2013年以来，股权质押场外质押的开放，进一步放松了质押审核条件，简化了质押手续流程，这使得股权质押这种融资方式吸引了众多的上市公司，我国股权质押的规模飞速上涨。但在2018年6月，随着股市的下跌，场外质押因为巨大的平仓风险而正式被中国证监会叫停。同年，“一行两会”也发文，要求做好股权质押风险管理，纾解上市公司质押困境。在此之前，也存在“德隆系”“鸿仪系”等上市公司控股股东通过股权质押侵占公司财产，并最终导致企业破产等现象。这让学者更加关注控股股东股权质押对于企业的经济影响。一种观点认为，股权质押有效地补充了企业的现金流，缓解了企业的融资约束；而另一种观点认为由于代理问题的存在，控股股东往往具有动机采取股权质押或者关联交易等方式掏空上市公司，侵占中小股东利益，恶化公司财务状况。我们不禁好奇，对于股权质押，控股股东对上市公司究竟是不是伸出了“攫取之手”？控股股东股权质押行为会不会引起企业陷入财务困境的风险。

为此本文以信息不对称理论、委托代理理论和隧道效应理论为理论基础，探究控股股东股权质押是否会导致上市公司陷入财务困境。接着深入剖析在控股股东股权质押后，控股股东金字塔控制结构和企业产权性质对上市公司财务困境的影响差异。为了克服样本选择偏误，本文的研究对象选取2014-2018年的A股上市公司，运用了倾向得分匹配的方法，研究控股股东股权质押是否会对上市公司财务困境产生影响。研究表明：控股股东股权质押会显著影响上市公司的财务困境风险。进一步地，相对于控股股东部分质押，控股股东将所持股份全部质押会使上市公司陷入财务困境的风险加大；相对于直接控股股东，采用金字塔控股结构的控股股东股权质押会使上市公司陷入财务困境的风险加大；相对于国有企业，非国有企业控股股东股权质押会使上市公司陷入财务困境的风险加大。此外，本文更换了多种匹配方式，得到了相同的结论，进一步增强了本文结论的可靠性。本文的研究不仅丰富了控股股东股权质押的经济后果和企业财务困境成因的理论研究，而且为公司治理提供了经验证据，具有理论和实践双重意义。

Since 2013, the opening of the equity pledge off-site pledge has further relaxed the conditions for the pledge audit and simplified the process of pledge procedures, which has attracted many listed companies in this financing mode of equity pledge, and the scale of equity pledge in China has risen rapidly. But in June 2018, as the stock market fell, the over-the-counter pledge was officially suspended by the China Securities Regulatory Commission because of the huge risk of closing positions. In the same year, "one line of two sessions" also issued a letter, requiring to do a good job of equity pledge risk management, to alleviate the situation of listed companies pledge. Prior to this, there are also "Delong XI" "Hungyi Xi" and other listed companies, such as the controlling shareholders of the company through equity pledge to encroach on the company's property, and ultimately lead to the bankruptcy of enterprises and other phenomena. This makes scholars pay more attention to the economic impact of controlling shareholders' equity pledge on enterprises. One view is that equity pledge effectively supplements the cash flow of enterprises and eases the financing constraints of enterprises, while another view holds that because of the existence of agency problems, controlling shareholders often have the incentive to empty listed companies by means of equity pledge or related transactions, encroaching on the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders and worsening the financial situation of the company. We can not help but wonder whether the controlling shareholder is a "grab hand" for the listed company? To this reason, based on the theory of information asymmetry, the theory of entrustment and agent and the theory of tunnel effect, this paper explores whether the controlling shareholder's equity pledge will lead to the financial difficulties of listed companies. Then, after the controlling shareholder's equity pledge, the influence of the controlling shareholder's pyramid control structure and the nature of the enterprise property right on the financial difficulties of the listed company is analyzed in depth.

In order to overcome the sample selection bias, the research subject solely selected the A-share listed companies for 2014-2018, and used the method of tendentious score matching to study whether the controlling shareholder's equity pledge would have an impact on the financial difficulties of listed companies. The research shows that the controlling shareholder's equity pledge will significantly affect the financial distress risk of listed companies. Further, relative to the controlling shareholder's partial pledge, the controlling shareholder's pledge of all the shares held by the controlling shareholder will increase the risk of the listed company's financial difficulties, compared with the direct controlling shareholder, the controlling shareholder's equity pledge using the pyramid holding structure will increase the risk of the listed company's financial difficulties, and the controlling shareholder of non-state-owned enterprises will increase the risk of the listed company's financial difficulties. In addition, this paper has replaced a variety of matching methods, got the same conclusion, and further enhanced the reliability of the conclusions of this paper. The research of this paper not only enriches the theoretical research on the economic consequences of the controlling shareholder's equity pledge and the causes of the financial difficulties of the enterprise, but also provides empirical evidence for corporate governance, which has both theoretical and practical significance.

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