国内商业银行间的竞争随着国家金融行业的不断开放变得愈加激烈，随着外资银行的进入、股份制银行和城市商业银行的兴起以及民间借贷组织和机构的合法化，国有商业银行以往所处于的相对垄断的地位已被打破，业绩和增长的压力使得国有商业银行的管理者们更加注重经营效率的提升，激励机制的优化调整逐渐成为管理者们提升业绩最常用的工具。

员工薪酬激励对于商业银行提高经营业绩效、降低资产风险起着重要的作用。事实上，目前商业银行员工个体内部人才队伍的素质和工作效率决定着现代商业银行能否在激烈的竞争中获得优势，而完备的薪酬激励机制是促进和发挥员工的工作积极性，使其将个人目标与银行的战略目标有机结合起来的一种重要形式，通过对员工努力工作的肯定和报偿，激励其长期保持努力工作的状态，从而提升商业银行提升经营质效，控制风险的最终目的。

目前建设银行南京Q支行网点基层员工的薪酬激励机制于2020年开始执行，通过细化对网点员工的日常表现，并与绩效发放、职级晋升等挂钩，实现激励员工，提升经营的目的。然而上述制度在实践当中，缺点逐步暴露，尤其是最重要的绩效薪酬的管理方面，出现了注入考核方案过于繁杂、考核结果缺乏公平性、无法激励和引导员工提升业绩的情况，导致支行出现了经营绩效持续下滑，员工离职人数增加的问题。

本文采用规范分析的方式，以激励理论作为基础，通过文献研究、问卷调查、数据分析的研究方法，对于建设银行南京Q支行基层员工的薪酬激励现状和存在的具体问题进行梳理，针对目前网点薪酬激励机制缺乏员工认同感，失去了对于员工的促进、引导作用的这一情况，从网点基层员工绩效考核制度的制定过程，实际工作中的执行情况以及现行制度导致的问题等三个方面着手进行研究，对Q支行的网点基层员工薪酬激励机制进行研究，结合其现状提出创新性建议，提高薪酬激励机制对于员工的促进和引导作用，这对于目前商业银行优化网点基层员工考核制度、提升员工工作效率进而提高商业银行整体绩效水平具有重要意义。

The competition between domestic commercial banks has become increasingly fierce with the continuous opening of the national financial industry.With the entry of foreign banks,the rise of joint-stock banks and urban commercial banks,and the legalization of private lending organizations and institutions,the relative monopoly position of state-owned commercial banks in the past has been broken.The pressure of performance and growth has made managers of state-owned commercial banks pay more attention to improving operational efficiency,Salary system management has gradually become the most commonly used tool for managers.

The salary incentive system plays an important role in improving business performance and reducing asset risks for commercial banks.In fact,the quality and work efficiency of the internal talent team of current commercial bank employees determine whether modern commercial banks can gain an advantage in fierce competition.A comprehensive salary incentive system is an important form of promoting and unleashing employees'work enthusiasm,enabling them to organically combine personal goals with the bank's strategic goals.By recognizing and rewarding employees'hard work,The ultimate goal of motivating commercial banks to maintain a state of hard work for a long time is to enhance their operational quality and efficiency,and control risks.

At present, the incentive system for grassroots branch employees of Construction Bank Nanjing Q Branch has been implemented since 2020. By refining the daily performance of branch employees and linking it with performance distribution, job promotion, etc., the goal of motivating employees and improving operations is achieved. However, in practice, the shortcomings of the above system have gradually been exposed, especially in the management of performance-based compensation, where the injection of assessment plans is too complicated, the assessment results lack fairness, and employees cannot be motivated and guided to improve their performance. This has led to a continuous decline in business performance and an increase in the number of employees leaving the branch.

This article adopts a combination of normative analysis and empirical analysis, based on motivation theory. Through literature research, questionnaire survey, and data analysis methods, it sorts out the current situation and specific problems of motivation for grassroots employees of Construction Bank Nanjing Q Branch. In response to the lack of employee identification in the current branch incentive system, which has lost its promoting and guiding role for employees, the research is conducted from three aspects: the formulation process of grassroots branch performance evaluation system, the implementation situation in actual work, and the problems caused by the current system. The incentive system of Q Branch's grassroots branch is studied, and innovative suggestions are proposed based on its current situation. The promotion and guiding role of the incentive system for employees is proposed, which is beneficial for commercial banks to optimize the performance evaluation system of grassroots branches Improving employee work efficiency and subsequently enhancing the overall performance level of commercial banks is of great significance.

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