在百年未有之大变局下，农业保险的功能定位已突破传统风险分散工具的单一维度，演进为应对全球粮食安全挑战、赋能农业产业体系转型、保障国家战略安全的系统性制度安排。在政策支持与财政补贴的双轮驱动下，我国农业保险实现市场供给能力与保费规模水平的双重跃升，具体表现为保障品种覆盖率达89.7%、三大主粮保险覆盖率突破72%的制度建设成效。但需清醒认识到，当前农业保险发展过程中存在的种种制度性缺陷：从保险供给角度，保险机构展业行为失范导致承保管理粗放化、理赔标准执行异化以及服务供给碎片化，严重削弱农业保险风险保障的有效性；而在保险需求端，行政考核压力下的高参保率刚性要求异化了保险市场需求形成机制，基于制度性干预的被动参保模式，不仅造成农户对农业保险风险认知的偏差，更导致其保险真实需求难以被精准识别。更关键的是，农户基于认知错位形成的非理性参保决策，与农业保险风险管理的政策逻辑产生系统性偏离，削弱了国家保费补贴资金使用效率。进一步而言，上述供需双侧问题相互强化，由此形成“供给低效-需求扭曲”的供需失衡困境，对农业保险市场高质量发展构成了实质性的约束。

在推进农业保险高质量发展过程中，目标实现的关键支点在于激发农户保险的主动需求，其核心突破路径在于完善“认知提升与需求提振”的协同路径。为此，农业保险基层实践需立足于农业保险长期发展的宏观视野，以精准识别农户保险认知及需求的真实水平及其内在关联为根基，剖析制度实施层面所塑造的农户保险认知与需求的关键影响因素，并构建基于认知提升驱动需求增长的系统性策略框架。相较于农业保险初期发展的阶段性特征，当前农户已构建了以参保经验为导向的保险认知体系，并形成了与之相匹配的需求结构。然而，由于市场制度实施合规性不足的客观现实，农户现有认知与需求的真实状态仍处于模糊地带。特别是农业保险中的集体承保、保费返还等违背保险原则的操作，不仅易使农户对保险风险分散机制产生误解，还可能引发其保险有效需求形成逻辑偏离风险分散机制的制度初衷。从构建农户保险有效需求的长效机制来看，核心在于如何将宣传教育的理论有效性转化为现实实践中的应用效能。这其中要求政策决策者立足保险市场发展阶段以及中国农村环境现实特征，围绕宣传教育内容的精准性、实施主体的协同性等方面构建与现实适配的策略框架，实现宣传教育弥补农户认知短板、破解需求困境的精准对接，进而推动农业保险的高质量发展。尤为重要的是，农户既往参保经历与现行宣传教育策略存在着复杂的动态关联性，这种交互作用所形成的农户保险认知更新在很大程度上受到前期保险实施合规性差异的影响；特别是农户经历的非合规实施行为传递了与保险客观知识相悖的保险信息，在一定程度上威胁了保险后期宣传教育的有效性。进一步而言，农户的保险需求在很大程度上取决于其在保险参保经历和宣传教育过程中所获得的认知更新。因此，深入剖析参保经历和宣传教育这两种信息来源在农户保险认知与需求形成中的协同作用机制，对于农业保险需求的稳定提升具有重要的现实意义。综上，构建农业保险“信息传递—认知更新—需求提升”的理论框架，不仅为规范农业保险市场行为、优化宣传教育策略以激发农户保险需求的稳定提升提供了坚实的理论依据，亦为推动农业保险高质量发展明确了政策优化的方向指引。

基于此，本研究将立足于中国农业保险发展的阶段性特征，将农业保险实施合规性的现实制度条件与宣传教育理论可行路径纳入统一的分析框架，综合考量其对农户保险认知与需求的作用路径，旨在找准未来政策优化着力点。具体而言，本研究以江苏省2021年实施的小麦完全成本保险试点政策为依托，通过农户微观调查与宣传教育田野实验，判断当前农业保险市场执行合规性不足的制度缺陷，以及农户保险认知与真实需求意愿不足的现实表现，发现农户保险认知需求困境与保险非合规实施行为的关联。在此基础上，本研究首先分析了农户经历的农险非合规实施行为对其保险需求的影响及其认知变动的内在机理，论证实施合规性不足对农户保险需求合理形成的制约作用；其次，基于认知提升与需求提振的目标，分析当前农险发展阶段开展宣传教育的有效性与必要性，探索信息内容、教育主体协同的可行路径，旨在为农业保险宣传教育策略提供优化方向；最后，立足长期视角，探讨农户参保经历与宣传教育协同作用对农户保险认知更新的影响，以及其对农户保险需求的动态影响机制，进而为规范保险实施行为与宣传教育的协同路径、破解农户保险需求端困境提供系统的理论依据。全文分为四个部分，主要研究内容与结论如下：

研究内容一：农业保险市场需求现状：基于江苏省的事实特征

尽管我国农业保险市场在长期发展中取得了显著成效，但仍面临供给端保险实施合规性不足以及需求端农户保险认知与需求意愿不足的双重困境。来自江苏省代表农户的微观调查结果表明：其一，样本农户的农业保险真实需求意愿不足，基于调研地区首次开展的小麦完全成本保险支付意愿调查，样本农户的保险支付意愿集中于18元/亩的水平，显著低于该类保险的市场价格60元/亩。其二，农户存在着农业保险认知广度不足与认知偏差的问题。保险知识标准化测试结果显示，样本农户对农业保险风险分散的机制认知与保险政策的基础认知测试中的得分均值未达到总分中值水平，且普遍存在着将农业保险误认为投资理财产品的机制认知偏差。其三，农业保险实施合规性不足，97%的样本农户在2019~2021年参保经历中遭遇过农业保险非合规实施的问题，主要表现为未签署保险合同、未及时定损以及无灾获赔等行为。最后，相较于未经历农业保险非合规实施行为的农户群体，经历过此类事件的农户的保险认知水平较低，但其对小麦完全成本保险的支付意愿更高。进一步分析表明，农户保险认知与其小麦完全成本保险支付意愿存在着负相关关系。

研究内容二：实施合规性对农业保险需求意愿的影响及机制分析

此部分研究从农户经历的农业保险非合规实施角度出发，证实了农户经历非合规实施行为通过误导农户对保险风险分散的机制认知，进而虚估了其保险需求意愿。具体而言：其一，农户经历的农业保险非合规实施行为显著提升了其对小麦完全成本保险的支付意愿，提升幅度约为46.9%。这种提升作用主要来源于未签署保险合同与无灾获赔两种情形；相反，未及时定损与受灾未赔则显著降低了样本农户的保险支付意愿。其二，农业保险非合规实施行为对农户不同类别的保险认知产生了差异性的影响，表现为未签署保险合同与无灾获赔情景显著降低了农户的保险机制认知，以及未及时定损与受灾未赔显著降低了农户的保险基础认知；其三，在控制其他变量不变的条件下，农户的保险支付意愿随着保险机制认知的提升而显著被降低，但因保险基础认知的降低而受到抑制。这一结果在通过工具变量法排除内生性问题后依然成立，表明农业保险的非合规实施所传递的错误保险机制认知是导致农户保险支付意愿提升的重要原因。

研究内容三：宣传教育提升农业保险需求意愿的有效性

本部分结果表明农业保险宣传教育降低了农户的保险需求意愿，其原因在于宣传教育纠正了农户对保险机制的误解。此外，基于信息内容与教育主体差异所开展的教育干预，进一步强化了这一效应。具体而言，其一，基于保险合同开展的通识教育显著降低了样本农户对小麦完全保险支付意愿约20.81%，进一步的机制分析表明，通识教育对农户错误保险机制认知的纠正是导致其保险支付意愿降低的主要原因。其二，机制信息强化教育通过提升农户保险机制认知，进而使其保险支付意愿降低约5元/亩；且赔付要素信息教育的进一步的干预，增强了机制信息教育对农户保险支付意愿的抑制作用，导致农户保险支付意愿进一步下降至约10元/亩。其三，在政府背书的影响下，通识教育对农户保险支付意愿有着更为明显的降低作用，且农户保险机制认知的提升完全解释了政府背书后通识教育导致的农户保险支付意愿下降。其四，社会网络存在保险知识传递与行为示范作用，其分别表现出对农户保险需求意愿的提升作用与下降作用。

研究内容四：宣传教育提升农业保险需求意愿的条件判断：基于认知更新视角

宣传教育对农业保险的有效性受到农户所经历的赔付合规性差异及其引发的认知基础影响，而其对需求的提升则依赖于保险实施合规性的现实基础。研究表明：其一，农户在参与农业保险过程中经历的无灾获赔行为对其认知具有持续性影响，表现为后期的通识教育难以扭转因前期无灾获赔经历而导致的农户对保险机制认知的降低，以及对其保险需求意愿的虚高影响。其二，赔付合规性差异与宣传教育构成农户保险的认知更新，具体表现为合规赔付经历与宣传教育构成认知更新的同化表现，以及非合规赔付经历与宣传教育构成认知更新的异化表现。进一步反映在保险需求上，宣传教育将在合规赔付经历基础上促进农户的保险支付意愿提升；在无灾赔付经历基础上削弱农户的保险支付意愿。除此之外，从规范赔付实施行为的必要性视角来看，合规赔付能够有效弥补通识教育导致的农户保险支付意愿降低，且当合规赔付次数达到7次以上时，通识教育则可以显著提升农户保险支付意愿。

基于上述研究结论，本研究提出以下政策启示：一是，规范农业保险市场秩序，为农户保险需求稳定提升提供健康市场环境；二是，构建科学完善的农业保险宣传教育策略，破除信息传递障碍，实现农户保险认知提升与误解纠正，夯实农业保险需求根基；三是，强化保险实施合规性与宣传教育的协同效应，稳步推进保险认知与需求的提升。

In the context of risk upgrading, crop insurance has been positioned to function beyond its traditional role as a single risk diversification tool. Instead, it has evolved into a systematic institutional arrangement that aims to address the challenges of global food security, to empower the transformation of the agricultural industry and to safeguard the country’s strategic security. The implementation of policy support and financial subsidies has led to notable advancements in China's crop insurance, as evidenced by substantial improvements in market supply capacity and premium scale. This is demonstrated by the attainment of an 89.7% coverage rate for insured crop varieties and a participation rate that exceeds 72% for the three primary staple grains. However, it is crucial to acknowledge the systemic deficiencies that persist in the current development of crop insurance. From the perspective of insurance supply, the misconduct of insurance institutions has resulted in substandard underwriting management, the distortion of claims standards, and fragmented service delivery, which has seriously weakened the effectiveness of agricultural insurance risk protection. From a demand-side perspective, the high participation rate resulting from the pressure of administrative assessment has had a deleterious effect on the formation of demand in the insurance market. The passive insurance participation mode, based as it is on institutional intervention, engenders bias in farmers’ knowledge of crop insurance. Furthermore, it hinders the ability to accurately identify their real demand for insurance. Farmers’ participation decisions that are driven by cognitive biases deviate systematically from the policy logic of crop insurance risk management. This diminishes the efficiency of national premium subsidies. Furthermore, the interplay between supply and demand gives rise to structural contradictions, which reciprocally exacerbate the consequences of inefficiencies and distortions in supply and demand. Consequently, these factors impose a substantial constraint on the high-quality and sustainable development of the crop insurance market.

In the pursuit of achieving the aspiration of optimal development in the domain of crop insurance, it assumes paramount importance to elicit the farmers’ active demand for insurance. A symbiotic enhancement in the domain of both knowledge and demand is regarded as the pivotal breakthrough path to facilitate this objective. To this end, grassroots practices of crop insurance must be grounded in a macroscopic vision for its long-term development. This involves accurately identifying the true levels of farmers’ insurance knowledge and demand and their interrelationships, analyzing the key factors affecting farmers' insurance knowledge and demand from the market implementation level and constructing a systematic strategic framework driven by knowledge enhancement to promote demand. In comparison with the phased characteristics of the initial development of crop insurance, farmers have now established an insurance cognition system oriented by their participation experience and have formed a corresponding demand structure. Nevertheless, given the objective reality of inadequate compliance in market implementation, there remains great uncertainty regarding the true state of farmers' current cognition and demand. In particular, collective underwriting and premium rebates in crop insurance appear to violate the principles of insurance, leading to farmers' misunderstanding of the risk-sharing mechanism of insurance.  Moreover, such practices may result in the formation basis of farmers' effective insurance demand deviating from the intrinsic logic of the risk-sharing mechanism.

From the perspective of establishing a long-term mechanism for farmers' effective insurance demand, the pivotal issue is the transformation of theoretical effectiveness of education into practical application efficacy. It is imperative that policymakers base their decisions on the development stage of the insurance market and the real characteristics of the rural environment in China. A strategy framework must be constructed that fits reality, with a focus on the precision of education content and the synergy of implementing entities. This will enable education to compensate for farmers' cognitive shortcomings and solve demand dilemmas accurately, thereby promoting the high-quality development of crop insurance. Of particular significance is the intricate and evolving relationship between farmers’ prior insurance experiences and contemporary educational initiatives. The updating of farmers’ insurance knowledge as a consequence of this interaction is predominantly influenced by variations in compliance with prior insurance implementation. From this standpoint, the uncertainty surrounding the updating of farmers' insurance cognition further challenges the stability of insurance demand. Consequently, there is an evident necessity for research to elucidate the synergistic mechanism of the two information sources — farmers’ insurance participation experiences and education — in the formation of farmers’ insurance knowledge and demand. In summary, constructing a theoretical framework for crop insurance that links "information transmission–cognitive updating–demand enhancement" will provide a theoretical basis and policy optimization direction for regulating market behavior in crop insurance and precisely promoting its high-quality development through education.

As previously indicated, this study is grounded in the phased characteristics of the development of crop insurance in China. It integrates the market realities of the implementation of crop insurance, together with the theoretical feasibility of educational initiatives. This approach enables a comprehensive examination of their influence on farmers’ knowledge and demand for insurance. The aim is to identify key focal points for the future optimisation of policy. Specifically, this study takes the pilot policy of full-cost wheat insurance implemented in Jiangsu Province in 2021 as a basis. Through micro-level surveys of farmers and field experiments on education, it systematically explores the compliant implementation of crop insurance, the effectiveness of education strategies, and the real-world scenarios of farmers’ insurance cognition updates and resulting changes in insurance demand, which are shaped by these two factors. The study’s primary objective is to identify and address institutional deficiencies in the current noncompliant implementation of crop insurance market behaviour and to examine the real manifestations of insufficient insurance knowledge and demand among farmers. On this basis, the study first analyzes the impact of noncompliant implementation on farmers’ insurance demand and the underlying mechanisms of their knowledge changes. It demonstrates how inadequate implementation compliance at the institutional level constrains the rational formation of farmers’ insurance demand. Second, aiming at enhancing knowledge and stimulating demand, the study examines the effectiveness and necessity of education in the current stage of crop insurance development. It explores feasible pathways for coordinated information content and educational entities, with the goal of providing an optimized direction for crop insurance education strategies. Finally, from a dynamic systems perspective, the study investigates the impact of the combined effect of insurance participation experience and education on farmers’ insurance cognition updates and the dynamic mechanisms influencing their insurance demand. This provides a systematic theoretical basis for regulating the synergistic pathways of insurance implementation and education and publicity and for resolving the dilemmas on the demand side of farmers’ insurance. The paper is divided into four parts, with the main research content and conclusions as follows:

Research Content I: Characterisation of Crop Insurance Market Demand

Despite the substantial achievements of China's crop insurance market over the long term, it still faces a dual dilemma of insufficient enforcement compliance on the supply side and insufficient insurance knowledge and genuine demand among farmers on the demand side. Micro-level survey results from a representative sample of farmers in Jiangsu Province reveal the following key findings: First, the genuine demand for crop insurance among sampled farmers is insufficient. Based on a willingness-to-pay (WTP) survey for full-cost wheat insurance conducted for the first time in the surveyed region, the WTP of sampled farmers is concentrated at 18 yuan per mu, which is lower than the market price of 40 yuan per mu for this type of insurance. Second, there is a lack of breadth in farmers’ knowledge of crop insurance as well as a cognitive bias. Results from a standardized insurance knowledge test indicate that the average scores of sampled farmers in both insurance mechanism knowledge and basic knowledge tests did not reach the median level of the total score. Moreover, there is a widespread cognitive bias among farmers who mistakenly regard crop insurance as a form of investment or financial management. Third, the implementation of crop insurance lacks sufficient compliance. As many as 97% of sampled farmers encountered non-compliant implementation issues in their insurance participation experiences from 2019 to 2021. These issues are mainly manifested in the absence of signed insurance contracts, untimely loss assessment, and claims payments in the absence of losses. Lastly, compared with farmers who have not experienced noncompliant implementation of crop insurance, those who have encountered such issues exhibit lower levels of insurance knowledge but higher WTP for full-cost wheat insurance. Further analysis indicates a negative correlation between insurance knowledge and WTP for full-cost wheat insurance.

Research Content Ⅱ: Mechanisms of Crop Insurance Implementation Compliance on Insurance Demand

The findings of this part of the study demonstrate that noncompliant implementation of crop insurance distorts farmers' cognition of the risk-sharing mechanism of insurance, thereby inflating their demand for insurance. Specifically: First, the noncompliant implementation of crop insurance that farmers have experienced significantly increases their WTP for full-cost wheat insurance by approximately 46.8%. This increase is primarily driven by the scenarios of not signing insurance contracts and receiving claims payments without losses. In contrast, untimely loss assessment and no claims payment after losses significantly reduce the WTP of sampled farmers. Second, noncompliant implementation of crop insurance differentially affects various types of insurance knowledge. The scenarios of not signing insurance contracts and receiving claims payments without losses significantly reduce farmers’ mechanism knowledge. Conversely, untimely loss assessment and no claims payment after losses significantly diminish farmers’ basic knowledg. Third, holding other variables constant, farmers’ insurance WTP is significantly reduced with an increase in their knowledge of the insurance mechanism but is suppressed by a decrease in their basic insurance knowledge. This result remains robust after addressing endogeneity issues using the instrumental variable method, indicating that the erroneous insurance mechanism knowledge conveyed by noncompliant implementation is a significant cause of the increased WTP among farmers.

Research Content Ⅲ: Effectiveness of Education: Based on Knowledge and Demand

Education enhances farmers’ knowledge of crop insurance while reducing their demand. Moreover, educational interventions based on differences in information content and implementing entities further amplify this effect. The study reveals the following findings: First, general education based on insurance contracts significantly increases farmers’ knowledge of insurance mechanism, basic concepts, and product features by approximately 63.75%, 40.68%, and 447.84%, respectively. However, it also reduces their insurance WTP by about 20.81%. Further analysis indicates that correcting farmers’ misconceptions about the insurance mechanism through general education is the primary driver of the reduced WTP. Second, mechanism-focused education significantly improves farmers’ knowledge of the insurance mechanism, thereby reducing their WTP for insurance by about 5 yuan per mu. Additionally, element education further intensifies the suppressive effect of mechanism-focused education on WTP, resulting in a further reduction to approximately 9 yuan per mu. Thirdly, government endorsement significantly enhances the effectiveness of general education in improving farmers’ insurance knowledge. The increase in farmers’ mechanism knowledge fully accounts for the reduction in WTP following government-endorsed general education. Lastly, social networks play a dual role in disseminating insurance knowledge and demonstrating behaviors. These functions respectively enhance farmers’ insurance knowledge and increase their insurance WTP.

Research Content Ⅳ: Insurance Demand in a Cognitive Updating Perspective: Synergies between Participation Experience and Education

This study investigates how insurance claim experiences and education jointly drive updates in farmers’ insurance knowledge and changes in their insurance demand. It demonstrates that the enhancement of crop insurance demand relies on the foundation of compliant implementation. First, the experience of receiving claims without losses has a lasting impact, as subsequent general education cannot reverse the initial negative effect of such experiences on farmers’ mechanism knowledge and the resulting inflated demand. Second, the experience of receiving claims without losses exerts an intrinsic anchoring effect, significantly reducing farmers’ mechanism knowledge by approximately 3% compared to compliant claim experiences. Third, differences in claim compliance experiences interact with education to produce distinct cognitive updates. Compliant claim experiences, combined with education, lead to a convergent update in farmers’ insurance knowledge, while noncompliant claim experiences, combined with education, result in a divergent update. This interaction is further reflected in insurance demand: education enhances farmers’ insurance WTP when based on compliant claim experiences but diminishes their WTP when based on experiences of receiving claims without losses. Finally, from the perspective of compliant claim implementation, compliant claims effectively offset the reduction in farmers’ WTP resulting from general education. When farmers experience compliant claims seven or more times, general education significantly increases their WTP for insurance. This study highlights the necessity of compliant claim implementation in enhancing the effectiveness of education and promoting sustainable demand for crop insurance.

Drawing on the foregoing conclusions, this study proposes the following policy insights: First, regulating the market order of crop insurance is imperative to provide a robust and healthy market environment that supports the stable growth of farmers’ insurance demand. Second, the development of a comprehensive education strategy for crop insurance is crucial. Such a strategy should aim to eliminate barriers in information dissemination, enhance farmers’ insurance knowledge, and correct misconceptions, thereby solidifying the foundation of insurance demand. Third, the synergistic relationship between compliant insurance implementation and education should be reinforced to ensure the steady advancement of insurance knowledge and demand.

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