应地提升其农业生产率。这两方面的效应均提升女性劳动价值，提高女性在家庭的经济地位，改变婚姻市场上女性作为供给方的价格弹性，进而推动彩礼相应上涨。由于婚姻市场与宗族文化相关，本文进一步检验宗族文化异质性，发现女性劳动价值提升对彩礼上涨的影响在宗族文化强的地区更明显。其次，婚配过程中的信息不对称程度提高会增加女方要高价彩礼进行风险规避的概率，导致彩礼增加，并且这种影响对于中低收入群体更大。最后，示范效应存在于婚嫁彩礼的要价过程中，并且该效应对于中低收入人群更大。

基于上述研究结论，提出如下建议：第一，除了家庭负债等显性问题以外，还需关注因彩礼上涨给农户带来的其他生计问题，如教育终止、婚姻不稳定等隐患。第二，彩礼上涨有其正常合理的部分，对彩礼的引导需要准确识别并因地制宜。第三，彩礼对家庭生育的积极影响值得注意，平衡养育儿子与女儿的收益需从改变生育子女的经济激励入手，制定合理的政策。

本研究可能有以下三方面的创新：

第一，将劳动力市场发展带来的女性劳动价值提升和信息不对称程度提高作为重要的研究视角，运用经济学理论和方法，探究女方彩礼要价的内在机制。现有文献多从社会学角度分析彩礼，彩礼成因涉及文化社会因素，但经济因素也至关重要。本研究从经济学视角揭示经济因素对彩礼变化的影响，从女性劳动参与增加导致劳动力内在价值提升视角出发，充实对于彩礼上涨成因的理解和认知，也为婚姻市场定价理论提供了新的经验证据。以信息不对称和示范效应为切入点，加深对婚姻支付和婚姻市场的认识，并且印证经济因素对文化习俗的影响，拓展相关领域研究。进一步讨论在不同宗族文化地区女性劳动价值提升对彩礼上涨影响的异质性，以及对不同收入水平家庭而言信息不对称程度提高对彩礼的异质性影响和彩礼要价示范效应的异质性，细化并丰富相关研究内容。

第二，将家庭负债、教育终止、婚姻稳定纳入分析框架，综合考察彩礼上涨对农户生计发展的影响与逻辑，深化对返贫成因的理解，为寻找防止农户返贫的有效途径和政策措施提供理论依据与经验证据。区别于已有相关文献对于高额彩礼影响的定性研究，本文运用经济学理论和方法定量分析彩礼上涨对农户生计发展及返贫可能性的影响，研究发现有助于丰富“文化的经济影响”方面文献。为乡村治理相关政策的制定提供参考。

第三，考虑彩礼上涨对家庭生育的积极影响，丰富彩礼上涨综合影响的分析框架。从女性劳动价值提升视角考察彩礼上涨对出生性别比的作用机制，分析女性家庭决策地位对生育决策和转移支付决策的影响，不仅具有重要的现实价值，也对既有文献做出有益补充。本研究结论深化对传统文化习俗与性别平等之间关系的理解，也为关于是否应该禁止彩礼的政策辩论提供一个新的视角。

It is a common phenomenon that men pay bride price when they get married in rural China. Bride price refers to the general name of goods and gifts given by the husband to the wife when the they are engaged and married. The amount of bride price in rural areas of China has continued to rise since the 1980s, forming the phenomenon of high bride price, especially the rapid rise after 2000, causing a certain pressure on the normal life of middle- and low-income families. In China’s rural areas, there is a heavy intergenerational responsibility, and parents usually regard their son’s life event as a task that they must complete, so the pressure of high bride price is ultimately borne by the parents of the men. High bride price has prompted many rural families to spend decades of savings or even borrow to get married. Due to the influence of traditional culture and customs, the phenomenon of bride price payment will still exist in rural China for a long time. Therefore, it is of great practical significance to reveal and clarify the reasons and influences of the rising bride price.

Most of the existing studies explain the increase of bride price from the angle of sex ratio imbalance, but do not fully reveal the deep-seated reasons for the increase of rural bride price in China, and can not completely explain the phenomenon of rising bride price. Although the number of supply and demand of males and females in the marriage market is important, female’s improvement of the intrinsic value of labor force cannot be ignored. The existing studies mainly focus on the negative effects of bride price increase, ignoring its possible positive effects on the decrease of sex ratio at birth. The purpose of this study is to provide a novel and relatively complete thinking and analysis framework for the rural bride price increase, and to provide important reference for future research.

The overall goal of this study is to examine the impact of rising bride price on the development of farmers’ livelihood and reveal its mechanism based on the perspective of intergenerational responsibility and marital utility, and provides references for the formulation of relevant policies on rural governance. This paper is aimed at analyzing the effect of rising bride price on the family fertility and the mechanism of female’s decision-making status in family, comprehensively and objectively evaluates the comprehensive impact of rising bride price. This paper intends to explore the influence of the improvement of female’s labor value and information asymmetry on the increase of rural bride price as well as the demonstration effect of asking bride price under the background of labor market development and face culture, and scientifically understand the deep-rooted reasons for the rise of rural bride price. In this study, fixed effect model, random effect model, binary selection model, Tobit model, panel Tobit model, Ordered logit model and OLS model were used for empirical analysis. The main research contents and conclusions include three parts.

The first part studies the impact of rising bride price on the development of farmers’ livelihood. From the three dimensions of family debt, education termination and marital stability, this paper analyzes the influence mechanism of rising bride price on the development of farmers’ livelihood by taking males and their parents as the main body. This paper empirically tests the impact based on the four phase tracking data of 297 administrative villages in Jiangsu, Sichuan and Jilin provinces and the survey data of 1110 rural households. The results show that under the background of the rising bride price, the traditional cultural concept of “carrying on the family name” and intergenerational responsibility in rural China make the pressure of high bride price finally borne by the male’s parents. The high bride price expenditure at the time of marriage does increase the probability of farmers falling into debt and lead to an increase in the amount of debt. Under the pressure of high bride price, it also forces school-age teenager to terminate their studies and enter the labor market earlier in order to accumulate greater material capital to prepare for future bride price. In addition, high bride price will also bring tremendous life pressure and mental pressure to the men, which is easy to make them have negative emotions, leading to tension between husband and wife, aggravating friction and conflict between them, resulting in the decline of marriage quality and marriage effectiveness, and thus affecting the stability of marriage. Empirical evidence shows that the divorce rate in rural areas increases significantly with the increase in bride price. Therefore, the impact of bride price increase on the development of farmers’ livelihood is multi-dimensional, which is reflected in financial capital (debt), human capital (education), and the development of resources (marriage), which will aggravate the risk of farmers returning to poverty to a certain extent.

The second part studies the effect of rising bride price on family fertility. Under the framework of economic motivation and family decision making, this paper analyzes the effect of rising bride price on the decrease of sex ratio at birth and the mechanism of female’s family decision making status. The empirical test is conducted by using the multiphase data of Population Census, 1% Population Sample Survey, China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS), China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), and China Regional Economic Statistical Yearbook. The results show that rising bride price significantly reduces the sex ratio at birth because it leads to higher relative costs of raising boys in the context of parents preparing bride price for their sons’ marriages and changes the relative benefits of raising children. The improvement of female’s decision-making status in family due to the rising bride price will weaken the gender preference of rural residents when giving birth to children, and ultimately reduce the desired number of boys through gender substitution mechanism, thereby reducing the sex ratio at birth. At the same time, the rising bride price makes the cost of raising children higher, which will reduce the family’s demand for the number of children, and the improvement of female’s decision-making status in the family will also reduce their fertility willingness, which will indirectly reduce the sex ratio at birth through the birth number mechanism in the case of the imbalance of the sex ratio at high birth parity. In addition, the increase in economic and time transfer payments provided to parents after female’s decision-making status in the family will also increase the expected benefits of having girls, thus weakening the preference for boys and reducing the sex ratio at birth. Since husband power and boy preference are related to clan culture, this paper further tests the sample regions according to the strength of clan culture. The results show that the effect of bride price increase on female’s decision-making status and sex ratio at birth is more significant in the regions with weak clan culture.

The third part studies the influence of female’s labor value and the increase in information asymmetry on the rise of rural bride price and its demonstration effect. In the context of labor market development and face culture, this paper analyzes the influence of female’s labor value (increase in non-agricultural labor participation, increase in agricultural productivity) and the increase in information asymmetry on the rise of rural bride price as well as the demonstration effect of asking bride price, and uses the four phase tracking survey data of 297 administrative villages in Jiangsu, Sichuan and Jilin provinces and the survey data of 1110 rural households for empirical test. The study finds that, first of all, the rise of female’s labor value significantly promotes the increase of rural bride prices. On the one hand, the rise of large-scale working economy makes the non-agricultural labor participation of females at marriageable age increase, females’ traditional dependence on males declines, and they become economically independent. On the other hand, the development of outsourcing services has changed the degree of participation in the household division of labor of females who remain in rural areas to work in agriculture, and correspondingly increased their agricultural productivity. Both of these effects improve female’s labor value and their economic status in the family, change the price elasticity of females as suppliers in the marriage market, which in turn drives up bride prices accordingly. Since the marriage market is related to clan culture, this paper further examines the heterogeneity of clan culture and finds that the influence of the increase of female’s labor value on the rise of bride price is more obvious in areas with strong clan culture. Secondly, the increase of information asymmetry in the process of marriage will increase the probability of females wanting high price for risk avoidance, resulting in an increase in bride price. And this impact is greater for middle- and low- income groups. Finally, the demonstration effect exists in the process of asking bride price, and the effect is larger for middle- and low- income people.

Based on the above research conclusions, the following suggestions are put forward: First, in addition to the obvious problems such as household debt, other livelihood problems brought by the rising bride price to farmers should also be paid attention to, such as education termination, marital instability and other hidden dangers. Second, the rising of bride price has its normal and reasonable parts, and the guidance of bride price needs to be accurately identified and adapted to local conditions. Third, the positive impact of bride price on family fertility is noteworthy. To balance the benefits of raising sons and daughters, it is necessary to change the economic incentives to have children and formulate reasonable policies.

This research may be innovative in the following three aspects:

First, take the rise of female’s labor value and the increase of information asymmetry brought about by the development of labor market as an important research perspective, and use economic theories and methods to explore the internal mechanism of female’s bride price asking. The existing literature mostly analyzes the bride price from the sociological angle. The causes of bride price involve cultural and social factors, but economic factors are also crucial. From the perspective of economics, this study reveals the influence of economic factors on the change of bride price, and from the perspective of the increase of female’s labor force participation leading to the improvement of labor’s intrinsic value, enriching the understanding and cognition of the causes of the rise of bride price, and providing new empirical evidence for the theory of marriage market pricing. Taking the information asymmetry and demonstration effect as the entry point, it deepens the understanding of marriage payment and marriage market, confirms the influence of economic factors on cultural customs, and expands the research in related fields. This paper further discusses the heterogeneity of the influence of female’s labor value on the increase of bride price in different clan cultural regions, the heterogeneity of information asymmetry on bride price, and the demonstration effect of bride price asking for families with different income levels, elaborating and enriching the relevant research contents.

Second, family debt, education termination and marriage stability are included in the analysis framework, and the impact and logic of rising bride price on the development of farmers’ livelihoods are comprehensively investigated, so as to deepen the understanding of the causes of poverty return, and provide theoretical basis and empirical evidence for finding effective ways and policy measures to prevent farmers from returning to poverty. Different from the qualitative research on the impact of high bride price in the existing literature, this paper uses economic theories and methods to quantitatively analyze the impact of rising bride price on the development of farmers’ livelihoods and the possibility of returning to poverty. The research findings are helpful to enrich the literature on the “economic impact of culture”. It provides reference for the formulation of relevant policies of rural governance.

Third, consider the positive impact of rising bride price on family fertility, and enrich the analysis framework of the comprehensive impact of rising bride price. From the perspective of female’s labor value improvement, it is not only of practical value, but also helpful to supplement existing literature to investigate the mechanism of bride price increase on birth sex ratio and analyze the influence of female’s family decision-making status on fertility decision and transfer payment decision. The conclusions of this study deepen the understanding of the relationship between traditional cultural practices and gender equality, and also provide a new perspective on the policy debate on whether bride price should be banned.

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