2018年底，随着新版《中华人民共和国农村土地承包法》的颁布实施，农地“三权分置”制度正式由政策上升为法律，实现了对传统“两权分离”的农地产权结构的重塑。在构建国内大循环和国内国际双循环新发展格局背景下，农地“三权分置”制度能否有效落实并取得预期的实施效果，直接影响着农业现代化的实现和农业生产国际竞争力的提升。但与通过明晰产权、赋予农民更多的土地权利便能实现资源有效配置的理论认识不同，实践中，单纯通过产权强化难以直接取得预期的政策效果。

具体来看，农地“三权分置”的重点内容——放活土地经营权——的实践在部分地区不仅未能达成制度目标，也表现出一定的实施困境。一方面，与土地流转规模持续扩大不同的是，虽然土地流转正式契约的签订情况在农地产权制度改革的推动下有所改善；但现实中受农村特定的人地关系影响，正式契约的签订率并不高，即使签订了正式契约也并不能完全规避和有效处置土地流转过程中可能发生的流转纠纷；另一方面，经过试点、推广的农地经营权抵押贷款业务近年来发展迅速，贷款余额显著增加，但通过调研访谈可知，目前大多地区金融机构开展此项业务，多受行政激励所致，具有“政策性贷款”性质。随着时间的推移，部分地区已出现贷款余额下降、抵押违约难处置的现象，个别地区甚至面临政策难以持续的现实困境，以致暂停该项业务。

值得注意的是，与此同时也有地方在农地“三权分置”制度产权实施实践中表现出有效化解困境、取得良好实施效果的特征，在权益保护、农地流转及农地经营权抵押贷款等方面获得显著的制度绩效。如何理解中央制度设计与地方实践之间的差异？又该如何将成功经验在理论层面一般化？成为进一步落实和完善农地“三权分置”制度必须要回答的现实问题。而为了充分解释这些问题并为解释的视角提供历史依据，在关注当前农地“三权分置”制度的实践现状的同时，还需要从历史的维度探究农地“三权分置”的制度由来。

基于此，本文借鉴了新制度经济学理论洞见，构建了包含中央政府、地方政府和村集体、普通农户等在内的多层次多主体治理结构分析框架，对农地“三权分置”制度的制度由来、产权配置及实践路径进行深入剖析。具体而言：首先，从农地产权制度出发，引入制度演化思想，以建国后农地产权制度变迁的历史资料为依托，总结并提炼出中国特色场域下农地产权制度的演变逻辑，厘清多层次多主体治理结构下农地“三权分置”制度的制度由来，并识别多层次多主体间的相互作用机制，为后续针对农地“三权分置”制度下的产权配置以及实践路径分析奠定基础；其次，在把握中央政府、地方政府、村集体及普通农户在内的多层次多主体相互作用机制的前提条件下，基于产权配置和产权公共域的视角，结合理论分析与已有的实践经验，探究在多层次多主体相互作用背景下农地“三权分置”的产权配置结构以及可能存在的实施困境；继而通过对农地“三权分置”的主要实践内容，即农地经营权流转和农地经营权抵押贷款典型案例的比较和分析，识别差别化农地“三权分置”实现形式的运行机制及绩效差异，并进行总结和提炼。最后，在此基础上，借助前述已探究的农地“三权分置”的制度由来，回答在当前区域间社会经济发展水平存在显著差异背景下，未来如何完善和推进农地“三权分置”有效落实的现实问题，并对进一步深化农村土地产权制度改革提供相应政策建议，由此作为全文的改革启示。

    主要研究发现如下：

（1）农地“三权分置”制度是“设计-演化”共同作用的结果。有别于传统社会主义国家单方面的中央宏观制度设计，建国后的中国社会制度变迁受中央政府、地方政府、村集体等多层次多主体的共同影响，其中既存在中央政府“自上而下”的制度设计，也伴随着地方基层“自下而上”的自发演化，具有典型的中国特色。受二者在“创新-选择-扩散”环节相互作用强度不同的影响，不同阶段的制度变迁绩效表现存在显著差异。总而言之，建国后中国农地产权制度变迁是沿着多层级多主体间“设计-演化”的统一逻辑循序展开。而“三权分置”制度的形成便是在这一逻辑主导下、多层次多主体相互作用的产物。

（2）受产权公共域的影响，农地“三权分置”制度实施面临着现实困境，阻碍“三权分置”制度的有效落实。在多层次多主体治理结构框架下，受中央层面法律法规模糊表达、地方政府层面产权再配置及权利主体层面契约规则的影响，实践中农地“三权分置”的产权配置结构存在着不同层次的产权公共域，这阻碍了“三权分置”制度的有效落实，致使其在实践中不仅可能难以兼顾包括所有权、承包权及经营权在内的各产权主体权益，也有可能制约农地流转。除此之外，在农地经营权抵押贷款中，不仅普通农户与新型经营主体围绕农地经营权抵押的经济价值争夺会增加实现抵押权能的交易费用。在抵押违约时，多个权利主体的争夺，也会影响农地经营权的再流转，使得农地经营权难以得到有效处置，限制农村金融市场的发育，最终阻碍“三权分置”制度的有效落实。

（3）外部治理环境优化能够促进农地“三权分置”的落实，但制度实施效果有限。理论分析及实证检验均表明，以中央层面的农地产权制度改革和地方政府的行政干预措施为主的外部治理环境优化，通过产权安全性和完整性的提升，能够有效促进农地“三权分置”的实施。这在农地流转市场发育中表现为流转数量的增加；而在农地经营权抵押贷款中则体现为抵押品交易价值、可保值性和排他性的提升。实践经验也表明，虽然农地流转数量显著增加，但在农地流转契约签订、执行以及监督与管理环节的交易费用仍较高；而由于抵押品易处置性并未得到显著改善，违约抵押品难以得到处置，农地经营权抵押权能仍存在难以实现的困境。概言之，农地“三权分置”的制度实施效果有限。

（4）内部治理结构设置中适度的公共干预行为能够降低农地“三权分置”实践的交易费用，提升制度实施效果。与仅依靠中央层面农地产权制度改革和地方政府层面行政干预不同的是，在有效开展农地“三权分置”实践的地区，内部治理结构设置中多引入了包括村集体和第三方平台的共同治理。其中，在农地流转市场领域，通过差别化的主体关系制度安排实现流转交易费用的降低和农地流转质量的提升；在农地经营权抵押贷款中，则通过多种形式的担保与反担保设置，实现对新型经营主体的机会主义行为的约束，并促进农地经营权抵押权能的有效实现。不仅提高了普通农户的信贷可得性，也同时解决了违约后的抵押物处置难题，使得在政府财力较弱、农地流转市场发育水平较低的地区，也存在实现农地权利资本化的可能。

    鉴于此，在构建治理体系现代化背景下，为了完善和促进农地“三权分置”制度的落实，推动农村土地产权制度深化改革，本文提出政策建议如下：

    （1）协同外部治理环境与内部治理结构，促进“三权分置”有效落实。首先地方政府应构建公平交易的环境，以实现交易主体的公平竞争，减少因争夺产权公共域而造成的权益损耗；其次，各地应结合地方政府财力和治理水平，循着减少交易费用的路径，选择差别化的农地流转和农地经营权抵押贷款内部治理结构；并随着外部治理环境的变化灵活调整内部治理结构，以促进农地“三权分置”制度的有效落实。

（2）依托多层次多主体治理结构，丰富“三权分置”实现形式。随着中央层面农地“三权分置”法律体系的建立，地方政府及村集体应发挥更大作用。其中，地方政府在构建和完善交易平台的基础上，也可采取适当措施进行行政干预，例如建立流转风险和抵押贷款风险规避机制、新型经营主体的考核机制以及第三方的服务机制等。而村集体可以弥补以往“缺位”的不足，在内部治理结构当中充分发挥管理和服务权能，以差别化形式积极介入农地流转或农地经营权抵押贷款当中，由此丰富农地“三权分置”的实现形式。

（3）引导鼓励村集体层面制度创新，审慎推广地区经验。在对“三权分置”的制度由来和实践路径分析中可以发现，无论是历史证据还是现实经验均表明，在我国农村，村集体不仅是最小的行政组织，也是有效的演化单元。村集体自身的制度创新特性为中央和地方的制度设计创造了丰富的可选集。由此，现阶段应坚持农村土地集体所有制，并积极引导村集体创新；但同时，在制度创新和推广地区经验时也应保持审慎的态度，以自发创新和自主模仿为主，不宜采用强制推广的措施。

（4）借鉴农地产权制度实施经验，推动农村土地产权制度深化改革。随着农村土地产权制度改革的深入，除农地外的宅基地、林地等集体所有土地都面临着深化改革的需求。在这一过程中，除鼓励引导村集体层面积极开展制度创新外，也应强调完善多层次多主体治理结构的上下互动机制，制度设计与制度演化相结合，在发现问题时能够得到及时纠正，以有效推动农村土地产权制度深化改革。

At the end of 2018, with the promulgation and implementation of the new "Rural Land Contracting Law of the People’s Republic of China", the "three rights separation" of farmland was officially upgraded from policy to law, realizing the reshaping of the traditional "separation of two rights" farmland property rights structure. Under the background of building a new domestic and international dual-cycle development pattern, whether the "three rights separation" system of farmland can be effectively implemented and achieve the expected implementation effects directly affects the realization of agricultural modernization and the promotion of international competitiveness of agricultural production. However, unlike the theoretical understanding that effective allocation of resources can be achieved by clarifying property rights and granting farmers more land rights, in practice, it is difficult to directly achieve the expected policy effects simply by strengthening property rights.

Specifically, in some areas, the practice of the key content of the "three rights separation" of farmland—releasing land management rights—has not only failed to achieve the system goals, but also showed certain implementation difficulties. On the one hand, unlike the continuous expansion of the scale of land transfer, although the signing of formal land transfer contracts has improved due to the reform of the farmland property rights system; in reality, the signing of formal contracts is affected by the specific human-land relationship in rural areas, the rate is not high. Even if a formal contract is signed, it cannot completely circumvent and effectively deal with the transfer disputes that may occur in the process of land transfer; The loan balance has increased significantly, but through surveys and interviews, it can be seen that financial institutions in most regions currently carry out this business, which is mostly caused by administrative incentives and has a "policy loan" nature. Over time, some areas have seen a decline in loan balances and difficulties in dealing with mortgage defaults. Some areas have even faced practical difficulties that the policy is difficult to sustain, and the business has been suspended.

It is worth noting that at the same time, there are also some places that have effectively resolved the difficulties and achieved good implementation results in the implementation of the property rights of the "three rights separation" system of farmland. They are in the protection of rights and interests, the transfer of farmland, and the mortgage of farmland management rights. Obtained significant system performance in terms of loans. How to understand the differences between central system design and local practice? How to generalize successful experience at the theoretical level? It has become a realistic question that must be answered in the further implementation and improvement of the "three-rights separation" system for farmland. In order to fully explain these issues and provide a historical basis for the perspective of interpretation, while paying attention to the current status of the practice of the "three rights separation" system of farmland, it is also necessary to explore the origin of the "three rights separation" system from a historical perspective.

Based on this, this article draws on the theoretical insights of the new institutional economics, constructs a multi-level and multi-agent governance structure analysis framework including the central government, local governments, village collectives, ordinary farmers, etc. To in-depth analysis of the origin of the system, the allocation of property rights and the path of practice. Specifically: First of all, starting from the farmland property rights system, introducing the thought of system evolution, relying on the historical data of the changes in the farmland property rights system after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, summarizing and extracting the evolution logic of the farmland property rights system in the field of Chinese characteristics, and clarifying the origin of the farmland "three-rights separation" system under the multi-level and multi-subject governance structure, and the identification of the interaction mechanism between multi-level and multi-subjects, for the subsequent allocation and practice of property rights under the "three rights separation" system path analysis lays the foundation; secondly, under the premise of grasping the multi-level and multi-subject interaction mechanism of the central government, local governments, village collectives and ordinary farmers, based on the perspective of property rights allocation and the public domain of property rights, combining theoretical analysis and existing some practical experience explores the property rights allocation structure and possible implementation dilemmas of the "three rights separation" of farmland in the context of multi-level and multi-subject interaction; then through the main practical content of the "three rights separation" of farmland, that is, the comparison and analysis of typical cases of farmland management rights transfer and farmland management rights mortgage loans, to identify the operating mechanism and performance differences of the realization form of differentiated farmland "three rights separation", and to summarize and refine. Finally, on this basis, with the help of the origin of the “three rights separation” of farmland has been explored, we will answer how to improve and promote the “three-rights separation” of farmland under the background of significant differences in the current level of social and economic development among regions. It is a practical issue for the effective implementation of “home” and provides corresponding policy suggestions for further deepening the reform of rural land property rights system, which serves as the reform inspiration of the full text.

The main findings are as follows:(1) The "three rights separation" system of farmland is the result of the combined effect of "design-evolution". Different from the unilateral central macro-system design of traditional socialist countries, the changes in China’s social system after the founding of the People’s Republic of China were affected by the central government, local governments, village collectives and other multi-level and multi-subjects. Among them, the central government "top-down" design of the system is also accompanied by the spontaneous evolution of the local grassroots "bottom-up", with typical Chinese characteristics. Affected by the different intensity of the interaction between the two in the "innovation-choice-diffusion" link, there are significant differences in the performance of institutional changes at different stages. In a word, after the founding of the People's Republic of China, the changes of the Chinese farmland property rights system followed the unified logic of "design-evolution" among multiple levels and multiple subjects. The formation of the "three rights separation" system is the product of multi-level and multi-subject interaction under this logic.

(2) Affected by the public domain of property rights, the implementation of the "three rights separation" system of farmland is facing a real dilemma, which hinders the effective implementation of the "three rights separation" system. Under the framework of a multi-level and multi-subject governance structure, affected by the vague expression of laws and regulations at the central level, the reallocation of property rights at the local government level, and contract rules at the level of the rights subject, in practice, the property rights allocation structure of the "three rights separation" of farmland has different levels. The public domain of property rights, which hinders the effective implementation of the "three-rights separation" system, makes it not only difficult to balance the rights and interests of various property rights including ownership, contracting and management rights, but also may restrict the circulation of farmland. In addition, in farmland management rights mortgage loans, not only ordinary farmers and new business entities competing for the economic value of farmland management rights mortgages will increase the transaction costs for realizing mortgage rights, the contention of multiple rights subjects will also affect the re-circulation of farmland management rights, making it difficult to effectively dispose of farmland management rights, restricting the development of rural financial markets, and ultimately hindering the effective implementation of the "three rights separation" system.

(3) The optimization of the external governance environment can promote the implementation of the "three rights separation" of farmland, but the implementation effect of the system is limited.Theoretical analysis and empirical tests have shown that the optimization of the external governance environment based on the reform of the farmland property rights system at the central level and the administrative intervention measures of the local government can effectively promote the three rights of farmland through the improvement of the security and integrity of property rights.This is manifested in the development of the farmland transfer market as an increase in the number of transfers; while in the farmland management rights mortgage loan, it is reflected in the increase in the value of the collateral transaction, value preservation, and exclusivity. Practical experience has also shown that although the number of farmland transfers has increased significantly, the transaction costs in the signing, implementation, supervision and management of farmland transfer contracts are still relatively high; and because the disposition of collateral has not been significantly improved, the default collateral is difficult to be disposed, and the mortgage power of farmland management rights is still difficult to realize. In a nutshell, the implementation effect of the "three rights separation" system for farmland is limited.

(4) Appropriate public intervention in the establishment of the internal governance structure can reduce the transaction costs of the practice of "three rights separation" in farmland and improve the effect of system implementation. Different from only relying on the reform of the farmland property rights system at the central level and administrative intervention at the local government level, in areas where the practice of " three rights separation" of farmland is effectively carried out, the internal governance structure has mostly introduced village collectives and third-party platforms.Among them, in the field of farmland transfer market, through differentiated subject relationship institutional arrangements, the transfer transaction cost is reduced and the quality of farmland transfer is improved; in the farmland management right mortgage loan, various forms of guarantees and counter-guarantees are used to set up to realize the constraints on the opportunistic behavior of new business entities and promote the effective realization of the mortgage power of farmland management rights. This not only improves the credit availability of ordinary farmers, but also solves the problem of collateral disposal after default. This makes it possible to realize the capitalization of farmland rights in areas with weak government financial resources and low development of farmland transfer markets.

In summary, in the context of building a modern governance system, in order to improve the implementation of the "three-rights separation" system of farmland and promote the deepening reform of the rural land system, this article proposes policy recommendations as follows:(1) Collaborate with the external governance environment and internal governance structure to promote the effective implementation of the "three rights separation". First, local governments should build a fair trading environment to achieve fair competition among transaction subjects and reduce the loss of rights and interests caused by competing for the public domain of property rights; second, local governments should combine local government financial resources and governance levels to follow the path of reducing transaction costs. Choose a differentiated internal governance structure for farmland transfer and farmland management rights mortgage loans; and flexibly adjust the internal governance structure with changes in the external governance environment to promote the effective implementation of the "three rights separation" system of farmland.

(2) Relying on a multi-level and multi-subject governance structure to enrich the realization of the "three rights separation". With the establishment of the legal system for the "three rights separation" of farmland at the central level, local governments and village collectives should play a greater role. Among them, on the basis of building and improving the trading platform, the local government can also take appropriate measures for administrative intervention, such as establishing a circulation risk and mortgage risk avoidance mechanism, an assessment mechanism for new business entities, and a third-party service mechanism. The village collective can make up for the “absence” in the past, give full play to management and service powers in the internal governance structure, and actively intervene in the transfer of farmland or mortgage loans for farmland management rights in a differentiated form, thereby enriching the the realization form of the "three rights separation" of farmland.

(3) Guide and encourage system innovation at the village collective level, and prudently promote regional experience. In the analysis of the origin and practice path of the "three rights separation" system, it can be found that both historical evidence and practical experience show that in rural my country, the village collective is not only the smallest administrative organization, but also an effective evolutionary unit. The institutional innovation characteristics of the village collectives have created a rich set of options for the central and local institutional design. Therefore, at this stage, we should adhere to the collective ownership of rural land and actively guide village collective innovation; but at the same time, we should maintain a cautious attitude when innovating systems and promoting regional experience, focusing on spontaneous innovation and independent imitation, and compulsory promotion should not be adopted.

(4) Drawing lessons from the implementation experience of the farmland property rights system, promote the deepening reform of the rural land property rights system. With the deepening of the reform of the rural land property rights system, collectively-owned land such as homesteads and forest land other than farmland are facing the need for deepening reforms. In this process, in addition to encouraging and guiding the village collective level to actively carry out system innovation, it should also emphasize the improvement of the interaction mechanism of the multi-level and multi-agent governance structure. The combination of system design and system evolution can be corrected in time when problems are discovered to effectively promote the deepening of the reform of the rural land property rights system.

[1] Acemoglu, D.,2006, “Lecture Notes for Plolitical Economy of Institutions and Development”, Harvard University, Chap 1.

[2] Alchian, A.,1965, “Some Economics of Property Rights”, Ⅱ Politico 30(4): 816–829.

[3] Alchian A., 2018, “Property Rights”, In: Macmillan Publishers Ltd (eds) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London.

[4] Arner, D.W.; Booth, C. D.; Lejot, P. and Hsu, B.F.C，2007, “Property Rights, Collateral, Creditor Rights and Insolvency in East Asia”, Texas International Law Journal, 42(3):515-559.

[5] Arrow K.J.,1969，“The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Non-market Allocation”, in Joint Economic Committee, The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditure: The PPB System, Washington: Government Printing Office,59-73.

[6] Aoki, M., 2001, “Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis”, MIT Press.

[7] Besley, T.J., Burchardi, K.B. and Ghatak, M., 2012, “Incentives and the de Soto Effect”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics,127(1):237-282.

[8] Bester, H., 1985, “Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Market with Imperfect Information”, American Economic Review, 75(4):850-855.

[9] Boucher, S., Barham, B.L. and Carter, M.R., 2005, “The Impact of ‘Market-Friendly’ Reforms on Credit and land market in Honduras and Nicaragua”, World Development,33(1):107-128.

[10] Briggs C., and Zuijderduijn J. ,2018, Land and Credit, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

[11] Cao Y, Bai Y, L Zhang., 2020, “The impact of farmland property rights security on the farmland investment in rural China”, Land Use Policy, 97(97).

[12] Cheung S.N.S., 2018, “Economic Organization and Transaction Costs”, In: Macmillan Publishers Ltd (eds) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London.

[13] Cheng W, Xu Y, Zhou N, et al., 2019, “How did land titling affect China's rural land rental market? Size, composition and efficiency”, Land Use Policy, 82(82): 609-619.

[14] Coase R.H., 1960，“The Problem of Social Cost”, Journal of Law and Economics,3(10):1-44.

[15] Conning, J., and Udry, C., 2007, “Chapter 56 Rural Financial Markets in Developing Countries”, Handbook of Agricultural Economics, 3:2857-2908.

[16] De Soto, H., 2000, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, New York： Basic Books, Bantam Press/Random House.

[17] Demsetz H., 1967, “Toward a Theory of property Rights”, The American Economic Review, 57(2):347-359.

[18] Domeher, D. and Abdulai, R., 2012, “Access to Credit in the Developing World: Does Land Registration Matter?”, Third World Quarterly,33(1):161-175.

[19] Erokhin V., Gao T., 2018, Competitive Advantages of China’s Agricultural Exports in the Outward-Looking Belt and Road Initiative. In: Zhang W., Alon I., Lattemann C. (eds) China's Belt and Road Initiative. Palgrave Studies of Internationalization in Emerging Markets. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

[20] FAO. Collateral in Rural Loans，Rome，1996

[21] Galiani, S. and Schargrodsky, E.,2010, “Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of Land Titling”, Journal of Public Economics,94(9):700-729.

[22] Greif, A, 1998, “Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis”, American Economic Review,88(5):80-84.

[23] Ho, P., and M. Spoor, 2006, “Whose Land? The Political Economy of Land Titling in Transitional Economies”, Land Use Policy, 23(4): 580-587.

[24] Hodgson, G.M., Knudsen, T., 2006, “Why we need a generalized Darwinism, and why generalized Darwinism is not enough”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 61(1):0~19.

[25] Hodgson, G.M., Knudsen, T., 2008, “In search of general evolutionary principles: Why Darwinism is too important to be left to the biologists”, Journal of Bioeconomics, 10(1):51~69.

[26] Hodgson, G.M., Knudsen, T., 2010, Darwin’s Conjecture: The search for general principles of social and economic evolution. The University of Chicago Press.

[27] Huy H T, Nguyen T T., 2019, “Cropland rental market and farm technical efficiency in rural Vietnam”, Land Use Policy, 81(81): 408-423.

[28] Kemper, N., Klump, R. and Schumacher, H., 2011, “Representation of Property Rights and Credit Market Outcomes: Evidence from a Land Reform in Vietnam”, Proceeding of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin, No.45.

[29] Kingston C, 2019, “Institutional Change”, In: Marciano A., Ramello G.B.(eds), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Springer, New York, NY.

[30] Lewis, O.A., Steinmo, S., 2012, “How Institutions Evolve: Evolutionary Theory and Institutional Change”, Policy, 44(3):314~339.

[31] Lin, J. Y., 1992, “Rural reform and Agricultural Growth in China”, America Economic Review, 82(1):34-51.

[32] Ma, X.，Heerink, N., Feng, S., and X. Shi，2015，“Farmland tenure in Chinas Comparing legal, actual and perceived security”, Land Use Policy，42:293-306.

[33] Menard C, Shirley M S., 2014, “The contribution of Douglass C. North to new institutional economics”, Access & Download Statistics, 10(3):613-622.

[34] Menkhoff, L., Neuberger, D., and Ornsiri R.,2012, “Collateral and its substitutes in emerging markets’ lending”, Journal of Banking & Finance,36(3):817-834.

[35] Nelson, R, Dosi, G, Helfat, C, Pyka, A, Saviotti, P., Lee, K, Dopfer, K, Malerba, F, Winter, S., 2018, “Modern Evolutionary Economics: An Overview”. 10.1017/9781108661928.

[36] Parisi F., 2018, “Coase Theorem”, In: Macmillan Publishers Ltd (eds) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London.

[37] Qiu T, Luo B, Boris S.T, et al., 2020, “Do land renting-in and its marketization increase labor input in agriculture? Evidence from rural China”, Land Use Policy, 99(99).

[38] Roland G, 2004, “Understanding institutional change: fast-moving and slow moving institutions”, Stud Comp Int Dev, 38(4):109-131.

[39] Ruttan, V.M., 2006, “Social Science Knowledge and Induced Institutional Innovation: An Institutional Design Perspective”, Journal of Institutional Economics, 2(3):249~272.

[40] Stiglitz, J. E., and A. Weiss, 1981, “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information”, American Economic Review, 71(3): 393-410.

[41] Tang, L., Ma, X., Zhou Y., Shi, X., and J. Ma, 2019,“Social relations, public interventions and land rent deviation: Evidence from Jiangsu Province in China”，Land Use Policy, 86:406-420.

[42] Wang H, Riedinger J, Jin S, et al.,2015, “Land documents, tenure security and land rental development: Panel evidence from China”, China Economic Review, 220-235.

[43] Wang Y, Li X, Li W, et al.,2018, “Land titling program and farmland rental market participation in China: Evidence from pilot provinces”, Land Use Policy, 74(74): 281-290.

[44] Wang, Q., and X. Zhang, 2017, “Three Rights Separation: China’s Proposed Rural Land Rights Reform and Four Types of Local Trials”, Land Use Policy, 63:111-121.

[45] Wang, Q., X. Zhang, Y. Wu, and M. Skitmore, 2015, “Collective Land System in China: Congenital Flaw or Acquired Irrational Weakness?”, Habitat International, 50: 226-233.

[46] Williamson O E., 2012, “Transaction Cost Economics”, Handbook of Industrial Organization, 1(1):41-65.

[47] Williamson O E.,1979, “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations”, Journal of Law & Economics.

[48] Winter, S.G., Nelson, R.R., 1982, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Social Science Electronic Publishing.

[49] Xu Y, Xu Y, Huang X, et al,2018, “Rural land rights reform and agro-environmental sustainability: Empirical evidence from China”, Land Use Policy, 74(74): 73-87.

[50] Zhang L, Cao Y, Bai Y, et al.,2019, “The impact of the land certificated program on the farmland rental market in rural China”, Journal of Rural Studies.

[51] Zhang L, Feng S, Heerink N, et al., 2018, “How do land rental markets affect household income? Evidence from rural Jiangsu, P.R. China”, Land Use Policy, 74(74): 151-165.

[52] Zhang, H., Luo, J.C., Cheng, M.W., and Pei, D., 2019, “How Does Rural Household Differentiation Affect the Availability of Farmland Management Right Mortgages in China?”, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 1-20. 10.1080/1540496X.2019.1658073.

[53] Zhao, L., and P. Develtere, 2010, “New Co-operatives in China: Why They Break away from Orthodox Co-operatives?”, Social Enterprise Journal, 6(1): 35-48.

[54] Zhou Y, Li X, Liu Y, et al., 2020, “Rural land system reforms in China: History, issues, measures and prospects”, Land Use Policy, 91(91).

[55] Loren Brandt,李果,黄季焜,Scott Rozelle.中国的土地使用权和转移权:现状评价[J].经济学(季刊),2004(03):951-982.

[56] Y·巴泽尔，1997：《产权的经济分析》，费方域、段毅才译，上海：上海人民出版社，1997.

[57] 爱德华·O·威尔逊.社会生物学[M].北京：北京理工大学出版社，2008.

[58] 安海燕,洪名勇,钱文荣.农地产权抵押贷款的三种典型模式及其自我履约研究[J].华中农业大学学报(社会科学版),2016(04):100-106+131.

[59] 奥利弗·威廉姆森、斯科特·马斯滕.交易成本经济学经典名篇选读（李自杰、蔡铭译）[M].北京：人民出版社，2008.

[60] 薄一波.若干重大决策与事件的回顾[M].北京：中共党史出版社，2008.

[61] 蔡立东,姜楠.承包权与经营权分置的法构造[J].法学研究,2015,37(03):31-46.

[62] 蔡立东,姜楠.农地三权分置的法实现[J].中国社会科学,2017(05):102-122+207.

[63] 曾大鹏.土地承包经营权抵押的法律困境与现实出路[J].中国农村观察,2017(02):15-26.

[64] 曾雅婷,吕亚荣,刘文勇.农地流转提升了粮食生产技术效率吗——来自农户的视角[J].农业技术经济,2018(03):41-55.

[65] 陈朝兵.农村土地“三权分置”:功能作用、权能划分与制度构建[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(04):135-141.

[66] 陈飞,翟伟娟.农户行为视角下农地流转诱因及其福利效应研究[J].经济研究,2015,50(10):163-177.

[67] 陈利根,李宁,龙开胜.产权不完全界定研究:一个公共域的分析框架[J].云南财经大学学报,2013,29(04):12-20.

[68] 陈小君.我国农村土地法律制度变革的思路与框架——十八届三中全会《决定》相关内容解读[J].法学研究,2014,36(04):4-25.

[69] 陈志刚,曲福田.农地产权制度变迁的绩效分析——对转型期中国农地产权制度多样化创新的解释[J].中国农村观察,2003(02):2-9+13-80.

[70] 程令国,张晔,刘志彪.农地确权促进了中国农村土地的流转吗?[J].管理世界,2016(01):88-98.

[71] 程郁,张云华,王宾.农村土地产权抵质押:理论争论、现实困境和改革路径[J].金融监管研究,2014(10):10-27.

[72] 程久苗.农地流转中村集体的角色定位与“三权”权能完善[J].农业经济问题,2020(04):58-65.

[73] 单平基.“三权分置”理论反思与土地承包经营权困境的解决路径[J].法学,2016(09):54-66.

[74] 道格拉斯·诺思.理解经济变迁过程（钟正生等译）[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社，2013.

[75] 道格拉斯·诺思.制度、制度变迁与经济绩效（杭行译）[M].上海：格致出版社，2008.

[76] 德隆·阿西莫格鲁,詹姆斯·罗宾逊.国家为什么会失败（李增刚译）[M].长沙：湖南科学技术出版社，2015.

[77] 丁文.论“三权分置”中的土地经营权[J].清华法学,2018,12(01):114-128.

[78] 董欢.中国农地产权制度:历史、现实与未来——“三权分置”政策背景下的新审视[J].四川大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2019(04):58-66.

[79] 董志强.制度及其演化的一般理论[J].管理世界,2008(05):151-165.

[80] 杜润生.杜润生自述：中国农村体制改革重大决策纪实[M].北京：人民出版社，2005.

[81] 丰雷,郑文博,张明辉.中国农地产权制度变迁70年：中央—地方—个体的互动与共演[J].管理世界,2019,35(09):30-48.

[82] 丰雷.新制度经济学视角下的中国农地产权制度变迁:回顾与展望[J].中国土地科学,2018,32(04):8-15.

[83] 付江涛,纪月清,胡浩.产权保护与农户土地流转合约选择——兼评新一轮承包地确权颁证对农地流转的影响[J].江海学刊,2016a,(03):74-80+238.

[84] 付江涛,纪月清,胡浩.新一轮承包地确权登记颁证是否促进了农户的土地流转——来自江苏省3县(市、区)的经验证据[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2016b,16(01):105-113+165.

[85] 高帆.中国农地“三权分置”的形成逻辑与实施政策[J].经济学家,2018(04):86-95.

[86] 高飞.农村土地“三权分置”的法理阐释与制度意蕴[J].法学研究,2016,38(03):3-19.

[87] 高海.论农用地“三权分置”中经营权的法律性质[J].法学家,2016(04):42-52+176-177.

[88] 高名姿. 农地经营权抵押贷款缔约条件与第三方组织的作用[D].南京农业大学,2016.

[89] 高圣平.承包土地的经营权抵押规则之构建——兼评重庆城乡统筹综合配套改革试点模式[J].法商研究,2016,33(01):3-12.

[90] 高王凌.人民公社时期中国农民“反行为”调查[M].北京：中共党史出版社，2006.

[91] 高欣,张安录.农地流转、农户兼业程度与生产效率的关系[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(05):121-128.

[92] 郜亮亮,黄季焜,Rozelle Scott,徐志刚.中国农地流转市场的发展及其对农户投资的影响[J].经济学(季刊),2011,10(04):1499-1514.

[93] 郜亮亮.中国农地流转发展及特点:1996～2008年[J].农村经济,2014(04):51-54.

[94] 顾庆康,林乐芬.农地经营权抵押贷款能缓解异质性农户信贷配给难题吗?[J].经济评论,2019(05):63-76.

[95] 顾建光.从公共服务到公共治理[J].上海交通大学学报（哲学社会科学版）,2007(03):50-55.

[96] 桂华.农村土地产权制度与村民自治的关联分析——兼论村级治理的经济基础[J].政治学研究,2017(01):99-110+128.

[97] 郭忠兴,罗志文.农地产权演进:完整化、完全化与个人化[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2012,22(10):123-130.

[98] 郭忠兴,汪险生,曲福田.产权管制下的农地抵押贷款机制设计研究——基于制度环境与治理结构的二层次分析[J].管理世界,2014(09):48-57+187.

[99] 哈耶克.自由秩序原理（邓正来译）[M]. 上海：生活.读书.新知三联书店，1997.

[100] 哈耶克.致命的自负（冯克利等译）[M]. 北京：中国社会科学出版社，2009.

[101] 韩长赋.土地“三权分置”是中国农村改革的又一次重大创新[J].中国合作经济,2016(10):6-10.

[102] 韩长赋.中国农村土地产权制度改革[J].农业经济问题,2019(01):4-16.

[103] 何·皮特.谁是中国土地的拥有者？——制度变迁、产权和社会冲突（林韵然译）[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社，2008.

[104] 何欣,蒋涛,郭良燕,甘犁.中国农地流转市场的发展与农户流转农地行为研究——基于2013～2015年29省的农户调查数据[J].管理世界,2016(06):79-89.

[105] 洪名勇,施国庆.农地产权制度与农业经济增长——基于1949～2004年贵州省的实证分析[J].制度经济学研究,2007(01):31-53.

[106] 洪名勇,杨单单,郑淋议.农地流转对农户收入的影响——基于PSM模型的计量分析[J].贵州大学学报(社会科学版),2019,37(05):32-41.

[107] 胡新艳,罗必良.新一轮农地确权与促进流转:粤赣证据[J].改革,2016(04):85-94.

[108] 胡新艳,杨晓莹,罗锦涛.确权与农地流转:理论分歧与研究启示[J].财贸研究,2016,27(02):67-74.

[109] 胡新艳,杨晓莹,王梦婷.农地流转中的禀赋效应及其影响因素:理论分析框架[J].华中农业大学学报(社会科学版),2017(01):105-112+144.

[110] 胡新艳,杨晓莹.农地流转中的禀赋效应及代际差异[J].华南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2017,16(01):12-23.

[111] 黄枫,孙世龙.让市场配置农地资源:劳动力转移与农地使用权市场发育[J].管理世界,2015(07):71-81.

[112] 黄惠春,曹青,曲福田.农村土地承包经营权可抵押性及其约束条件分析——以湖北与江苏的试点为例[J].中国土地科学,2014,28(06):44-50.

[113] 黄惠春,祁艳.农户农地抵押贷款需求研究——基于农村区域经济差异的视角[J].农业经济问题,2015,36(10):11-19+110.

[114] 黄惠春,徐霁月.中国农地经营权抵押贷款实践模式与发展路径——基于抵押品功能的视角[J].农业经济问题,2016,37(12):95-102+112.

[115] 黄惠春.农村土地承包经营权抵押贷款可得性分析——基于江苏试点地区的经验证据[J].中国农村经济,2014(03):48-57.

[116] 黄季焜,冀县卿.农地使用权确权与农户对农地的长期投资[J].管理世界,2012(09):76-81+99+187-188.

[117] 黄凯南.演化博弈与演化经济学[J].经济研究,2009,44(02):132-145.

[118] 惠献波.农户土地承包经营权抵押贷款潜在需求及其影响因素研究——基于河南省四个试点县的实证分析[J].农业经济问题,2013,34(02):9-15+110.

[119] 冀县卿,钱忠好.农地产权结构变迁与中国农业增长:一个经济解释[J].管理世界,2009(01):172-173.

[120] 冀县卿,钱忠好.如何有针对性地促进农地经营权流转?——基于苏、桂、鄂、黑四省(区)99村、896户农户调查数据的实证分析[J].管理世界,2018,34(03):87-97+183-184.

[121] 冀县卿,钱忠好.中国农地产权制度改革40年——变迁分析及其启示[J].农业技术经济,2019(01):17-24.

[122] 焦富民.“三权分置”视域下承包土地的经营权抵押制度之构建[J].政法论坛,2016,34(05):25-36.

[123] 焦长权,周飞舟.“资本下乡”与村庄的再造[J].中国社会科学,2016(01):100-116+205-206.

[124] 蒋晓妍,吴一恒.“三权分置”下农地经营权抵押贷款实践研究——以上海市A区为例[J].经济研究导刊,2019(27):73-75.

[125] 杰克·奈特.制度与社会冲突（周伟林译）[M].上海：上海人民出版社，2009.

[126] 卡尔·波兰尼.大转型：我们时代的政治与经济起源（冯钢、刘阳译）[M].杭州：浙江人民出版社，2007.

[127] 卡尔松.天涯成比邻——全球治理委员会的报告[M].北京：中国对外翻译出版公司，1995.

[128] 科斯、诺思、威廉姆森等.制度、契约与组织（刘刚、冯健、杨其静、胡琴等译）[M].北京：经济科学出版社，2003.

[129] 孔祥智,伍振军,张云华.我国土地承包经营权流转的特征、模式及经验——浙、皖、川三省调研报告[J].江海学刊,2010(02):87-92.

[130] 三年来新中国经济的成就[M].北京：人民出版社，1953.

[131] 兰庆高,惠献波,于丽红,王春平.农村土地经营权抵押贷款意愿及其影响因素研究——基于农村信贷员的调查分析[J].农业经济问题,2013,34(07):78-84+112.

[132] 李金宁,刘凤芹,杨婵.确权、确权方式和农地流转——基于浙江省522户农户调查数据的实证检验[J].农业技术经济,2017(12):14-22.

[133] 李宁.农地产权变迁中的结构细分特征研究[D].南京农业大学，2016.

[134] 李宁,蔡荣,李光勤.农户的非农就业区域选择如何影响农地流转决策?——基于成员性别与代际分工的分析视角[J].公共管理学报,2018,15(02):93-103+157-158.

[135] 李宁,陈利根,孙佑海.现代农业发展背景下如何使农地“三权分置”更有效——基于产权结构细分的约束及其组织治理的研究[J].农业经济问题,2016,37(07):11-26+110.

[136] 李宁,何兴邦,王舒娟.地权结构细分视角下中国农地产权制度变迁与改革:一个分析框架的构建[J].中国农村观察,2017(02):2-14.

[137] 李善波. 公共项目治理结构及治理机制研究[D].河海大学,2012.

[138] 李韬,罗剑朝.农户土地承包经营权抵押贷款的行为响应——基于Poisson Hurdle模型的微观经验考察[J].管理世界,2015(07):54-70.

[139] 李伟伟,张云华.土地承包经营权抵押标的及其贷款操作:11省(区、市)个案[J].改革,2011(12):76-84.

[140] 李长健,杨莲芳.三权分置、农地流转及其风险防范[J].西北农林科技大学学报(社会科学版),2016,16(04):49-55.

[141] 林乐芬,沈一妮.异质性农户对农地抵押贷款的响应意愿及影响因素——基于东海试验区2640户农户的调查[J].财经科学,2015(04):34-48.

[142] 林乐芬,赵倩.推进农村土地金融制度创新——基于农村土地承包经营权抵押贷款[J].学海,2009(05):68-72.

[143] 林文声,秦明,苏毅清,王志刚.新一轮农地确权何以影响农地流转?——来自中国健康与养老追踪调查的证据[J].中国农村经济,2017(07):29-43.

[144] 林一民,林巧文,关旭.我国农地经营权抵押的现实困境与制度创新[J].改革,2020(01):123-132.

[145] 林毅夫,蔡昉,李周.中国的奇迹：发展战略与经济改革[M]. 上海：上海三联书店，1994.

[146] 廖洪乐.农地“两权”分离和“三权”分置的经济学与法学逻辑[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2020,20(05):109-118.

[147] 刘广栋,程久苗.1949年以来中国农村土地产权制度变迁的理论和实践[J].中国农村观察,2007(02):70-80.

[148] 刘守英.集体地权制度变迁与农业绩效——中国改革40年农地产权制度研究综述性评论[J].农业技术经济,2019(01):4-16.

[149] 刘守英.土地制度与农民权利[J].中国土地科学,2000(03):1-9.

[150] 刘守英.以“三权分置”重构农地权利体系[J].农村经营管理,2016(11):26.

[151] 刘淑春.改革开放以来中国农村土地流转制度的改革与发展[J].经济与管理,2008(10):23-27.

[152] 刘涛,曲福田,金晶,石晓平.土地细碎化、土地流转对农户土地利用效率的影响[J].资源科学,2008(10):1511-1516.

[153] 刘颖,南志标.农地流转对农地与劳动力资源利用效率的影响——基于甘肃省农户调查数据的实证研究[J].自然资源学报,2019,34(05):957-974.

[154] 刘玥汐,许恒周.农地确权对农村土地流转的影响研究——基于农民分化的视角[J].干旱区资源与环境,2016,30(05):25-29.

[155] 罗必良,李尚蒲.农地流转的交易费用:威廉姆森分析范式及广东的证据[J].农业经济问题,2010,31(12):30-40+110-111.

[156] 罗必良.产权强度与农民的土地权益:一个引论[J].华中农业大学学报(社会科学版),2013(05):1-6.

[157] 罗必良.制度变迁:路径依赖抑或情境依赖?——兼论中国农业经营制度变革及未来趋势[J].社会科学战线,2020(01):38-51.

[158] 罗兴,马九杰.不同土地流转模式下的农地经营权抵押属性比较[J].农业经济问题,2017,38(02):22-32+1.

[159] 骆友生,张红宇.家庭承包责任制后的农地产权制度创新[J].经济研究,1995(01):69-80.

[160] 毛泽东.毛泽东选集（第五卷）[M].北京：人民出版社，1977.

[161] 马贤磊,车序超,李娜,唐亮.耕地流转与规模经营改善了农业环境吗?——基于耕地利用行为对农业环境效率的影响检验[J].中国土地科学,2019,33(06):62-70.

[162] 马贤磊,仇童伟,钱忠好.农地产权安全性与农地流转市场的农户参与——基于江苏、湖北、广西、黑龙江四省(区)调查数据的实证分析[J].中国农村经济,2015(02):22-37.

[163] 马贤磊,仇童伟,钱忠好.农地流转中的政府作用:裁判员抑或运动员——基于苏、鄂、桂、黑四省（区）农户农地流转满意度的实证分析[J].经济学家,2016(11):83-89.

[164] 冒佩华,徐骥,贺小丹,周亚虹.农地经营权流转与农民劳动生产率提高:理论与实证[J].经济研究,2015,50(11):161-176.

[165] 冒佩华,徐骥.农地产权制度、土地经营权流转与农民收入增长[J].管理世界,2015(05):63-74+88.

[166] 南光耀,诸培新.农地流转中禀赋效应的影响因素分析——基于江苏省两县区的调查数据[J].经济经纬,2020,37(03):54-61.

[167] 潘俊.农村土地“三权分置”:权利内容与风险防范[J].中州学刊,2014(11):67-73.

[168] 彭澎,刘丹.三权分置下农地经营权抵押融资运行机理——基于扎根理论的多案例研究[J].中国农村经济,2019(11):32-50.

[169] 彭魏倬加,刘卫柏.种养专业大户的农村土地经营权抵押融资需求意愿及影响因素——基于湖南4个试点县调查的实证研究[J].经济地理,2018,38(12):176-182.

[170] 彭长生,王全忠,钟钰.农地流转率差异的演变及驱动因素研究——基于劳动力流动的视角[J].农业技术经济,2019(03):49-62.

[171] 仇童伟,罗必良,何勤英.农地流转市场转型:理论与证据——基于对农地流转对象与农地租金关系的分析[J].中国农村观察,2019(04):128-144.

[172] 钱龙,洪名勇.非农就业、土地流转与农业生产效率变化——基于CFPS的实证分析[J].中国农村经济,2016(12):2-16.

[173] 钱文荣,安海燕.利率对农户参与土地承包经营权抵押贷款意愿的影响分析[J].浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版),2017,47(03):132-143.

[174] 钱忠好.农村土地承包经营权产权残缺与市场流转困境:理论与政策分析[J].管理世界,2002(06):35-45+154-155.

[175] 钱忠好,冀县卿.中国农地流转现状及其政策改进——基于江苏、广西、湖北、黑龙江四省(区)调查数据的分析[J].管理世界,2016(02):71-81.

[176] 钱忠好.非农就业是否必然导致农地流转——基于家庭内部分工的理论分析及其对中国农户兼业化的解释[J].中国农村经济,2008(10):13-21.

[177] 乔榛,焦方义,李楠.中国农村经济制度变迁与农业增长——对1978—2004年中国农业增长的实证分析[J].经济研究,2006(07):73-82.

[178] 孙小龙,郜亮亮,钱龙,郭沛.产权稳定性对农户农田基本建设投资行为的影响[J].中国土地科学,2019,33(04):59-66.

[179] 申惠文.法学视角中的农村土地三权分离改革[J].中国土地科学,2015,29(03):39-44.

[180] 史蕾.从“两权分置”到“三权分置”:农地产权制度演变的逻辑[J].学习与实践,2017(06):72-78.

[181] 宋志红.三权分置下农地流转权利体系重构研究[J].中国法学,2018(04):282-302.

[182] 苏岚岚,孔荣.农地抵押贷款促进农户创业决策了吗?——农地抵押贷款政策预期与执行效果的偏差检验[J].中国软科学,2018(12):140-156.

[183] 孙宪忠.推进农地三权分置经营模式的立法研究[J].中国社会科学,2016(07):145-163+208-209.

[184] 谭明方.1949-2020：国家行为与农村土地所有权[M].武汉：华中科技大学出版社，2016.

[185] 唐世平.国际政治的社会演化：从公元前8000年到未来[M].北京：中信出版社，2017.

[186] 唐世平.制度变迁的广义理论[M].北京：北京大学出版社，2016.

[187] 陶钟太朗,杨遂全.农村土地经营权认知与物权塑造——从既有法制到未来立法[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2015,15(02):73-79+127.

[188] 田传浩,方丽.土地调整与农地租赁市场:基于数量和质量的双重视角[J].经济研究,2013,48(02):110-121.

[189] 汪险生,郭忠兴.土地承包经营权抵押贷款:两权分离及运行机理——基于对江苏新沂市与宁夏同心县的考察[J].经济学家,2014(04):49-60.

[190] 万举.农地流转成本、交易体系及其权利完善[J].改革,2009(02):94-100.

[191] 王谦.劫后余稿——试办初级社文存[M].太原：山西人民出版社，1995.

[192] 王敬尧,魏来.当代中国农地产权制度的存续与变迁[J].中国社会科学,2016(02):73-92+206.

[193] 王蔷,郭晓鸣.新型农业经营主体融资需求研究——基于四川省的问卷分析[J].财经科学,2017(08):118-132.

[194] 王晓兵,侯麟科,张砚杰,孙剑林.中国农村土地流转市场发育及其对农业生产的影响[J].农业技术经济,2011(10):40-45.

[195] 王雪琪,曹铁毅,邹伟.地方政府干预农地流转对生产效率的影响——基于水稻种植户的分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2018,28(09):133-141.

[196] 王岩,李宁,马贤磊,石晓平.农地经营权主体差异与农地抵押方式选择——基于市场与组织合约的分类视角[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2017(02):3-13+158.

[197] 王士海,王秀丽.农村土地承包经营权确权强化了农户的禀赋效应吗？——基于山东省117个县（市、区）农户的实证研究[J].农业经济问题,2018(05):92-102.

[198] 韦森.社会制序的经济分析导论[M].上海：上海三联书店，2001.

[199] 魏立乾,罗剑朝.农地经营权抵押贷款试点政策效果仿真模拟研究——以宁夏平罗县658份农户数据为例[J].中国土地科学,2019,33(05):69-77.

[200] 吴一恒,徐砾,马贤磊.农地“三权分置”制度实施潜在风险与完善措施——基于产权配置与产权公共域视角[J].中国农村经济,2018(08):46-63.

[201] 吴一恒,马贤磊,马佳,周月鹏.如何提高农地经营权作为抵押品的有效性？——基于外部治理环境与内部治理结构的分析[J].中国农村经济,2020(08):40-53.

[202] 伍振军,张云华,孔祥智.土地经营权抵押解决贷款问题运行机制探析——宁夏同心县土地抵押协会调查[J].农业经济与管理,2011(01):9-15.

[203] 肖鹏.土地经营权的性质研究——基于土地经营权抵押贷款规范性文件的分析[J].中国土地科学,2016,30(09):12-18.

[204] 肖卫东,梁春梅.农村土地“三权分置”的内涵、基本要义及权利关系[J].中国农村经济,2016(11):17-29.

[205] 徐旭.苏联怎样实现农业集体化[M].上海：华东人民出版社，1954.

[206] 许恒周,金晶.农地流转市场发育对农民养老保障模式选择的影响分析——基于有序Probit模型的估计[J].资源科学,2011,33(08):1578-1583.

[207] 许庆,刘进,钱有飞.劳动力流动、农地确权与农地流转[J].农业技术经济,2017(05):4-16.

[208] 许庆,田士超,徐志刚,邵挺.农地产权制度、土地细碎化与农民收入不平等[J].经济研究,2008(02):83-92+105.

[209] 许庆,杨青,钱有飞.合久必分,分久必合——新中国农地产权制度的一个分析框架[J].农业经济问题,2019(01):46-60.

[210] 亚当·斯密.国富论(唐日松等译)[M].北京：华夏出版社，2005.

[211] 杨德才.我国农地产权制度变迁的历史考察及绩效分析[J].南京大学学报(哲学.人文科学.社会科学版),2002(04):60-67.

[212] 杨瑞龙,杨其静.阶梯式的渐进制度变迁模型——再论地方政府在我国制度变迁中的作用[J].经济研究,2000(03):24-31+80.

[213] 杨婷怡,罗剑朝.农户参与农村产权抵押融资意愿及其影响因素实证分析——以陕西高陵县和宁夏同心县919个样本农户为例[J].中国农村经济,2014(04):42-57.

[214] 杨玉珍.农村三权分置政策执行偏差的成因及其矫正[J].农业经济问题,2017,38(06):23-30+1.

[215] 杨子,马贤磊,诸培新,马东.土地流转与农民收入变化研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(05):111-120.

[216] 姚洋.中国农地产权制度:一个分析框架[J].中国社会科学,2000(02):54-65+206.

[217] 叶剑平,丰雷,蒋妍,郎昱,罗伊·普罗斯特曼.2016年中国农村土地使用权调查研究——17省份调查结果及政策建议[J].管理世界,2018,34(03):98-108.

[218] 于丽红,陈晋丽,兰庆高.农户农村土地经营权抵押融资需求意愿分析——基于辽宁省385个农户的调查[J].农业经济问题,2014,35(03):25-31+110.

[219] 于丽红,兰庆高,戴琳.不同规模农户农地经营权抵押融资需求差异及影响因素——基于626个农户微观调查数据[J].财贸经济,2015(04):74-84.

[220] 俞海,黄季焜,Scott Rozelle,Loren Brandt,张林秀.地权稳定性、土地流转与农地资源持续利用[J].经济研究,2003(09):82-91+95.

[221] 俞可平.中国公民社会的兴起与治理的变迁[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社，2002.

[222] 翟黎明,夏显力,吴爱娣.政府不同介入场景下农地流转对农户生计资本的影响——基于PSM-DID的计量分析[J].中国农村经济,2017(02):2-15.

[223] 中共中央办公厅编.中国农村的社会主义高潮（选本）[M].北京：人民出版社，1956.

[224] 中共中央文献编辑委员会.刘少奇选集（上卷）[M].北京：人民出版社，1981.

[225] 中华人民共和国国家农业委员会办公厅编.农业集体化重要文件汇编（1949-1957）[M].北京：中共中央党校出版社，1981.

[226] 中华人民共和国国家农业委员会办公厅编.农业集体化重要文件汇编（1958-1981）[M].北京：中共中央党校出版社，1981.

[227] 张珩,罗剑朝,王磊玲.农地经营权抵押贷款对农户收入的影响及模式差异:实证与解释[J].中国农村经济,2018(09):79-93.

[228] 詹姆斯N·罗西瑙.没有政府的治理（张胜军、刘小林等译）[M].南昌：江西人民出版社，2001.

[229] 张红宇. 从“两权分离”到“三权分置”[N]. 农民日报,2017-07-29(003).

[230] 张红宇.准确把握农地“三权分置”办法的深刻内涵[J].农村经济,2017(08):1-6.

[231] 张建,冯淑怡,诸培新.政府干预农地流转市场会加剧农村内部收入差距吗?——基于江苏省四个县的调研[J].公共管理学报,2017,14(01):104-116+158-159.

[232] 张建,诸培新,南光耀.不同类型农地流转对农户农业生产长期投资影响研究——以江苏省四县为例[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2019,19(03):96-104+158-159.

[233] 张建,诸培新,王敏.政府干预农地流转:农户收入及资源配置效率[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(06):75-83.

[234] 张建,诸培新.不同农地流转模式对农业生产效率的影响分析——以江苏省四县为例[J].资源科学,2017,39(04):629-640.

[235] 张力,郑志峰.推进农村土地承包权与经营权再分离的法制构造研究[J].农业经济问题,2015,36(01):79-92+111-112.

[236] 张龙耀,王梦珺,刘俊杰.农地产权制度改革对农村金融市场的影响——机制与微观证据[J].中国农村经济,2015a,(12):14-30.

[237] 张龙耀,王梦珺,刘俊杰.农民土地承包经营权抵押融资改革分析[J].农业经济问题,2015b,36(02):70-78+111.

[238] 张毅,张红,毕宝德.农地的“三权分置”及改革问题:政策轨迹、文本分析与产权重构[J].中国软科学,2016(03):13-23.

[239] 张翼.土地流转、阶层重塑与村庄治理创新——基于三个典型村落的调研[J].中共中央党校学报,2016,20(02):13-21.

[240] 张占录,张雅婷,康明明.家庭结构对农地流转意愿的影响——基于结构方程模型的实证分析[J].中国土地科学,2019,33(10):74-83.

[241] 张照新.中国农村土地流转市场发展及其方式[J].中国农村经济,2002(02):19-24+32.

[242] 张忠明,钱文荣.不同兼业程度下的农户土地流转意愿研究——基于浙江的调查与实证[J].农业经济问题,2014,35(03):19-24+110.

[243] 张五常.中国的经济制度[M].北京：中信出版社，2009.

[244] 赵冈,陈钟毅.中国土地制度史[M].北京：新星出版社，2006.

[245] 赵金龙,王丽萍.改革开放以来我国农地产权政策演变及未来展望[J].经济纵横,2018(05):89-96.

[246] 赵忠奎.土地承包经营权抵押制度的构建——以土地经营权物权塑造为视角[J].江西财经大学学报,2017(06):118-124.

[247] 郑淋议,张应良.新中国农地产权制度变迁:历程、动因及启示[J].西南大学学报(社会科学版),2019,45(01):46-54+193-194.

[248] 郑美江,范静.农户土地承包经营权抵押贷款意愿分析——基于吉林省7县(市、区)农村地区的实地调查[J].中国农村经济,2012(12):41-48.

[249] 钟晓萍,于晓华,唐忠.地权的阶级属性与农地“三权分置”:一个制度演化的分析框架[J].农业经济问题,2020(07):47-57.

[250] 钟文晶,罗必良.禀赋效应、产权强度与农地流转抑制——基于广东省的实证分析[J].农业经济问题,2013,34(03):6-16+110.

[251] 周南,许玉韫,刘俊杰,张龙耀.农地确权、农地抵押与农户信贷可得性——来自农村改革试验区准实验的研究[J].中国农村经济,2019(11):51-68.

[252] 周其仁.农地产权与征地制度——中国城市化面临的重大选择[J].经济学(季刊),2004(04):193-210.

[253] 周其仁.中国农村改革:国家和所有权关系的变化(上)——一个经济制度变迁史的回顾[J].管理世界,1995a,(03):178-189+219-220.

[254] 周其仁.中国农村改革:国家和所有权关系的变化(下)——一个经济制度变迁史的回顾[J].管理世界,1995b, (04):147-155.

[255] 周业安.中国制度变迁的演进论解释[J].经济研究,2000(05):3-11+79.

[256] 朱建军,杨兴龙.新一轮农地确权对农地流转数量与质量的影响研究——基于中国农村家庭追踪调查(CRHPS)数据[J].农业技术经济,2019(03):63-74.

[257] 朱文珏,罗必良.农地流转、禀赋效应及对象歧视性——基于确权背景下的IV-Tobit模型的实证分析[J].农业技术经济,2019(05):4-15.

[258] 诸培新,苏敏,颜杰.转入农地经营规模及稳定性对农户化肥投入的影响——以江苏四县(市)水稻生产为例[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2017,17(04):85-94+158.