流域环境污染和流域资源短缺己成为世界各国面临的主要问题，中国在加速城镇化、工业化的阶段也付出了巨大的代价，承担了极高的流域治理成本。作为改变流域生态环境和流域水资源利用方式的重要制度工具——流域生态补偿成为建设美丽中国的重要抓手，党的十九大更是指出要“加大生态系统保护力度……，建立市场化、多元化生态补偿机制”，探索流域生态补偿制度已经成为推进生态文明建设、依靠制度保护环境的重要举措。

现有我国多数流域生态补偿的实践是政府主导，流域流经的各级政府作为水资源所属权和管辖权的具体承担者，在流域生态补偿机制构建和运行中充当着重要角色。流域生态补偿由于涉及跨行政区域治理、上下游地区的利益关系复杂且不易协调，加之，流域水资源的流动性、开放性等特征，使得流域上下游地区间的用水矛盾日益常态化。那么，如何通过制度安排、建立特定的规则体系解决跨省流域生态补偿中的利益矛盾是本文的研究问题。具体而言，流域上下游地区的利益关系表现在哪些方面，这些利益关系会导致流域上下游地方政府产生怎样的利益矛盾，如何通过流域生态补偿制度协调利益关系来实现流域政府建立补偿合作，建立之后又怎样让制度良好有序地运作以及是否会产生有效的结果。本文基于制度分析与发展（IAD）框架的理论和视角对以上问题展开了研究。

本文以流域生态补偿为研究对象，在梳理流域生态补偿相关文献、界定流域生态补偿重要概念和理论之后，提出一个基于IAD框架的流域生态补偿“要素形式-内在机理-规则设计”的分析框架作为本文的逻辑支点。之后，讨论流域生态补偿的行动情境、上下游行为主体的利益关系和行动逻辑，发现在自然状态的情况下流域利益相关者很难建立流域生态补偿制度来应对流域资源利用中存在的问题。需要制定具体规则来确定行动者、允许进入项目的条件、如何支付、如何监管以及许多其他行为，所以该制度也受到复杂的规则体系的影响。选择合适的应用规则类型和形式将有利于流域生态补偿制度运行。对已经实践中的流域生态补偿，规则能产生什么有益的结果需要进一步评估，挑选国家第一个上下游跨省流域水环境补偿试点——新安江流域生态补偿试点项目，从规则运行结果能否满足预期目标、规则运行结果的可持续性两个角度评价其实施结果。最后对流域生态补偿的规则优化进行探讨，以期指导中国流域生态补偿的实践创新。本文的主要研究结论如下：

流域生态补偿规则建立模式取决于生态系统服务提供者和购买者面临的成本。在自然状态下的流域生态系统服务提供者和购买者博弈过程中，提供者的额外收益、成本和购买者的成本是影响系统演化稳定策略的重要因素。当额外收益大于成本的时候会有越来越多的提供者选择提供生态系统服务。但现实中这种条件很难出现。所以在自然状态下，流域上下游很难建立生态补偿。那么在政府主导的流域生态补偿中，是上级政府作为规则的制定者还是选择让上下游政府作为规则的主体是流域生态补偿建立模式的选择问题。在加入两种激励-约束机制——上级政府的激励-约束机制和上下游之间的激励-约束机制之后发现，当实施流域生态补偿成本较低的时候，上级政府的激励-约束机制更强有利于提供者和购买者向社会最优策略演化；当提供者和购买者实施流域生态补偿成本较高的情况下，两者基于生态系统服务的激励-约束机制可能比上级政府的机制更有效，而且流域生态系统服务的购买者对变量的变动比提供者做出更积极的响应。基于此，可以提出依据实施生态补偿成本来选择不同建立模式的合理性建议。实施流域生态补偿成本较低的时候上级政府的激励-约束机制更有效。当实施成本高的时候，则需要鼓励提供者和购买者建立基于生态系统服务标准的约束体系，完善对提供者的技术支持帮助其达到生态系统服务标准，并加大对提供者的经济激励。

流域生态补偿实施依赖于特定的完整规则体系及其相互间的配合。中国流域生态补偿顶层设计的规则奠定了流域生态补偿的实践基础，体现在流域资源的产权、流域管理和流域系统服务的有偿使用等方面。与此同时，流域生态补偿的实践促进了顶层设计的完善，流域生态补偿的要素在实践中发现问题又在政策改革中提出可能的解决方案。其中，流域生态补偿的应用规则体系构成了协调不同生态补偿参与者利益分配关系、利益获取关系和利益保障关系的现实机制。通过构建一组针对流域生态补偿的特定规则体系，发现这套规则应当包括明确的位置规则、清晰的边界规则、全面有层次的选择规则、合理放权的聚合规则、匹配的范围规则、透明公开的信息规则、创新的收益规则。进一步结合新安江实践表明，位置规则明晰补偿主体和责任、边界规则选择参与者标准、选择规则规定允许的行动集合、偿付规则创新补偿渠道和分级制裁，是跨区域流域生态补偿机制建立的基石；信息规则确定可用完整的信息、聚合规则适当放权于当地居民、范围规则建立与流域匹配的管理机构，是促进流域生态补偿持续性的重要因素。

流域生态补偿运行结果需要达成预期目标且具备长期向好的能力。从新安江生态补偿项目的预期目标达成的角度来看，该流域的水质不但达到了补偿要求，而且得到了进一步的提高。接着通过计算人类活动净氮输入，发现新安江生态补偿有效减少了河流的氮素输入。从结果能否长期向好的角度来看，新安江生态补偿通过严格规定补偿资金使用用途和设计一系列项目做法优化流域产业布局，改变流域地区人类活动行为，达到控制水源控污染的目的。同时，新安江生态补偿在补偿期间改变了当地发展模式、增加了上下游的联动，实现了精准扶贫和多主体共同参与，为流域生态补偿结果能够长期向好提供了经济保障和制度保障，打下了坚实的基础。

根据以上结论，本文提出流域生态补偿需要设计主体多元化、运行多向化的规则体系，通过创造责任共担的多元职位规则、建立市场化的边界规则和偿付规则、打造多层次的选择规则、制定多考核指标的范围规则、创立有利于基层参与和上下游合作的聚合规则、加强信息交流频率和透明度的信息规则，能够进一步为建立可复制、可推广的流域生态补偿制度提供对策建议，以期将流域生态补偿的制度优势转化为流域生态资源的治理效能。

Environmental pollution of watersheds and the shortage of watershed resources have become major problems for countries around the world. China has also paid a huge price in accelerating urbanization and industrialization and has borne extremely high governance costs. As an important institutional tool to change the ecological environment of the watershed and the utilization of water resources, payments for watershed services (PWS) has become an important starting point for the construction of beautiful China. The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party also pointed out that it is necessary to “Step up the protection of ecosystems ... Exploring and diversifying the payments for ecosystem services", so exploring PWS has been an essential initiative to promote the construction of ecological civilization and to protect the environment by an institutional approach.

The existing practices of PWS in China is dominated by the government. The governments at all levels, as the specific bearers of water resources ownership and jurisdiction, play an important role in the construction and operation of PWS. Inter-provincial PWS involves cross-regional governance, and the interests of relevant stakeholders are complex and difficult to coordinate. At the same time, the mobility and openness of the water resources make the use conflicts between the upstream and downstream areas of the watershed increasingly normalized. How to resolve the conflicts of interest in PWS in cross-provincial watersheds through institutional arrangements and the establishment of specific rule systems is the research question of this paper. Specifically, what are the manifestations of interests in the upstream and downstream areas, how do these lead to conflicting interests of local governments in the upstream and downstream areas, how do they coordinate interests through PWS to achieve cooperation, how do they make the system work well and in an orderly manner after established and whether it will produce effective results. This paper studies the above issues based on the theory and perspective of institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework.

In this paper, PWS is taken as the research object. After combing the relevant literature of PWS and defining the important concepts and theories of PWS, this paper proposes a “factor characterization-intrinsic mechanism-rules design” under IAD framework. The analytical framework serves as the logical pivot for this study. Afterwards, the action scenarios of PWS, the interests of the upstream and downstream actors and the logic of action are discussed. It is found that in the natural state, it is difficult for the stakeholders to establish a PWS system to cope with the problems in the utilization of the watershed resources. Specific rules are needed to control who can participate in buying and selling of watershed services, under what circumstances participation is allowed, how transactions are regulated, and many other actions. Decisions made by the developers of PWS schemes about what rules to include and what form these rules take are likely to have an impact on the eventual success or failure of the schemes. After established and operated, it is necessary to evaluate the implementation results from both the perspective of whether the results meet the expected objectives and the sustainability of these results, so the paper selects the China's first upstream and downstream inter-provincial PWS pilot—Xin'an River Project as an example to multi-dimensionally evaluate the implementation results. Finally, the optimization of PWS is discussed to guide the practice and innovation of PWS in China. The main research methods and conclusions drawn in this paper are as follows:

The mode established for rules in PWS depends on the cost of providers and buyers. In the process of the game between the ecosystem service providers and the buyers in the natural state, the additional benefits, costs of providers and buyers’ cost are important factors affecting the system's evolutionary stability strategy. As additional revenues outweigh costs, more and more providers will choose to provide ecosystem services. But in reality, such conditions are hard to realize. Therefore, in the natural state, it is difficult to establish PWS in the upstream and downstream of the basin. After adding dual motivation-constraint mechanisms—the motivation-constraint mechanism of the higher-level government and the motivation-constraint mechanism between the upstream and downstream, it is found that when the cost of implementing is low, the constraint mechanism of the higher-level government is stronger. Providers and buyers will evolve to social optimal strategies; when the cost of implementing is higher for providers and buyers, the restraint mechanisms based on ecosystem services are likely to be more effective than higher-level government restraint mechanisms, and the react of buyers is more positive than that of the provider. Based on this, recommendations can be made for the reasonableness of the selection of different establishment modes based on the cost of implementing. The motivation-constraint mechanism of higher government is more effective in watersheds with lower costs. If the cost is high, there is a need to encourage providers and buyers to establish motivation-constraint mechanism based on ecosystem service standards, improve technical support for providers to help them meet ecosystem service standards, and increase financial incentives for providers.

The process of implementing PWS depends on the whole and coordination of a particular system of rules. The rules for the top-level design of PWS in China lay the practical foundation for PWS, which is reflected in the property rights of river resources, watershed management and the paid use of watershed services. At the same time, the practices of PWS promote the improvement of the top-level design. The elements will find problems in practice and propose possible solutions in the policy reform. Among them, the rules-in-use of PWS constitutes a realistic mechanism for coordinating the interest’s distribution relationship, interest acquisition relationship and interest protection relationship of different participants. By constructing a set of specific rules-in-use systems for PWS, it is found that this set of rules should include clear position rules, accurate boundary rules, comprehensive and hierarchical choice rules, aggregation rules for reasonable decentralization, matching scope rules, transparent information rules, and innovative pay-off rules. Further integration with Xin'an River practices shows that the established system of rules-in-use provides common rules for the regulation of the main stakeholders of PWS, the additionality of watershed service, the conditionality of PWS, the distribution of benefits and the adaptation to other social goals, which provide solutions for the general problems in PWS. Main rules are the cornerstones of the inter-regional PWS mechanism, including the position rules which clarify stakeholders and their responsibilities, the boundary rules which set selection criteria, the choice rules which stipulate multi-level action sets, the pay-off rules which innovate payments’ sources and graduated sanctions. Other rules are important factors in promoting the sustainability of PWS, including the information rules which determine the available complete information, the aggregation rules which give authority to the local appropriately, the scope rules which establish a management organization that matches the watershed area.

The operational results of PWS should be able to achieve short-term goals as well as long-term improvement. In terms of achieving expected goals of PWS in Xin’an river, the water quality of the basin has not only met the payments’ requirements but has also been further improved. Next, by calculating NANI (Net Anthropogenic Nitrogen Input), the practice of Xin'an River has effectively reduced the nitrogen input of rivers. PWS in Xin’an river aims to control water pollution by strictly regulating the use of payments’ funds and designing a series of projects to optimize the industrial layout of the basin and to change the behaviour of human activities in the area. Moreover, PWS in Xin’an river has changed the regional development model, increased the linkage between upstream and downstream, targeted poverty alleviation, and achieved multi-participation, which providing institutional guarantees for the sustainability of all good results and laying a solid foundation.

According to the above conclusions, this paper suggests that PWS needs to design a rule system with diversified subjects and multi-directional operation. By creating multiple position rules for shared responsibility, the establishment of market-based boundary rules and pay-off rules, the creation of multi-level choice rules and scope rule, the establishment of aggregation rules that facilitate grassroots participation and the strengthening of information rules can further provide recommendations for the establishment of replicable PWS systems, so as to transform the institutional advantages of PWS into governance efficiency of watershed ecological resources.

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