十八大以来，混合所有制经济的重要性日益提高，作为发展混合所有制经济的核心途径，国有企业的混合所有制改革是我国经济体制改革要完成的重点任务之一。为加快国企混改进程，使国企混合所有制改革有章可循，中央陆续出台了多项文件与政策，完成了国企混改工作的顶层设计工作，2018年8月“双百行动”正式开展，筛选了百家国企作为混合所有制改革先行者，标志着国企混改工作从政策设计迈入了实践落地的新阶段。随着国企混改工作逐渐推进，已经出现多批混改成功的企业值得深入研究，其中老凤祥股份有限公司十分典型。

2009年整体上市时，老凤祥股份因子公司老凤祥有限职工持股会的问题，就存在着股权固化的隐患，问题一直悬而未解，直到2018年混改前，彼时的老凤祥股份受制于股权固化问题，难以健全自身的管理制度，业绩增长陷入瓶颈。入选“双百行动”名单后，老凤祥开展混合所有制改革，引入战略投资者国新张创，解决了子公司老凤祥有限内部的股权固化问题，实现了股权结构、董事会结构的明显优化，产生了良好的经济效果，案例较为典型，具有示范作用。

因此本文选取老凤祥混改案例作为研究对象，研究老凤祥混改动因和混改路径，探究混改对老凤祥财务绩效影响的作用机制，分析老凤祥混改后的短期市场反应和财务绩效变化，在财务绩效中引入经济增加值与托宾Q值，以求多角度反映出老凤祥的财务绩效变化趋势，从而系统全面地体现混合所有制改革的经济效果，得出了以下结论：

第一，老凤祥股份在混改前正处于一个市场竞争激烈的行业环境，但因为子公司老凤祥有限内部长达数十年的股权结构固化问题一直未得到妥善解决，导致企业活力不足，业绩持续低迷，解决上述难题进而提高自身在业内的竞争力是老凤祥股份开展混合所有制改革的主要动因。

第二，老凤祥股份根据自身混改动因以及长远的战略目标，把解决子公司老凤祥有限的职工持股会带来的股权固化问题作为混改要达成的首要目标，并选择了“引入战略投资者+引入国改基金+员工持股”的混改路径，最终解决了老凤祥有限股权固化的难题。

第三，混改解决了公司内部长期存在的治理问题，引入战略投资者使公司打破了股权结构固化的僵局，实现了治理结构的调整与优化，提高了董事会、监事会的决策能力，管理层聘用开始了市场化管理，同时公司建立了有效的员工激励机制，激发了企业活力，管理效率有了很大的提升。

第四，老凤祥混合所有制改革得到了市场和投资者的肯定，混改事件产生了积极的短期市场反应。在财务绩效方面，通过财务指标、EVA值以及托宾Q值多个角度进行纵向和横向对比分析发现，混改提升了企业的财务绩效水平，产生了良好的经济效果。

基于以上结论，本文提出，国企混改应选择合适的路径，坚定目标持续推进混改进程，并在混改过程中不断优化股权结构和治理机制，希望能为后续开展混合所有制改革的企业给予启示。

Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the importance of mixed ownership economy has been increasing. As a core way to develop mixed ownership economy, the reform of mixed ownership in state-owned enterprises is one of the key tasks to be completed in China's economic system reform. In order to accelerate the process of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises and ensure that the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises has rules to follow, the central government has successively issued multiple documents and policies, completing the top-level design work of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises. In August 2018, the "Double Hundred Action" was officially launched, selecting 100 state-owned enterprises as pioneers of mixed ownership reform, marking a new stage of policy design and practical implementation of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises. With the gradual advancement of mixed reform work in state-owned enterprises, there have been multiple batches of successful mixed reform enterprises worth in-depth research, among which Lao Feng Xiang Co., Ltd. is a very typical one.

When the company went public as a whole in 2009, there was a hidden danger of equity solidification in the Lao Feng Xiang Limited Employee Stock Ownership Association, which was a factor company of Lao Feng Xiang. The problem remained unresolved until the 2018 mixed reform, when Lao Feng Xiang was constrained by the issue of equity solidification and it was difficult to improve its own management system, resulting in a bottleneck in performance growth. After being selected for the "Double Hundred Action" list, Lao Feng Xiang carried out mixed ownership reform and introduced strategic investor Guo Xin Zhang Chuang, solving the problem of equity solidification within its subsidiary Lao Feng Xiang Co., Ltd., achieving significant optimization of equity structure and board structure, and producing good economic results. The case is relatively typical and has a demonstrative role.

Therefore, this article selects the case of Lao Feng Xiang's mixed reform as the research object, studies the reasons and paths of Lao Feng Xiang's mixed reform, explores the mechanism of the impact of mixed reform on Lao Feng Xiang's financial performance, analyzes the short-term market response and financial performance changes after Lao Feng Xiang's mixed reform, and introduces economic value added and Tobin Q value into financial performance, in order to reflect the trend of Lao Feng Xiang's financial performance changes from multiple perspectives, Thus, the economic effects of the mixed ownership reform were comprehensively reflected, and the following conclusions were drawn:

Firstly, before the mixed ownership reform, Lao Feng Xiang Co., Ltd. was in a fiercely competitive industry environment. However, due to the decades long problem of solidified equity structure within its subsidiary, Lao Feng Xiang Co., Ltd., which had not been properly resolved, the company's vitality was insufficient, and its performance continued to be sluggish. Solving the aforementioned problems and improving its competitiveness in the industry was the main motivation for Lao Feng Xiang Co., Ltd. to carry out the mixed ownership reform.

Secondly, based on its own mixed ownership reform motives and long-term strategic goals, Lao Feng Xiang Co., Ltd. regards solving the problem of equity solidification caused by the employee shareholding of its subsidiary Lao Feng Xiang Co., Ltd. as the primary goal to be achieved in the mixed ownership reform, and chooses the mixed ownership path of "introducing strategic investors, introducing national reform funds, and employee shareholding", ultimately solving the problem of equity solidification of Lao Feng Xiang Co., Ltd.

Thirdly, the mixed reform has solved the long-standing governance problems within the company, introduced strategic investors to break the deadlock of fixed equity structure, achieved adjustment and optimization of governance structure, improved the decision-making ability of the board of directors and supervisory board, and started market-oriented management for management recruitment. At the same time, the company has established an effective employee incentive mechanism, stimulated enterprise vitality, and greatly improved management efficiency.

Fourthly, the mixed ownership reform of Lao Feng Xiang has received recognition from the market and investors, and the mixed ownership reform event has generated positive short-term market reactions. In terms of financial performance, through vertical and horizontal comparative analysis from multiple perspectives such as financial indicators, EVA values, and Tobin Q values, it was found that mixed reform has improved the financial performance level of enterprises and produced good economic effects.

Based on the above conclusions, this article proposes that the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises should choose a suitable path, firmly adhere to the goal of continuously promoting the mixed ownership reform process, and continuously optimize the equity structure and governance mechanism during the mixed ownership reform process. It is hoped that this can provide inspiration for enterprises carrying out mixed ownership reform in the future.

[1] 董梅生，黄功翔.中国混合所有制企业股权结构选择与绩效研究[J].上海经济研究， 2017(03):71-77.

[2] 高炜，黄东娅.关于中国国有企业“政治关联”的研究评述[J].上海行政学院学报， 2018,19(03):103-111.

[3] 郭东阳.行业市场化程度、员工持股计划与国有企业混改绩效[J].财会通讯， 2020(22):87-89.

[4] 郭于玮，马弘.混合所有制中的股权结构与企业全要素生产率[J].经济学报， 2016,3(02):90-109.

[5] 郝阳，龚六堂.国有、民营混合参股与公司绩效改进[J].经济研究， 2017(3):122-133.

[6] 郝颖.董事会治理如何影响混改国企的绩效[J].财会月刊， 2021(14):31-40.

[7] 胡莹莹.新时代国企混改面临的主要问题及对策研究[J].商讯， 2021(03):101-102.

[8] 黄群慧.国有企业改革新进展与趋势观察[J].改革， 2017(04):5-14.

[9] 霍晓萍，李华伟，邱赛.股权结构、高管薪酬差距与企业绩效[J].会计之友， 2019(18):25-31.

[10] 蒋长流，江成涛，郑德昌.新型政商关系能打破企业创新的政治资源诅咒吗？[J].软科学， 2021,35(06):52-57.

[11] 柯少葭.基于ESOP的国企混改中长期激励机制研究[J].广东经济， 2017(07):80-84.

[12] 李建标，王高阳，李帅琦等.混合所有制改革中国有和非国有资本的行为博弈—实验室实验的证据[J].中国工业经济， 2016(6):109-124.

[13] 李健.国企混改推行员工持股计划的动因及建议[J].财经界， 2020(31):29-30.

[14] 李锦.当前国企混合所有制改革势态与模式（上）[J].现代国企研究， 2017(13):14-19.

[15] 李利刚.冀中能源集团混合所有制改革实践探索[J].财务与会计， 2020(21):46-48.

[16] 李维安.深化国企改革与发展混合所有制[J].南开管理评论， 2014,17(03):1.

[17] 李向荣.混合所有制国企企业国有股比例、制衡股东特征与公司绩效[J].经济问题， 2018(10):101-104.

[18] 刘芳.国有企业混合所有制改革借鉴——以绿地借壳金丰投资重组为例[J].财务与会计， 2014(7):31-33.

[19] 牛彪，王建新.超额雇员与实质性创新——基于国企混改的分析[J].经济体制改革， 2022(05):121-128.

[20] 潘细香.政府补贴对企业绩效的影响分析及政策完善[J].商业会计， 2019(11):54-56.

[21] 祁怀锦，刘艳霞，王文涛.国有企业混合所有制改革效应评估及其实现路径[J].改革， 2018(09):66-80.

[22] 綦好东，郭骏超，朱炜.国有企业混合所有制改革：动力、阻力与现实路径[J].管理世界， 2017(10):8-18.

[23] 钱晓红.简述国有企业混合所有制的融资创新[J].现代工业经济和信息化， 2014(10):9-10.

[24] 任振宇.整体上市对公司绩效的影响研究[J].时代金融， 2019(24):63-65.

[25] 桑凌，李飞.混合所有制改革能提升企业的市场绩效吗？——以云南白药集团股份有限公司为例[J].财经问题研究， 2019(09):111-119.

[26] 盛宇华，祖君.不同类型战略投资者对上市公司绩效影响的实证研究[J].投资研究， 2014,33(02):120-129.

[27] 汪茜，郝云宏.第二大股东对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响——基于国有企业的动态面板数据[J].财会月刊， 2017(21):9-13.

[28] 王高阳，李建标.混合所有制改革的政策实践与理论演进[J].中国特色社会主义研究， 2019(03):35-41.

[29] 王曙光，王琼慧.产权—市场结构、技术进步与国企改革——基于企业和行业视角[J].中国特色社会主义研究， 2019(02):32-39.

[30] 王欣，韩宝山.混合所有制企业股权结构治理效应分析[J].经济体制改革， 2018(06):125-131.

[31] 王新红，白倩.控股股东股权质押对民营企业高管薪酬的影响检验[J].财会月刊， 2020(20):139-145.

[32] 王艺明，赵焱.混合所有制改革对国有企业劳动生产率的影响研究[J].财政研究， 2021(10):27-43.

[33] 杨红丽，郭舒.混合所有制改革对国有企业绩效的影响及作用机制[J].现代经济探讨， 2021(01):31-38.

[34] 张辉，黄昊，闫强明.混合所有制改革、政策性负担与国有企业绩效——基于1999—2007年工业企业数据库的实证研究[J].经济学家， 2016(09):32-41.

[35] 张继德，刘素含.从中国联通混合所有制改革看战略投资者的选择[J].会计研究， 2018(07):28-34.

[36] 张伟，于良春.创新驱动发展战略下的国有企业改革路径选择研究[J].经济研究， 2019,54(10):74-88.

[37] 张伟华，高冰莹，刘金钊.混合所有制改革对国有企业冗余雇员的影响[J].中国软科学， 2021(02):98-110.

[38] 张孝梅.混合所有制改革背景的员工持股境况[J].改革， 2016(01):121-129.

[39] 张永冀，吕彤彤，苏治.员工持股计划与薪酬粘性差距[J].会计研究， 2019(08):55-63.

[40] 甄伟丽.混合所有制改革与国有企业创新升级[J].人民论坛学术前沿， 2019(20):116-119.

[41] 周观平，周皓，王浩.混合所有制改革与国有企业绩效提升——基于定义矫正和PSM、DID、IV法的再透视[J].经济学家， 2021(04):80-90.

[42] 朱和平，吴梦雪.混合所有制、薪酬业绩敏感性与资产保值增值——基于沪深A股国有上市公司2010—2019年面板数据实证分析[J].会计之友， 2021(22):143-149.

[43] Boateng A, Bi X G, Brahma S. The impact of firm ownership, board monitoring on operating performance of Chinese mergers and acquisitions[J]. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2017, 49(4): 925-948.

[44] Ducassy I, Guyot A. Complex ownership structures, corporate governance and firm performance: The French context[J]. Research in International Business and Finance, 2017, 39: 291-306.

[45] Goldeng E, Grünfeld L A, Gabriel R G B. The Performance Differential between Private and State owned Enterprises: The Roles of Ownership, Management and Market Structure[J]. Journal of Management Studies, 2008, 45(7): 1244-1273.

[46] Holz C A. China's State-Owned Enterprises: Nature, Performance and Reform[J]. The Journal of Asian Studies, 2015, 74(2): 482-483.

[47] Johnstone K, Li C, Rupley K H. Changes in Corporate Governance Associated with the Revelation of Internal Control Material Weaknesses and Their Subsequent Remediation*[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2011, 28(1): 331-383.

[48] Kang Y S, Kim B Y. Ownership structure and firm performance: Evidence from the Chinese corporate reform[J]. China Economic Review, 2012, 23(2): 471-481.

[49] Kratz A, Brown P. Reforming China's State-owned Enterprises[J]. China Perspectives, 2013,93(1): 94-96.

[50] Liu G S, Beirne J, Sun P. The performance impact of firm ownership transformation in China: mixed ownership vs. fully privatized ownership[J]. Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 2015, 13(3): 197-216.

[51] McNulty T, Florackis C, Ormrod P. Boards of Directors and Financial Risk during the Credit Crisis[J]. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2013, 21(1): 58-78.

[52] Phung D N, Mishra A V. Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Vietnamese Listed Firms[J]. Australian Economic Papers, 2016, 55(1): 63-98.

[53] Rakhman F. Can partially privatized SOEs outperform fully private firms? Evidence from Indonesia[J]. Research in International Business and Finance, 2018, 45: 285-292.

[54] Wei S J, Xie Z, Zhang X B. From "Made in China" to "Innovated in China": Necessity, Prospect, and Challenges[J]. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2017, 31(1): 49-70.

[55] Xia Q G, Cheng Y. Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance from the Perspective of Ultimate Ownership: Evidence from Chinese State-owned Listed Enterprises[J]. International Business Research, 2016, 10(1): 34-34.