改革开放以来，我国经济高速发展，荣耀的光环背后是粗放式发展方式及其带来的一系列生态环境污染问题，经济发展与生态环境的矛盾日益凸显。近年来，我国生态环境的保护与环境质量的改善日臻受到党中央的重视。然而，环境规制的外溢性、地方保护主义以及环保绩效考评的失真，导致地方政府的常规环境治理失灵，地方环境治理一度陷入内卷化的困境。在常规环境治理失灵和环境政策执行梗阻的情况下，中央环保督察应运而生。

本研究以S省T市作为个案，主要运用个案研究法和访谈法，意图以小见大地观察中央环保督察在地方的实施情况。首先以地方政府常规环境治理失灵的困境，与中央环保督察制度的建立及发展历程作为切入点，旨在展现中央环保督察实施的现实背景。接着，根据笔者在T市的实地调研和深度访谈，生动展现了中央环保督察在地方的治理实践。中央督察组代表中央权威进驻地方下沉督察，以污染问题为导向，短期内集中大量资源进行环境污染整改工作，解决了一批地方长期以来难治理的重大环境问题，区域环境质量得到明显改善。其次，笔者调研中发现，在中央环保督察这一高压制度背景下，地方政府作为环境治理主体，在污染督察整改工作具体执行和落实的过程中，仍存在一系列环境治理行为偏差，导致地方的生态环境问题得不到根本性解决，弱化了整改工作成效，甚至损害了党和政府的形象，与中央环保督察的制度理念背道而驰。本研究总结出在督察进驻前、督察下沉期和督察“回头看”三个阶段，T市政府存在督察迎检“形式主义”、应付督察“一刀切”和督察过后“切一刀”的环境治理行为偏差；接着本文将就三个阶段的三种行为偏差的生成原因，运用压力型体制理论和委托代理理论对其进行深入探赜分析；最后针对三个阶段的问题诊断，相应地提出在中央环保督察背景下，地方政府环境治理行为如何进一步优化的政策建议，以期能够对中央环保督察背景下地方政府的环境治理行为进行纠偏。

2019年7月，第二轮中央环保督察全面启动。在此之际，本研究希冀通过回顾过往的督察整改工作经验，并反思地方政府在督察实施过程中出现的不足之处，结合中国国情与地方实际需要，期望对地方政府提出科学有效的建议措施，旨在推进中央环保督察未来持续向纵深发展，促进地方生态环境治理，推动地方政府贯彻执行环保政策，实现绿色低碳可持续发展，切实回应社会生态环境诉求，达到生态环境治理长久有效。

Since the reform and opening up, my country's economy has developed rapidly. Behind the glorious halo is the extensive development mode, and a series of ecological and environmental pollution problems that it has brought. The contradiction between economic development and ecological environment has become increasingly prominent. In recent years, the protection of my country's ecological environment and the improvement of environmental quality have been increasingly valued by the Party Central Committee. However, the spillover of environmental regulation, local protectionism and the distortion of environmental performance evaluation have led to the failure of local government's conventional environmental governance, and local environmental governance once fell into the dilemma of involution. In the case of the failure of conventional environmental governance and the obstruction of environmental policy implementation, the central environmental protection inspector came into being.

This study takes T city in S province as a case, mainly using the case study method and interview method, and intends to observe the implementation of the central environmental protection inspector in the local area. First of all, it takes the predicament of the local government's conventional environmental governance failure, and the establishment and development of the central environmental protection supervision system as the breakthrough point, aiming to show the realistic background of the implementation of the central environmental protection supervision. Then, based on the author's field research and in-depth interviews in City T, it vividly demonstrated the local governance practices of the central environmental protection inspectors. The central inspection team, on behalf of the central authority, has been stationed in local subterranean inspections, guided by pollution problems, and has concentrated a large amount of resources on environmental pollution rectification in a short period of time, solving a number of major local environmental problems that have been difficult to control for a long time, and the regional environmental quality has been significantly improved. Secondly, the author's investigation found that under the background of the high-pressure system of the central environmental protection inspector, the local government, as the main body of environmental governance, still has a series of deviations in environmental governance behavior during the specific implementation and implementation of the pollution inspection and rectification work, resulting in local Failure to fundamentally solve ecological and environmental problems has weakened the effectiveness of rectification work, and even damaged the image of the party and the government, which runs counter to the institutional philosophy of the central environmental protection inspector. This study concludes that there are three stages in the T city government: the "formalism" of inspecting inspectors, the "one-size-fits-all" approach to inspectors, and the "one-size-fits-all" environmental governance in T city government before the inspectors are stationed, during the subsidence period of the inspectors, and when the inspectors "look back". Then, this article will make an in-depth analysis of the causes of the three behavioral deviations in the three stages, using the pressure-based system theory and the principal-agent theory. Under the background of environmental protection supervision, policy suggestions on how to further optimize the environmental governance behavior of local governments, in order to rectify the environmental governance behavior of local governments under the background of central environmental protection supervision.

In July 2019, the second round of CES inspectors was fully launched. On this occasion, this research hopes to put forward scientific and effective suggestions and measures for local governments by reviewing the past work experience of supervision and rectification, and reflecting on the deficiencies of local governments in the process of supervision implementation. , aims to promote the continuous and in-depth development of the central environmental protection inspector in the future, promote local ecological environment governance, promote local governments to implement environmental protection policies, achieve green, low-carbon and sustainable economic development, effectively respond to social ecological environment demands, and achieve long-term and effective ecological environment governance.

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