宅基地“三权分置”改革是改善土地配置效率、维护农民合法权益、促进乡村全面振兴的关键所在。长期以来，由于存在制度内涵不清、合理有效处置机制缺失等问题，以福利性和身份性为突出特征的宅基地制度在运行中不仅浮现出“无地可分”与“一户多宅”并存的突出矛盾，而且也呈现出土地资源配置管控失效、价值难以显化、村庄治理效能不高等突出问题。因此，党的十八届三中全会以来，沿着“使市场在资源配置中发挥决定性作用”这条主线，国家通过创新和优化政策工具，先后推动了两轮宅基地制度改革试点，并在顶层设计上确认了宅基地“三权分置”权利结构和实施机制，并在试点中探索“三权分置”改革的具体路径。但是，各试点地区在实践过程中探索形成的具有显著区域特征的多元试点样态并未有效促进改革试点的纵深推进与共性经验的提炼，难以形成为可以指导国家层面改革的系列经验。因此，如何探索宅基地“三权分置”有效实现形式，科学评价改革试点成效，客观理解经济发达地区和经济欠发达地区的宅基地“三权分置”改革模式与绩效差异成为改革试点亟待解决的关键议题，对于上述问题的回应有助于为下一阶段深化宅基地“三权分置”改革，建设符合中国式现代化深刻内涵的宅基地制度，全面落实党的二十大和二十届三中全会提出的“深化农村土地制度改革”要求，有力有效推进乡村全面振兴提供理论镜鉴和经验依据。

基于此，本研究沿袭并创新新制度经济学的制度分析思路，以“制度设计—制度形态—制度实施—制度绩效”的分析逻辑为基础，结合宅基地“三权分置”改革总体历程、政策工具选择运用、权利结构和实施机制、农民农村共同富裕等核心要素，在制度设计层面剖析中央政府推动宅基地“三权分置”改革的演化逻辑与政策工具选择逻辑，阐释宅基地“三权分置”形成和发展的动态过程；在制度形态层面刻画宅基地“三权分置”的权利结构；在制度实施层面探索宅基地“三权分置”的实施机制；在制度绩效层面揭示经济欠发达地区宅基地“三权分置”改革的共同富裕效应。具体而言：

（1）在制度设计方面，首先通过厘清中国特色国家治理模式的基本特征，识别中国改革试点内含的“目标制定—顶层设计—地方试点—成果总结”四个阶段，在此基础上结合宅基地“三权分置”改革的典型事实，总结中央政府推动宅基地“三权分置”改革的总体历程与演化逻辑；其次，参考政策工具的一般性分类方法，构建适应于宅基地“三权分置”改革的政策工具分类类型，总结中央政府推动宅基地“三权分置”改革的政策工具运用特征与选择逻辑。（2）在制度形态方面，通过考察学界对自然资源产权一般性形态的讨论，结合我国集体所有自然资源产权体系的独特特征，从横向和纵向两个维度识别宅基地“三权分置”权利结构，进而结合宅基地“三权分置”改革的阶段性成果，总结宅基地“三权分置”权利结构的现存局限与优化路径。（3）在制度实施层面，沿袭巴泽尔产权经济分析思路刻画宅基地“三权分置”实施机制的理论形态，在此基础上，通过探讨宅基地“两权分离”的失序根源以及浙江义乌、江西余江、四川泸县等东、中、西部地区的典型试点实践，刻画宅基地“三权分置”实施机制的现实表现、尚存困境与优化路径。（4）在制度绩效层面，本研究利用解释结果型过程追踪法，通过总结经济欠发达地区宅基地“三权分置”改革和农民农村共同富裕的现实表现，在理论层面建立并识别宅基地“三权分置”改革促进农民农村共同富裕的基础性论断与干预机制，揭示以强化管理为核心内容的经济欠发达地区宅基地“三权分置”改革模式的共同富裕效应，与宅基地“三权分置”改革和农民农村共同富裕间的因果机制。

为了完成以上四个方面研究内容，本研究总体采用了制度分析方法、政策工具分析方法、比较分析方法，解释结果型过程追踪法，使用了党的十八届三中全会以来中央政府及相关部委出台的涉及宅基地“三权分置”改革的相关政策文件、宅基地“三权分置”改革地区出台的试点文件及实地调研资料等，本研究的主要结论包括：

（1）党的十八届三中全会以来的宅基地“三权分置”改革是中央政府在全面深化改革阶段系统性、整体性、协同性要求下，沿袭设计主义范式所推动的农业农村领域的重要政策议题。宅基地“三权分置”改革的总体历程受到阶段性国家治理任务的深度介入，呈现出国家宏观治理目标的深刻嵌入与从理论到实践的逐步深化的双重特征。宅基地“三权分置”改革的演进逻辑同样呈现出显著的国家嵌入特征，国家宏观治理目标构成了全面深化改革阶段驱动宅基地“三权分置”改革试点的重要动因。

（2）不同阶段宅基地“三权分置”改革的试点目标与顶层设计为中央政府运用和选择政府主导型、政府引导型、市场主导型、集体自治型等四类政策工具提供了基本遵循。其政策工具选择逻辑表现为：以不同发展阶段的国家宏观治理目标的内涵要求基本遵循和目标导向，以政策工具与改革环境相适应，为试点地区推动改革试点提供动力，维护农民基本居住权益和财产权益为基本原则，通过不同政策工具组合的层次化动态应用塑造符合不同阶段改革试点的改革目标和顶层设计要求的宅基地“三权分置”产权体系。

（3）宅基地“三权分置”的权利结构包括横向和纵向两个维度，在横向上表现为包括宅基地集体所有权、农户资格权、宅基地使用权的“三权”模式，在纵向上形成了宪法层次、控制层次Ⅰ、控制层次Ⅱ和用户层次在内的多层级结构。宅基地“三权分置”的实施机制表现为委托代理机制、集体自治机制和市场交易机制的复合形态。

（4）宅基地“三权分置”权利结构的有效性与实施机制的可执行性是影响宅基地“三权分置”有效实现的关键因素。相较于优化产权配置形势所需要的高昂制度成本以及所蕴藏的改革风险，完善融合委托代理机制、集体自治机制和完全市场交易机制的复合型产权实施机制，是现阶段促进宅基地“三权分置”有效实现的最优路径。

（5）经济欠发达地区宅基地“三权分置”改革能够通过优化资源配置机制和完善收益分配机制两条途径促进农民农村共同富裕。优化资源配置机制表现为宅基地“三权分置”改革试点可以通过拓展宅基地使用权财产性权能和探索宅基地使用权多元放活机制的方式提升资源配置效率和显化资产财产价值。完善收益分配机制表现为强化以农村集体经济组织为核心的初次分配与再分配，从而扭转以生产要素为依据的初次分配结果不公平。

基于结论，本文提出如下政策建议：

（1）加强改革试点的联动性与综合性，提升宅基地“三权分置”改革的广度。在坚持改革试点与新时代乡村治理目标相匹配，改革试点与新时期乡村治理能力相匹配，坚持改革试点与城乡融合发展、乡村振兴战略相衔接的基础上，坚持以乡村治理能力提升助推宅基地“三权分置”改革成效显化，以要素联动配置提升试点综合效应，避免农民和农村集体组织的利益受到侵害。

（2）赋予地方政府更为广阔灵活的政策空间，加快建立健全部门之间、试点地区之间的信息沟通机制和协调机制，提升宅基地“三权分置”改革深度。下一阶段的改革试点可以考虑进一步增加整市推进的试点数量，加速构建地区间、部门间的协同改革机制，健全信息沟通和协调机制，按照“多授权、少掣肘”的总体思路，在保障基本原则不被突破的原则下，赋予试点地区更多的自由裁量权。

（3）接续完善宅基地“三权分置”的权利结构和实施机制，促进宅基地“三权分置”有效实现。现阶段的宅基地“三权分置”改革需要探索合理配置宅基地集体所有权、农户资格权和宅基地使用权和定义权、监管权、分配权之间的关系，着力探索提升复合型产权实施机制的可执行性，从而形成更有利于促进宅基地“三权分置”的有效实现的制度环境。

（4）健全宅基地“三权分置”配套政策体系，夯实集体经济组织的行权能力，进一步激发改革的共同富裕效应。进一步健全宅基地“三权分置”配套政策体系，通过系统性的政策体系建设提升宅基地“三权分置”权利结构的有效性和实施机制的可执行性，夯实集体经济组织的行权能力，通过维护、发展和创新集体所有制的内在优势，进一步激发宅基地“三权分置”改革的共同富裕效应。

The reform of the "three rights separation" (ownership, contract, and management) for rural homestead land is pivotal in improving land allocation efficiency, protecting farmers' legitimate rights, and promoting comprehensive rural revitalization. Historically, the rural homestead land system—marked by its welfare and identity-based characteristics—has faced significant contradictions due to unclear institutional definitions and a lack of effective disposal mechanisms. Key issues include the paradox of "no land available for allocation" versus "multiple homesteads for one household," along with challenges like inefficient land resource allocation, difficulty in realizing land value, and low village governance efficiency.

Following the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the country adopted a policy allowing the market to play a decisive role in resource allocation, launching two rounds of pilot reforms for the homestead land system. These reforms introduced innovative and optimized policy tools. A framework was established to define the rights structure and implementation mechanisms of the "three rights separation," and various reform pathways were explored in pilot projects. However, the diverse regional models developed through these pilots, while reflecting distinct local characteristics, have not yet driven deeper reform or yielded common experiences that could inform national-level reforms. As a result, valuable lessons from these pilots have not been fully distilled.

Given these challenges, it is crucial to explore effective forms of "three rights separation" for homestead land, scientifically evaluate pilot reform outcomes, and objectively assess the differences in reform models and performance between economically developed and less-developed regions. Addressing these issues is essential to advancing the next phase of the "three rights separation" reform, which will help establish a homestead land system aligned with the deeper meanings of Chinese-style modernization. Furthermore, this will ensure the comprehensive realization of the goals set at the 20th National Congress and the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee on "deepening rural land system reform," supporting the effective promotion of comprehensive rural revitalization by providing both theoretical guidance and practical experience.

In light of these considerations, this study adopts and extends the institutional analysis approach of New Institutional Economics, using an analytical framework of "institutional design—institutional form—institutional implementation—institutional performance." It incorporates key aspects, including the overall process of "three rights separation" reform, the selection and application of policy tools, the rights structure and implementation mechanisms, and the goal of common prosperity for farmers and rural areas. At the institutional design level, this research examines the evolutionary logic and policy tool selection underlying the central government's promotion of the "three rights separation" reform. It also explains the dynamic formation and development process of the reform. At the institutional form level, the study outlines the rights structure of the "three rights separation." At the institutional implementation level, it investigates the mechanisms driving reform implementation. Finally, at the institutional performance level, the study reveals the positive economic effects of the reform, particularly in economically underdeveloped regions.

The next section will present the institutional design. First, by elucidating the core attributes of China’s unique governance model, this study identifies four key stages embedded within the country’s reform pilot process: goal setting, top-level design, local pilot programs, and the summary of results. Based on these stages, combined with the critical aspects of the "three rights separation" reform, the study outlines the central government's overall process and evolutionary logic in promoting the reform. Secondly, it establishes a classification system tailored to the "three rights separation" of homestead land by referencing general classifications of policy tools and summarizing the characteristics and selection logic of the policy tools utilized by the central government.

Regarding the institutional form, a review of academic literature on natural resource property rights, alongside an analysis of the distinctive features of China's collective ownership of natural resources, enables this study to identify the rights structure of the "three rights separation" of homestead land from both horizontal and vertical perspectives. These findings are then synthesized with the phased outcomes of the reform to summarize the existing limitations of the rights structure and propose optimization pathways.

The next section focuses on the implementation of the institutional framework. Adopting the property rights economic analysis approach proposed by Barzel, this study presents a theoretical framework for the implementation mechanism of the "three rights separation" reform. Building on this, the study investigates the root causes of the disorder in the previous "two rights separation" of homestead land. It examines notable pilot practices across eastern, central, and western regions, including Yiwu in Zhejiang, Yujiang in Jiangxi, and Luxian in Sichuan. This analysis helps to depict the real-world implementation mechanisms of the reform, identify the remaining challenges, and suggest paths for optimization.

The performance of the institutions involved is also considered. By applying the process-tracing method, the study examines the outcomes of the "three rights separation" reform in homestead land and its role in advancing common prosperity, particularly in economically underdeveloped regions. From a theoretical standpoint, the study establishes key propositions and intervention mechanisms that highlight how the reform promotes common prosperity among farmers and rural communities. It uncovers the common prosperity effects of the reform model in less economically developed regions, focusing on enhanced management practices, and further clarifies the causal link between the reform and the achievement of common prosperity in these areas.

To achieve the objectives of this study, four primary methods are employed: institutional analysis, policy tool analysis, comparative analysis, and outcome-oriented process tracing. The research draws on a range of policy documents, including those concerning the "three rights separation" reform issued by the central government and relevant ministries following the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Additionally, pilot program documents from regions implementing the reform, as well as data from field research, are considered. The principal findings of this study are as follows:

(1) The reform of the "three rights separation" of homestead land since the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee represents a significant policy initiative within the agricultural and rural sectors, spearheaded by the central government in the context of comprehensive deepening reform. This was conducted in accordance with the systematic, holistic, and coordinated requirements of this stage, employing a design-oriented paradigm. The overall process of the "three rights separation" reform has been significantly shaped by national governance tasks, exhibiting two notable characteristics: the profound integration of national macro-governance objectives and the gradual transition from theoretical principles to practical implementation. The evolutionary logic of the reform also reflects significant characteristics of national involvement, as these macro-governance goals have constituted a major driving force behind the reform pilots during the comprehensive deepening reform stage.

(2) The pilot goals and top-level design of the "Three Rights Separation" reform at different stages provided a basic framework for the central government's use and selection of four types of policy tools: government-led, government-guided, market-led, and collective self-governance tools. The rationale behind the selection of these instruments is defined by an adherence to the requirements and objectives of national macro-governance at varying stages of development. The alignment of policy tools with the reform environment provides impetus for local reform pilots. The principle of safeguarding farmers' basic housing and property rights informs the layered and dynamic application of different combinations of policy tools, thereby shaping the property rights system of the "three rights separation" in a manner that aligns with the goals and top-level design requirements of reform pilots at different stages.

(3) The "three rights separation" of homestead land is structured in a manner that encompasses both horizontal and vertical dimensions. In terms of horizontal structure, the model comprises three fundamental rights: collective ownership of homestead land, household qualification rights, and the right to use homestead land. From a vertical perspective, the structure is comprised of multiple levels, including the constitutional level, control level I, control level II, and the user level. The implementation mechanism of the "three rights separation" reform is a composite of principal-agent mechanisms, collective self-governance mechanisms, and market transaction mechanisms.

(4) The effectiveness of the rights structure and the executability of the implementation mechanism are pivotal factors influencing the successful realization of the "three rights separation" reform. In comparison to the considerable institutional costs and reform risks associated with optimizing the property rights allocation system, the optimal path to the effective realization of the "three rights separation" reform is the improvement of a composite property rights implementation mechanism that integrates principal-agent, collective self-governance, and complete market transaction mechanisms.

(5) The reform of the "three rights separation" in economically underdeveloped areas can facilitate collective prosperity for farmers and rural communities through two avenues: the optimization of resource allocation mechanisms and the enhancement of income distribution mechanisms. The optimization of resource allocation mechanisms is reflected in the ability of the reform pilots to enhance the efficiency of resource allocation and realize the asset value of property. This is achieved by expanding the property-related functions of homestead land usage rights and exploring diversified ways to activate these rights. The improvement of income distribution mechanisms is achieved by reinforcing the initial and subsequent distribution of income through the establishment of rural collective economic organizations. This approach addresses the inequitable outcomes of the initial income distribution based on production factors.

In light of the aforementioned conclusions, this paper puts forth the following policy recommendations:

(1) It is recommended that the coordination and comprehensiveness of reform pilots be strengthened in order to expand the scope of the "three rights separation" reform of homestead land. It is imperative to guarantee that the reform pilots are in accordance with the objectives of rural governance in the contemporary era and the requisite governance capacity for this period, as well as with the strategies of urban-rural integration and rural revitalization. The effectiveness of the "three rights separation" reform can be enhanced by improving rural governance capabilities. A coordinated allocation of resources should enhance the overall impact of the pilot programs, thereby preventing the interests of farmers and rural collective organizations from being undermined.

(2) It is recommended that local governments be granted broader and more flexible policy space, and that communication and coordination mechanisms between departments and pilot regions be accelerated in order to deepen the reform of the "three rights separation" of homestead land. The subsequent phase of reform pilots may wish to consider an increase in the number of city-wide pilot projects, the acceleration of the construction of collaborative reform mechanisms across regions and departments, and improvements to information communication and coordination mechanisms. In accordance with the overarching principle of "more authorization, fewer constraints," pilot regions should be afforded greater discretion, provided that the fundamental tenets are not contravened.

(3) It is imperative to persist in the enhancement of the rights structure and implementation mechanisms of the "three rights separation" of homestead land, with the objective of facilitating its effective realization. At this juncture, the reform should investigate a reasonable distribution of collective ownership, household qualification rights, and homestead land usage rights, in addition to defining the relationships between control rights, supervisory rights, and distribution rights. It is imperative to enhance the executability of the composite property rights implementation mechanism, thereby creating an institutional environment that more effectively supports the realization of the "three rights separation" reform.

(4) It is essential to enhance the supporting policy system for the "three rights separation" of homestead land and to reinforce the rights-execution capacity of collective economic organizations in order to further stimulate the common prosperity effects of the reform. The effectiveness of the rights structure and the executability of the implementation mechanism can be enhanced by the systematic construction of a supporting policy framework. The capacity of collective economic organizations to exercise their rights must be strengthened in order to maintain, develop, and innovate the inherent advantages of collective ownership, thereby further unleashing the common prosperity effects of the "three rights separation" reform.

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