近年来，我国农业一直处于快速发展阶段，但随着资源短缺和环境污染问题日益突出，推动农业可持续发展逐渐成为现实要求。为了减少农业资源浪费、保护生态环境，传统农业生产方式亟需绿色转型。然而，由于农户进行绿色生产的投入成本较高、风险较大，导致其绿色生产转型动力不足。与此同时，电子商务的迅猛崛起为农产品销售提供了新的渠道与机遇。作为连接农户与消费者的桥梁，电商平台能够通过推动优质绿色农产品得到市场认可，从而促进农户绿色生产行为。因此，有必要探究电商模式下的农户绿色生产行为，分析农户、电商平台和政府主体之间的利益博弈关系，进而引导和激励农户的行为决策，推动农业绿色生产转型及可持续发展。

本文首先从利益相关主体行为视角出发，分析农户、电商平台和政府层面的现存问题，以及农户绿色生产转型驱动因素，包括组织管理驱动、市场竞争驱动、绿色消费驱动和政府政策驱动。接着，针对电商模式下农户绿色生产行为问题，结合农户行为理论和演化博弈理论基础，构建农户与电商平台绿色产销行为博弈模型。根据模型分析结果和数值仿真，识别出影响主体行为决策的关键因素，并探讨参数变化的影响，为促进农户绿色生产行为提供理论依据。然后，针对农户绿色生产转型激励问题，引入政府主体参与博弈，构建农户-电商平台-政府三方演化博弈模型。根据模型分析结果和数值仿真，寻找系统在理想状态达到稳定均衡的条件，分析补贴和惩罚力度对农户及电商平台行为决策的影响，并结合系统演化趋势对比不同策略的激励效果，为政府制定有效的激励政策提供理论支持和参考。

研究结果表明：1）在农户与电商平台的博弈过程中，农户的绿色生产转型成本、电商平台的绿色销售成本、利益分配比例以及对绿色长期环境效益的重视程度均是影响其双方决策的关键因素，并且存在最优利益分配比例使双方最容易达成绿色产销策略组合。但在一定范围内，绿色重视程度对农户绿色生产行为的促进作用有限。2）在农户-电商平台-政府三方博弈系统中，各主体的行为决策相互影响。在农业绿色发展初期，即使农户的绿色生产意愿较低，政府也能通过积极加强扶持与激励措施促进农户绿色生产转型。3）从市场角度来看，农业绿色发展初期的绿色额外收益不足以驱动农户绿色生产转型。当市场前景逐渐向好，绿色额外收益逐渐增加时，农户作为直接受益者将率先转变进行绿色生产行为。4）从政策角度来看，在农业绿色发展初期，对农户采取罚款政策的激励效果优于技术补贴政策，对电商平台采取绿色税收优惠政策的效果优于政策限制。政府同时激励农户和电商平台对于促进博弈系统达到稳定的理想状态最为有效。

In recent years, China's agriculture is in a stage of rapid development, but with the increasingly prominent problems of resource shortage and environmental pollution, promoting sustainable development of agriculture has become a realistic requirement. In order to reduce the waste of agricultural resources and protect the ecological environment, the traditional agricultural production mode needs green transformation. However, due to the high input cost and high risk of green production, farmers have insufficient motivation for green production transformation. At the same time, the rapid rise of e-commerce has provided new channels for the sale of agricultural products. As a bridge between farmers and consumers, e-commerce platforms can promote farmers' green production behavior by promoting market recognition of high-quality green agricultural products. Therefore, it is necessary to study farmers' green production behavior and its transformation incentive strategy under the e-commerce model. By analyzing the interest game relationship between farmers, e-commerce platforms and the government, this paper studies how to promote the green production behavior of farmers, so as to promote the green development of agriculture.

Through literature review and summary, from the perspective of stakeholder behavior, this paper analyzes the existing problems of farmers, e-commerce platforms and governments, as well as the driving factors of farmers' green production transformation. Then, this paper builds a game model of green production and marketing behavior between farmers and e-commerce platforms. According to the results of model analysis and numerical simulation, the key factors affecting the decision-making of the subject behavior are identified, and the influence of parameter changes is discussed, which provides a theoretical basis for promoting the green production behavior of farmers. Finally, aiming at the incentive problem of farmers' green production transformation, the government incentive factor is introduced to build a tripartite evolutionary game model of farmers, e-commerce platform and government. According to the model analysis results and numerical simulation, the conditions for the system to reach a stable equilibrium in the ideal state are found, the effects of subsidies and penalties on the behavioral decisions of farmers and e-commerce platforms are analyzed, and the incentive effects of different strategies are compared in combination with the evolution trend of the system, so as to provide support and reference for the government to formulate effective incentive policies.

The results show that: 1) In the game process between farmers and e-commerce platforms, farmers' green production transformation cost, green sales cost of e-commerce platform, benefit distribution ratio and the degree of emphasis on green long-term environmental benefits are all key factors affecting their decision-making, and the existence of an optimal benefit distribution ratio makes it easiest for both sides to reach a green production and marketing strategy combination. However, within a certain range, the degree of green attention has limited effect on the promotion of farmers' green production behavior. 2) In the tripartite game system of farmers, e-commerce platforms and governments, the behavioral decisions of each subject influence each other. In the early stage of agricultural green development, even if farmers' willingness to green production is low, the government can actively strengthen support and incentive measures to promote farmers' green production transformation. 3) From the perspective of the market, the green additional income in the early stage of agricultural green development is not enough to drive the transformation of farmers' green production. When the market prospects gradually improve and the green additional income gradually increases, farmers, as the direct beneficiaries, will take the lead in transforming their green production behavior. 4) From the perspective of policy, in the early stage of agricultural green development, the incentive effect of fine policy on farmers is better than that of technical subsidy policy, and the effect of green tax preferential policy on e-commerce platform is better than that of policy restriction. It is most effective for the government to encourage farmers and e-commerce platforms at the same time to promote the game system to reach the ideal state of stability.

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