随着我国农地流转数量的迅速增长，农业政策一直在不断引导流转市场合约的“规范化”，其理由之一是能够有效保障农地产权的稳定性，有助于激励农户的农业生产投资和提高农业生产效率。然而，伴随着我国流转市场合约的规范化，农业生产投资却呈现增速放缓甚至走低的趋势，许多研究调查也显示规模经营户的农业生产投资普遍不足，这与理论预期和政策目标均不一致，原因值得深入研究。为何拥有书面与长期合约的农地转入户的投资积极性不足呢？换而言之，农地流转市场中合约的规范化是否保障了农地经营权的稳定性？其受到什么条件的约束？影响机制是什么？以上问题的回答能够丰富产权稳定性的内涵，有助于解释农地流转和农业现代化发展中亟待解决的难点问题。
按照现代产权理论，清晰的产权制度安排是实现市场资源交易与最佳配置的前提，制度的本质是人们之间行使一定行为的权力约定。当产权界限不清晰时，各种摩擦与障碍会影响经济主体行为和资源配置结果，农地流转市场同样如此。清晰界定流转农地主体的经济权利至关重要，包括法律界定与合约约定的权力，是保证农地资源有效配置和农地高效利用的前提。理论认为产权明晰能保证资源的最佳配置，不仅仅要求产权界定具有明晰性、专有性和可转让性等要求，还要求产权界定具有可操作性，而这是现有实证研究忽视或重视不够的地方。既有研究多仅考虑合约类型、期限与租金等条款对农地资源配置和农业生产投资的影响，暗含的假定条件是合约条款可以完全执行的，忽略了现实中履约环境和合约约束力对合约可操作性与可执行性的影响，这可能使得农地流转的合约稳定性不足，其作为农地经营权稳定性的重要内容会影响市场中的要素利用与资源配置。
本研究的总体目标是在要素市场化背景下，探讨农地流转合约稳定性与农业生产投资的关系，验证合约约束力是影响农地流转合约稳定性并制约农户农业生产投资的重要因素，进一步分析不同合约约束力下农地流转市场合约结构的异质性，揭示社会信任与法治强度对合约约束力的作用机制，为乡村治理与法制建设相关政策的制定和完善提供参考。本文针对合约约束力对农地转入户农业生产投资行为及农地流转市场合约结构的影响，以及合约约束力的影响因素逐步进行了实证检验，主要研究内容与结论包括三个部分。
第一部分研究了农地流转合约安排对农业生产投资的影响及合约约束力的调节效应。本部分将合约约束力引入合约安排与农业生产投资的分析框架，探讨合约稳定性对转入户农业生产投资的影响，着重考察合约约束力在上述影响机制中的作用，并利用黑龙江、河南、浙江和四川4省128村1033个农户的调查数据，实证检验农地流转合约安排、合约约束力对转入户农业生产投资行为的影响。结果表明：流转市场中的书面与长期合约对转入户农业生产投资具有激励效应，但会受到合约约束力的制约。不考虑合约约束力时，书面合约与长期合约的参数为正且显著，表明农地流转中签订书面、长期合约的农户进行基础设施投资和农业机械投资可能性更高。在控制合约约束力时，无论是选择合约执行率，还是纠纷解决率作为合约约束力的代理变量，合约类型、合约期限及其与合约约束力的交叉项的系数对比表明，在合约约束力较强的区域，流转中签订书面合约和长期合约的农户更有可能进行农业生产投资，即合约约束力不足会影响签订书面与长期的合约的稳定性，削弱其对转入户农业生产投资的激励效应。
第二部分研究了合约约束力对农地流转市场合约结构的影响及资源配置含义。本部分在分析不同类型和期限合约界定的权益异质性的基础上，探讨合约约束力对书面合约与长期合约界定权益的影响，进而分析不同合约约束力条件下农户合约选择的差异，推断合约约束力对农地流转市场中书面合约与长期合约面积占比的影响，并利用黑龙江、河南、浙江和四川4省128村农户层面和村庄层面的调查数据进行实证检验。结果表明：无论是选择合约执行率，还是纠纷解决率作为合约约束力的代理变量，合约约束力对农地流转市场中合约书面化和长期化具有正向影响。合约约束力不足会削弱书面合约的权益明晰性与长期合约的收益持续性，引致更多的转出户选择口头合约或短期合约，即降低了农地流转市场中签订书面合约与长期合约的农地面积占比。进一步比较不同合约类型与期限的农地转入户特征及农业生产方式的差异，结果显示：在合约约束力不足的地区，流转市场中农地流向人力资本高、资源禀赋充足、经营能力强、生产投入积极的农户的占比更低，表明合约约束力不足造成了流转市场资源配置效率的损失。
第三部分研究了社会信任与法治强度对合约约束力的影响。本部分在要素市场背景下，分析社会信任和法治强度对合约约束力的影响，利用在黑龙江、河南、浙江和四川4省128村的农户和村庄调查数据，构建了社会信任与法治强度标准化指数，实证检验社会信任与法治强度对流转市场合约约束力的影响，并分别采用社会信任与法治强度指标替换标准化指数进行稳健性检验。结果显示：社会信任和法治强度的提高对农地流转市场的合约约束力有强化作用。一方面以村庄邻里关系和借贷关系体现的社会信任，对农地流转市场的合约约束力具有显著的正向影响，即社会信任高的区域的合约执行率与纠纷解决率均相对较高。另一方面以法规制度和法规执行体现的法治强度，对农地流转市场的合约约束力具有显著的正向影响，即法治强度高的区域的合约执行率与纠纷解决率均相对较高。要素市场化过程中，农村人口的流动削弱了乡村人与人长期互动形成的社会信任，而现代法治社会建设中由于法规制度不完善、执法机构不健全、执法周期长等弱化了法治强度，违约者得不到惩戒、被违约者得不到补偿相当于变相“鼓励”违约，从而削弱了农地流转市场的合约约束力。
总体上，在要素市场化的发展过程中，农村人口的大量转移削弱了合约治理中传统乡村“非正式”制度约束，逐步向以现代法律制度为代表的“正式”制度约束演变，而地区之间“正式”与“非正式”制度的差异，无疑会形成不同的合约约束力影响农地市场流转的违约成本与合约执行，并进一步影响农地流转市场发展与农地资源配置。合约约束力不足对农地流转市场中农户行为有如下影响：第一，农户改变合约选择，当合约约束力不足时农户会选择与特定对象达成口头合约，或者选择期限更短的合约来减小可能遭遇违约的风险；第二，在已有合约安排下调整农业生产行为，合约约束力不足会导致合约界定的权益得不到有效保障，农户会由于投资存在“敲竹杠”的风险而降低农农业生产投资。据此提出如下建议：加强农地流转市场的监督与管理，强化流转纠纷的服务与调解能力；重视乡村振兴中的法制建设和宣传，强化农户的产权与法律意识；改善乡村治理的能力与水平，建立健全村规民约监督和奖惩机制，培育和提高乡村社会信任；创新农业生产投资激励机制，提高政策补贴力度以提升农业生产投资水平。

With the rapid development of the farmland transfer in China, agricultural policies have been constantly guiding the farmland transfer contract standardization. One of the important reasons is that the standard contract can effectively guarantee the stability of farmland property, which help to stimulate farmers' agricultural production investment and improve agricultural production efficiency. However, with the standardization of transfer market farmland contract, the growth rate of agricultural production investment has slowed down or even declined. Many researches also show that the agricultural production investment of scale operators is generally insufficient, which is inconsistent with the theoretical expectations and policy objectives. The reason is worthy of further study. Why are the investment enthusiasm of farmers with paper and long-term farmland contract insufficient? In other words, does the standardization of contract guarantee the stability of farmland management right? What are the constraints and what is the impact mechanism? The answers of the above questions can enrich the connotation of the stability of property rights, and help to explain the difficult problems to be solved in the process of agricultural land transfer and agricultural modernization.

According to the property right theory, clear arrangement of right is the premise of realizing market resource transaction and optimal allocation. The essence of the institution is the power agreement between people to exercise certain behaviors. When the boundary of property rights is not clear, some kinds of frictions and obstacles will affect the behavior of economic entities and the results of resource allocation, so do the farmland transfer market. It is very important to clearly define the economic rights of farmers’ transferred land, including the power defined by law and agreed by contract, which is the premise to ensure the effective allocation of resources and efficient use of farmland. In fact, modern property rights theory believes that clear property rights can ensure the optimal allocation of resources, which not only requires the definition of property rights to be clearly, exclusive and transferable, but also requires the definition of property rights can be operable. That are ignored or not paid enough attention in the existing research. Most of studies only consider the impact of contract type and term on the allocation of resources and agricultural production investment. The implied assumption is that the contracts can be fully implemented, ignoring the impact of contracts environment and contract binding force on the operability and enforceability in reality. As an important part of the stability of farmland management right, the stability of farmland transfer contract will affect the factor utilization and resource allocation in the market.

The purpose of research is to explore the relationship between the stability of farmland transfer contract and agricultural production investment under the background of factor marketization. And verify the contract binding is an important factor that affects the stability of farmland transfer contract and restricts farmers' agricultural production investment. Furthermore, the research analyzes the heterogeneity of the contract structure of farmland transfer market under different contract binding, which reveals the mechanism of social trust and the strength of law on the contract binding force. The research provides a reference for the formulation and improvement of rural governance and legal construction related policies. In the research, the impact of contract binding force on farmers’ agricultural production investment behavior and the contract structure of farmland transfer market, as well as the influencing factors of contract binding force are gradually empirically tested. The main research contents and conclusions include the following three parts.

At the first part, the research studies the impact of farmland transfer contract arrangement on agricultural production investment and the regulatory effect of contract binding. Based on the analysis of contract stability, this part introduces the contract binding into the analysis framework of contract arrangement and agricultural production investment, discusses the impact of contract stability on agricultural production investment, and focuses on the role of contract binding in the above impact mechanism. Based on the survey data in Heilongjiang, Henan, Zhejiang and Sichuan provinces, this paper empirically tests the influence of the farmlands’ contract arrangement and binding on the agricultural production investment of transferred farmers. The results show that the paper and long-term contracts can guarantee the stability of property rights of farmland transferred farmers in the transfer market, and have incentive effect on agricultural production investment. But the effects will be restricted by contract binding. When the contract binding is not considered, the parameters of paper and long-term contract are positive and significant, which indicates that farmers who sign paper and long-term contracts are more likely to invest in agricultural infrastructure and machinery. No matter the rate of contract execution or dispute resolution is chosen as the proxy variable to controlling the contract binding. The comparison of the type and term of contract and the coefficient of the cross item with the binding force of contract shows that: the farmers which signed paper and long-term contract are more likely to invest in agricultural production in the area with strong contract binding. That is say, the lack of contract binding will affect the stability of paper and long-term contracts, which would weaken the incentive effect on the agricultural production investment of the transferred farmers.

At the second part, the research studies the influence of contract binding on the contract structure of farmland transfer market and the meaning of resource allocation. Based on the discussing the heterogeneity of different types and terms of contract, this part compares the differences of farmers' profit in choosing different types and terms of contract under different conditions of contract binding. And then, this paper infers the impact of contract binding on the area proportion of paper and long-term contract in farmland transfer market. Further, the research use the Heilongjiang, Henan, Zhejiang and Sichuan provinces’ farmers and village survey data for empirical testing. No matter the contract execution rate or the dispute resolution rate are selected as the proxy variables of the contract binding, the results show that the contract binding have positive impacts on paper and long-term contracts in the farmland transfer market. The insufficient of contract binding will weaken the stability of farmland property rights with paper and long-term contracts, which will lead to more transferring farmers choosing oral contracts or short-term contracts. That will reduce the proportion of farmland, which choose to sign paper and long-term contracts in the farmland transfer market. Furtherly, the research compare the difference in the household characteristics and agricultural production mode under different contract types and terms. The results showed that the proportion of farmland which flows to farmers with high human capital, sufficient resource endowment, strong management ability and active production investment are lower in the region of less contract binding force. This phenomenon indicates that the lack of contract binding would cause the loss of resource allocation efficiency in the farmland transfer market.

At the third part, this research studies the influence of social trust and the strength of law on the contract binding under the background of resources marketization. Based on the survey data in Heilongjiang, Henan, Zhejiang and Sichuan provinces. In the data analysis, the standardized index of social trust and the strength of law intensity is constructed. And the empirical test is made to test the influence of social trust and the strength of law intensity on the contract binding of the circulation market. Then respectively uses the index of social trust and the strength of law to replace the standardized index for robustness test. The results show that the improvement of social trust and the strength of law will consolidate the contract binding in farmland transfer market. On the one hand, the social trust reflected by the village neighborhood relationship and the credit relationship have significant positive impacts on the contract binding of farmland transfer market. In other words, the contract implementation rate and dispute resolution rate are relatively high in the regions with high social trust. On the other hand, the strength of law reflected by the legal system and the enforcement of regulations have significant positive impacts on the contract binding of farmland transfer market. In other words, the contract implementation rate and dispute resolution rate of the regions with high the strength of law are relatively high. In the process of factor marketization, the flow of rural population weakens the social trust formed by the long-term interaction between people in rural areas. However, in the construction of modern legal society, due to the imperfect laws and regulations, imperfect law enforcement agencies and long law enforcement cycle, the strength of law is weakened. The defaulters are not punished and the defaulted are not compensated, which is equivalent to "encouraging" the breach of contract in disguise, thus weakening the contract binding of the transfer market.

On the whole, with the development of resources marketization, the transfer of population weakens the traditional "informal" institutional constraints in contract governance. And gradually evolves to the "formal" institutional constraints represented by the modern legal system. The differences between the "formal" and "informal" institutional among regions will form different contractual constraints undoubtedly, which will affect the contract execution and cost of contract breach. Further, it will affect the development of farmland transfer market and the allocation of farmland resources. The lack of contract binding force have the following effects on farmers' behavior in the farmland transfer market. First, farmer will change their contract choices. When the contract binding is insufficient, farmers will choose to enter into oral contracts with specific objects, or choose shorter contracts to reduce the risk of default. Second, farmer will adjust agricultural production behavior under existing contract arrangement. The insufficient of contract binding will lead to the lack of effective protection of the management right defined by contract, and farmers will reduce the investment in agricultural production due to the risk of investment "blackmail". Accordingly, the following suggestions are put forward. Firstly, the government would strengthen the supervision and management of farmland transfer market, consolidate the service and mediation ability of transfer disputes. Secondly, pay attention to the legal construction and publicity in rural revitalization, strengthen the property rights and legal consciousness of farmers. Thirdly, improve the ability and level of rural governance, establish and improve the supervision and reward/punishment mechanism of village regulations, cultivate and improve the rural social trust. Fourthly, innovation of incentive mechanism of agricultural production investment, or increasing policy subsidies to improve the level of investment in agricultural production.

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