境外资本市场发展时间较长，体系较为完善，准入条件比境内资本市场更为宽松，境内资本市场上市门槛较高。许多新兴行业早期为达到短期内获得融资的目的，纷纷选择赴港、赴美等境外上市，以便满足长期发展的需求。随着境内资本市场迅速发展，交易机制逐渐成熟，以及企业境外上市后表现差强人意等原因，使得蓬勃发展的境内资本市场逐渐吸引境外上市的企业，我国境外上市企业开始出现退市热潮。其中一大部分企业进行战略转型后回归A股市场。2019年科创板的设立标志着我国资本市场环境的进一步得到了优化，符合我国科技强国的发展战略。科创板为境外上市的科技型企业回归A股资本市场拓宽了路径，有助于我国科技型企业的更快更好的发展。

本文选取华熙生物科技股份有限公司（以下简称“华熙生物”）作为案例研究的对象。华熙生物作为一家曾在港股上市后私有化退市，且较短时间内在科创板成功上市的企业，具有较强的代表性和创新性。通过大量的国内外相关文献汇总、整理，得出学术界对于红筹企业回归的普遍研究逻辑为“动因-举措-效果”，本文借鉴已有研究思路，围绕“华熙生物私有化退市回归科创板的动因和经济后果”这一核心问题进行探究，主要研究内容如下：

首先，梳理了华熙生物从私有化退市到回归科创板三个重要阶段：第一阶段是注销全部股份完成私有化退市；第二阶段是清理与注销境外主体，全资子公司香港勤信先对境内实体经营进行全资控股后多次转让华熙生物的全部股权；第三阶段是回归科创板上市。

其次，本文分析了华熙生物港股退市回归科创板的原因。认为企业退市后回归科创板的原因分别为：一是港股上市期间企业的估值水平偏低，市盈率和股价均低于国内A股同类企业；二是战略转型期企业融资需求较大，企业原有的业务结构受限于产能饱和，为寻求新的利润增长，企业需加大研发生产投入；三是外部环境吸引了企业回归，城乡居民生活水平的提升以及居民可支配收入的增长，为消费市场带来活力，华熙生物所在的生物医药行业是我国战略性九大领域新兴产业之一，政策利好和消费观念的改变，为华熙生物回归科创板提供了良好的外部环境。

再次，本文为探究案例企业退市后回归科创板的经济表现，先从短期视角和长期视角分别分析市场如何看待华熙生物私有化退市一事；再次结合企业理念财务报表的表现，运用EVA经济价值方法，分析科创板上市对华熙生物的经济价值带来的效果。根据华熙生物回归科创板的动因，本文还对企业的融资效果、研发能力以及治理能力进行对比研究，探究科创板上市前后企业创新能力、主营业务结构以及自身组织架构发生了何种改变，是否提升了企业的运营效率。

最后，针对分析结果，本文从拟回归的企业、科创板上市企业、监管者多个角度提出建议，对于拟回归的企业来说，关注行业政策的变化，合理的回归动因和战略调整措施是前提；对于科创板已上市的企业来说，企业应坚持提升自身研发创新能力，增强产品竞争能力，才能为长期良好的发展奠定基础；监管者应通过完善政策、加快改革步伐等措施、改善资本市场环境，鼓励优质企业良好发展。

Overseas capital market development time is longer, the system is more perfect, access conditions than the domestic capital market is more relaxed. The domestic capital market listing threshold is higher. Many emerging industries in the early days in order to achieve the purpose of obtaining financing in the short term, they have to choose to go to Hong Kong, the United States and other offshore listings to meet the needs of long-term development. With the rapid development of the domestic capital market, the transaction mechanism is gradually mature. As well as the poor performance of enterprises listed abroad, the booming domestic capital market gradually attracted enterprises listed abroad. China's overseas listed enterprises began to appear delisting boom. A large part of these enterprises returned to the A-share market after strategic transformation.The establishment of the Sci-Tech Innovation board in 2019 marks the further optimisation of China's capital market environment, and broadens the path for overseas-listed science and technology enterprises to return to the A-share capital market, which is in line with China's development strategy of being a strong scientific and technological powerhouse and contributes to the faster and better development of China's science and technology-based enterprises.

Bloomage Biotechnology as a company listed in the Hong Kong stock market and then privatised and delisted. Within a relatively short period of time successfully listed on the Sci-Tech Innovation board, Bloomage Biotechnology has a strong representativeness and innovativeness. Therefore, this paper takes Bloomage Biotechnology as the case study object. Through a large amount of domestic and international related literature summarised and collated, the review mainly focuses on the motivation of delisting, the path of delisting, and the economic effects of delisting for overseas listed companies. At the same time, combined with the theory of regulatory avoidance, undervaluation theory, information asymmetry theory, and preferential financing theory. The objective is to comprehensively explore why the case company chose to privatise and delist, the path to re-listing and the choice of board. This paper will serve as a reference for other similar enterprises planning to relist in China in the future.

First, the three important stages of Bloomage Biotechnology journey from delisting through privatization to returning to the Shanghai Science and Technology Innovation Board were sorted out: the first stage was the cancellation of all shares to complete the delisting through privatization; the second stage was the cleanup and cancellation of overseas entities, with Hong Kong Qinxin, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bloomage Biotechnology, acquiring full control of the domestic entities' operations before transferring the entire shareholding in Bloomage Biotechnology multiple times; the third stage was the return to the Shanghai Science and Technology Innovation Board for IPO.

Secondly, this paper analyzes the reasons why Bloomage Biotechnology，a Hong Kong-listed company, returned to the Shanghai Science and Technology Innovation Board. The reasons for the company's return after delisting are as follows: First, the valuation level of the company during its Hong Kong listing period was lower than that of similar enterprises on the A-share market in China, with a lower PE ratio and stock price. Second, during the strategic transformation period, the company's financing needs are relatively large, and the company's existing business structure is limited by the saturation of production capacity. In order to seek new profit growth, the company needs to increase its R&D and production investment. Third, the external environment has attracted the company to return, the improvement of urban and rural residents' living standards and the growth of their disposable income have brought vitality to the consumption market. Bloomage Biotechnology is one of the nine emerging industries in China's strategic new industries, and the policy favor and change of consumption concept provide a good external environment for the company's return to the Shanghai Science and Technology Innovation Board.

Secondly, this paper aims to investigate the economic performance of the case enterprise after its return to the Science and Technology Innovation Board (STIB) by analyzing the market's perception of the privatization and delisting of Bloomage Biotechnology from the STIB in the short term and long term perspectives. Furthermore, by combining the enterprise's financial statements and its performance indicators, this paper applies the EVA economic value method to analyze the economic value brought about by the listing on the STIB for Bloomage Biotechnology. Based on the reasons for the enterprise's return to the STIB, this paper also conducts a comparative study on the enterprise's financing effects, R&D capabilities, and governance capabilities to explore the changes in the enterprise's innovation capabilities, main business structure, and organizational structure after its listing on the STIB, and whether it has improved the enterprise's operational efficiency.

Finally, this paper puts forward suggestions from multiple perspectives. For enterprises to be returned, paying attention to changes in industry policies, reasonable return motives and strategic adjustment measures are prerequisites. For companies already listed on the Sci-Tech Innovation board companies should improve their own R&D and innovation capabilities. Only by enhancing the competitiveness of their products can they lay the foundation for good long-term development. Regulators should improve the capital market environment by improving policies, accelerating the pace of reform and other measures to encourage the good development of high-quality enterprises.

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