在开放市场竞争和国际规则的双重约束下，当前以价格支持为基础、直接补贴为主体的粮食生产国内支持政策体系调整、优化的倒逼机制已经形成，中国正着手探索构建新型农业国内支持政策体系。政策性农业保险作为国际上有助于“对标”世贸组织合规农业国内支持的最重要的非价格农业支持保护工具之一，受到了中国的高度关注。中国正以政策性农业保险为“抓手”，积极在世贸组织规则框架内推动构建能够统筹兼顾国内实际的新型农业国内支持政策体系的转型升级。

2018年，财政部、农业农村部、银保监会联合印发《关于开展三大粮食作物完全成本保险和收入保险试点工作的通知》（以下简称《通知》）是一次最为重要的向该方向转型的全方位的制度设计探索。《通知》决定，从2018年到2020年在6省24个产粮大县探索开展稻谷、小麦、玉米三大粮食作物完全成本保险和收入保险试点。在试点届满之际，2020年中央农村工作会议和2021、2022年中央“一号文件”又明确指出要继续扩大试点范围的新要求。可以预见，“十四五”时期，完全成本保险和收入保险在中国构建新型农业国内支持政策体系进程中将扮演日益重要的角色，其政策设计的科学性、有效性，特别是与中国在国内外压力与挑战下构建既与世贸组织规则相适应又能统筹兼顾国内实际需求的新型农业国内支持政策体系目标的一致性，将成为后续扩大主粮完全成本保险和收入保险实施范围工作成功的关键。

本文基于经济学、国际贸易学的相关理论，在对WTO关于完全成本保险和收入保险补贴的国内支持规则和相关争端案例裁决结果进行深度剖析的基础上，采用定性与定量相结合的方式对中国正在试点的主粮完全成本保险和收入保险补贴措施与《农业协定》相关规则的适应性做出研判，并以数值模拟的方式研究两类保险的实施在适应WTO国内支持相关规则的基础上可能给粮农经济福利、政府财政支出效率以及国家粮食安全带来的潜在影响，由此提出中国新一轮扩大粮食作物完全成本保险和收入保险试点的针对性优化建议，助力中国在世贸组织规则框架内推动构建适合国情的新型农业国内支持政策体系的转型升级。具体而言，本文的主要研究内容和结论如下：

研究内容一：研判中国主粮完全成本保险和收入保险所涉补贴的WTO规则适应性

首先，完全成本保险补贴和收入保险补贴通过合理的机制设计均可被归为“绿箱”政策，但收入保险补贴被归为“绿箱”政策的难度更大。本文通过对比分析《农业协定》关于可被归为“绿箱”政策的完全成本保险补贴和收入保险补贴的规则文本，发现虽然两类保险补贴通过合理设置保险触发条件、保险赔付金额和保险附加限制后均可被归为“绿箱”政策，但由于收入保险补贴的保险对象须与特定作物脱钩，因此被归为“绿箱”政策的难度更大。

其次，中国探索试点的主粮完全成本保险和收入保险补贴政策并不能理所当然地被认为是“绿箱”政策，实际上更有可能被视作“黄箱”政策。一方面，虽然从2018年《通知》的原则性规定来看，中国试点的主粮完全成本保险补贴的制度设计实际上是存在被归为“绿箱”措施的制度设计空间。但试点地区实施的方案在保险触发条件上与《农业协定》附件2第8条的有关规定略有出入，正是由于这种差异导致地方试点的完全成本保险补贴很可能被归为“黄箱”措施；另一方面，中国目前对玉米正在试点的收入保险方案在保险对象、保险赔付条件、保险赔付金额等具体条款上与《农业协定》附件2第7条的有关规定存在一定出入，因此，按照当前试点方案运行并产生的农业收入保险补贴同样很有可能被视作“黄箱”措施。

最后，虽然中国探索试点的主粮完全成本保险和收入保险补贴政策很有可能被归为“黄箱”政策，但总体而言是符合WTO规则的。一方面，根据WTO关于可视为“绿箱”措施的完全成本保险补贴的规则条款与中国的前期探索实践来看，中国将完全成本保险补贴制度设计优化为“绿箱”措施的可操作性是相对较强的，今后的推进进程中只需将保险触发条件上调到基准产量损失的30%，并将基准产量确定方式调整为前3年期或通过去除前5年最高和最低年产量确定的3年平均产量等即可；另一方面，虽然按照当前试点方案运行并产生的玉米收入保险补贴更有可能需要基于相对支持空间更稀缺的“特定产品支持”、而非“非特定产品支持”来计算其综合支持量。但是，根据本文的测算结果可知，按照当前运行机制设计的玉米收入保险补贴可能的最大支持水平为2.80%～7.70%，离中国被WTO规则所允许的“黄箱”规则微量允许水平（8.5%）尚有一定的空间。

研究内容二：建立评价中国主粮完全成本保险和收入保险国内影响的分析框架

本文从经济学的角度出发，以期望效用理论为基础建立了评价中国主粮完全成本保险和收入保险国内影响的分析框架。首先，本文从中国实施主粮完全成本保险和收入保险的政策目标着手，确立了从农民的经济福利及政府财政支出效率变化两个维度对中国试点的完全成本保险和收入保险可能的国内影响进行评估的思路，并以期望效用理论为依据提出本文的分析方法；其次，本文综合运用非参数分析法、Copula理论和Monte Carlo随机模拟技术生成了处于不同风险环境下的稻谷、小麦、玉米代表性生产者所面临的10000组单产-价格对，以反映农业生产者进行农业生产经营可能面临的单产、价格与收入风险，为后文的模拟分析提供数据支撑。

研究内容三：模拟中国主粮完全成本保险和收入保险探索方案的国内影响

首先，中国探索试点的主粮完全成本保险和收入保险政策的实施在适应WTO规则的基础上，总体上而言能够在改善粮农经济福利的同时不损害政府的财政支出效率。一方面中国主粮完全成本保险探索方案实施后，处于高风险环境下的主粮生产者的经济福利相对政策实施前能够得到提高，处于中低风险环境下的主粮生产者的经济福利的改善程度相对于政策实施前并不明显甚至可能会进一步下降，而政府的财政支出效率相对于政策实施前则并不会受到太大的影响。考虑到在实践中，处于低风险环境下的生产者并不会购买保额较高但自付保费也更高的完全成本保险，主粮完全成本保险探索方案的实施主要是满足了处于高风险环境下的生产者对于高保障水平的农业保险的需求，因此总体而言主粮完全成本保险探索方案的实施能够起到改善粮农经济福利的作用；另一方面，中国玉米收入保险探索方案实施后，处于高、中、低风险环境下的生产者的经济福利相对于政策实施前均能够改善，政府的财政支持效率也有明显提升，且相对于同等保额的完全成本保险政策的实施，玉米收入保险政策的实施使得生产者的经济福利与政府的财政支出效率提高程度更大。

其次，中国探索试点的主粮完全成本保险和收入保险政策是现阶段中国在世贸组织规则框架内推动构建适合国情的主粮农业保险制度相对可取的制度设计。一方面，从适应WTO国内支持规则的角度来说，由于稻谷、小麦最低收购价政策占用了绝大部分特定产品“黄箱”支持空间，玉米取消临时收储政策后剩余较大的特定产品“黄箱”支持空间，中国三大粮食作物完全成本保险和收入保险推进过程中，最为理想的是对稻谷、小麦实施政府提供的补贴被归为“绿箱”措施可操作性较强的完全成本保险，对玉米则既可以实施完全成本保险也可以实施收入保险；另一方面，从“保护农民利益”的角度来说，本文的数值模拟结果表明，完全成本保险较传统物化成本保险保额大幅提升，能够有效匹配处于高风险环境下的稻谷、小麦生产者的需求，而收入保险理论上能够有效防范自然灾害和市场变动双重风险，切实保障玉米种植户收入。因此，对稻谷、小麦实施完全成本保险，对玉米实施收入保险，或许是中国现阶段推动构建既符合国际规则又适合国情的新型农业国内支持政策体系的转型升级进程中，对于主粮政策性农业保险而言相对可取的制度设计。

最后，中国探索试点的主粮完全成本保险和收入保险政策的实施在适应WTO规则的基础上有利于国家粮食安全的保障。从保持粮食生产稳定发展，确保国家粮食安全的角度出发，本文的数值模拟结果表明中国主粮完全成本保险和收入保险探索方案的实施总体上会提高农业生产者的期望收入水平，降低农业生产者的期望收入波动程度，这对于保障农业生产者的种粮积极性，确保国家粮食安全是有益的。

据此，为助力中国在世贸组织规则框架内推动构建适合国情的新型农业国内支持政策体系的转型升级，本文针对中国新一轮扩大粮食作物完全成本保险和收入保险试点工作提出如下政策建议：第一，优先推进稻谷、小麦完全成本保险，并将其所涉补贴优化为“绿箱”措施；第二，优先实施玉米收入保险，并着力探索“全覆盖、非特定”主粮收入保险；第三，农业保险相关部门要强化对WTO相关规则的理解与运用，同时中央要加强对地方及保险公司的完全成本保险和收入保险工作的指导；第四，积极拓展政策性农业保险补贴结构，完善农业再保险制度；第五，加快构建多层次农业保险体系，满足农户差异化投保需求等。

相较于以往研究，本文在以下三个方面做出拓展：其一，厘清了完全成本保险和收入保险所涉补贴在WTO框架内的差异化“归箱”规则与支持水平测度规则，从一个全新的视角拓展了以往有关中国主粮农业保险研究的文献。其二，本文采用定性与定量相结合的方法，定性研判了中国试点的主粮完全成本保险和收入保险补贴的“归箱”属性，根据《农业协定》文本推导了适应中国农业收入保险补贴的支持水平估算公式，定量评估了中国试点的玉米收入保险补贴的国际规则适应性。其三，本文基于期望效用理论建立了评价中国主粮完全成本保险和收入保险国内影响的分析框架，采用数值模拟的方式对中国主粮完全成本保险和收入保险政策的实施对国内农民收益、政府财政支出效率以及国家粮食安全的可能影响进行了讨论，不仅可以尝试以较为科学的分析方法评估政策性农业保险制度方案的预期影响，也有助于丰富我国政策性农业保险制度的研究方法体系，为后续研究提供有益启示。

Under the dual constraints of open market competition and international rules, the current forced mechanism for the adjustment and optimization of domestic support policy system for grain production based on price support and direct subsidies has been formed. China is exploring the construction of a new domestic support policy system for agriculture. As one of the most important non price agricultural support and protection tools that help promote domestic support policies to comply with WTO rules, policy-based agricultural insurance has received great attention from China. With policy oriented agricultural insurance as the "focus", China is actively promoting the transformation and upgrading of a new domestic support policy system for agriculture suitable for China's national conditions under the framework of WTO rules.

In 2018, the Ministry of finance, the Ministry of agriculture and rural areas and the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission jointly issued the notice on carrying out the pilot work of full-cost insurance and income insurance for three major grain crops (hereinafter referred to as the notice), which is the most important all-round system design exploration for transformation in this direction. At the expiration of the pilot, the 2020 Central Rural Work Conference and the "No. 1 document" of the central government in 2021 and 2022 clearly pointed out the new requirements to continue to expand the scope of the pilot. It can be predicted that during the "14th five-year plan" period, full-cost insurance and income insurance will play an increasingly important role in the process of China's construction of a new agricultural domestic support policy system. The scientificity and effectiveness of its policy design, especially the consistency with China's goal of building a new agricultural domestic support policy system that is not only compatible with WTO rules but also takes into account domestic reality under the pressure and challenges at home and abroad, will become the key to the success of the follow-up work of expanding the implementation scope of full-cost insurance and income insurance of staple grain.

Based on the relevant theories of economics and international trade, and based on the in-depth analysis of the domestic support rules of WTO on full-cost insurance and income insurance subsidies and the adjudication results of relevant dispute cases, this paper intends to study and judge the adaptability of the main grain full-cost insurance and income insurance subsidy measures being piloted in China with the relevant rules of the agreement on agriculture by combining qualitative and quantitative methods. It also studies the potential impact of the implementation of the two types of insurance on the economic welfare of food and agriculture, the efficiency of government financial expenditure and national food security while adapting to the relevant rules of WTO domestic support by means of numerical simulation, and puts forward targeted optimization suggestions for China's new round of pilot expansion of grain crop full-cost insurance and income insurance, so as to promote the transformation and upgrading of a new agricultural domestic support policy system compatible with compliance and incentive. Specifically, the main research contents and conclusions of this paper are as follows:

Part 1: Study and judge the adaptability of WTO rules of subsidies involved in China's main grain full-cost insurance and income insurance.

First of all, full-cost insurance subsidy and income insurance subsidy can be classified as "green box" policy through reasonable mechanism design, but it is more difficult for income insurance subsidy to be classified as "green box" policy. Based on a comparative analysis of the rules of the agricultural agreement on the complete cost insurance subsidy and income insurance subsidy, which can be classified as the "green box" policy, it is found that although the two kinds of insurance subsidies can be classified as "green box" policies by reasonably setting the trigger conditions, the amount of insurance claims and the additional insurance restrictions, However, because the insured object of income insurance subsidy must be decoupled from specific crops, it is more difficult to be classified as the "green box" policy.

Secondly, China's pilot full-cost insurance and income insurance subsidy policies for staple food can not be taken for granted as a "green box" policy. In fact, they are more likely to be regarded as a "amber box" policy. On the one hand, although from the perspective of the principled provisions of the 2018 notice, the system design of China's pilot main grain full-cost insurance subsidy actually has room for system design classified as "green box" measures. However, the insurance trigger conditions of the schemes implemented in the pilot areas are slightly different from the relevant provisions of Article 8 of Annex 2 to the agreement on agriculture. It is precisely because of this difference that the full-cost insurance subsidies of local pilot areas are likely to be classified as "amber box" measures; On the other hand, China's current pilot income insurance scheme for corn is different from the relevant provisions of Article 7 of Annex 2 to the agreement on agriculture in terms of specific terms such as insurance object, insurance compensation conditions and insurance compensation amount. Therefore, the agricultural income insurance subsidy operated and generated according to the current pilot scheme is likely to be regarded as a "amber box" measure.

Finally, although the full-cost insurance and income insurance subsidy policies for staple food explored and piloted by China are likely to be classified as "amber box" policies, they are generally in line with WTO rules. On the one hand, according to the rules and provisions of the WTO on full-cost insurance subsidies that can be regarded as "green box" measures and China's preliminary exploration practice, China's operability of optimizing the design of full-cost insurance subsidy system into "green box" measures is relatively strong. It only needs to raise the insurance trigger conditions to 30% of the benchmark output loss, And adjust the determination method of benchmark output to the first three years or the average output of three years determined by removing the maximum and minimum annual output of the first five years; On the other hand, although the corn income insurance subsidy operated and generated according to the current pilot scheme is more likely to need to calculate its comprehensive support based on "specific product support" with more scarce relative support space rather than "non-specific product support". However, according to the calculation results of this paper, the possible maximum support level of corn income insurance subsidy designed according to the current operation mechanism is 2.80%~7.70%, which is still a certain space from the de minimis level (8.5%) of the "amber box" rule allowed by WTO rules.

Part 2: Establish an analytical framework to evaluate the domestic impact of China's staple grain full-cost insurance and income insurancee.

From the perspective of economics, this paper establishes an analytical framework for evaluating the domestic impact of China's staple food full-cost insurance and income insurance based on expected utility theory. Firstly, this paper starts with the policy goal of implementing full-cost insurance and income insurance for staple grain in China, this paper establishes a method for evaluating the possible domestic impact of China's pilot full-cost insurance and income insurance from the perspectives of farmers' economic welfare and changes in government fiscal expenditure efficiency. Based on the expected utility theory, this paper proposes the analysis method of this paper; secondly, this paper comprehensively uses nonparametric analysis method, Copula theory and Monte Carlo stochastic simulation technology to generate representative producers of rice, wheat and corn under different risk environments. The 10,000 sets of yield-price pairs faced to reflect the yield, price and income risks that agricultural producers may face in their agricultural production operations, and provide data support for the following simulation analysis.

Part 3: Simulate the domestic impact of China's main grain full-cost insurance and income insurance exploration scheme.

First of all, the implementation of China's pilot full-cost insurance and income insurance policies for staple food can, on the basis of adapting to WTO rules, generally improve the economic welfare of food and agriculture without damaging the efficiency of government financial expenditure. On the one hand, after the implementation of China's main grain full-cost insurance exploration scheme, the economic welfare of main grain producers in high-risk environment can be improved compared with that before the implementation of the policy. The improvement degree of economic welfare of main grain producers in low-risk environment is not obvious compared with that before the implementation of the policy, and may even decline further, while the government's fiscal expenditure efficiency will not be greatly affected compared with that before the implementation of the policy. Considering that in practice, producers in low-risk environment will not buy full-cost insurance with higher insurance amount but higher out of pocket premium, the implementation of the main grain full-cost insurance exploration scheme is mainly to meet the needs of producers in high-risk environment for agricultural insurance with high guarantee level. Therefore, in general, the implementation of the main grain full-cost insurance exploration scheme can improve the economic welfare of food and agriculture; On the other hand, after the implementation of China's corn income insurance exploration plan, the economic welfare of producers in high, medium and low-risk environment can be improved compared with that before the implementation of the policy, and the efficiency of government financial support has also been significantly improved. Moreover, the implementation of corn income insurance policy has a greater improvement in the economic welfare of producers and the efficiency of government financial expenditure compared with the implementation of the full-cost insurance policy with the same insurance amount.

Secondly, the pilot full-cost insurance and income insurance policies for staple grains explored by China are relatively desirable institutional designs for China to promote the construction of a staple grain agricultural insurance system suitable for China's national conditions under the framework of WTO rules at this stage. On the one hand, from the perspective of adapting to the domestic support rules of the WTO, since the minimum purchase price policy of rice and wheat occupies most of the "amber box" support space for specific products, there is a large "amber box" support space for specific products after the cancellation of the temporary collection and storage policy of corn. In the process of promoting the full-cost insurance and income insurance of China's three major grain crops, the most ideal is to implement the subsidy provided by the government for rice and wheat, which is classified as the full-cost insurance with strong operability of the "green box" measure, while for corn, both full-cost insurance and income insurance can be implemented; On the other hand, from the perspective of "protecting farmers' interests", the numerical simulation results of this paper show that the insurance amount of complete cost insurance is significantly higher than that of traditional materialized cost insurance, which can effectively match the needs of rice and wheat producers in a high-risk environment, while income insurance can effectively prevent the dual risks of natural disasters and market changes in theory, and effectively protect the income of corn growers. Therefore, the implementation of full-cost insurance for rice and wheat and income insurance for corn may be a relatively desirable system design for staple grain policy agricultural insurance in China's transformation and upgrading process of promoting the construction of a new agricultural domestic support policy system that is not only in line with international rules but also suitable for national conditions.

Finally, the implementation of China's pilot main grain full-cost insurance and income insurance policies is conducive to the protection of national food security on the basis of adapting to WTO rules. From the perspective of maintaining the stable development of grain production and ensuring national food security, the numerical simulation results of this paper show that the implementation of the exploration scheme of China's main grain full-cost insurance and income insurance will generally improve the expected income level of agricultural producers and reduce the fluctuation of expected income of agricultural producers, which is beneficial to the national guarantee of food security.

Accordingly, in order to help China promote the transformation and upgrading of a new domestic support policy system for agriculture suitable for China's national conditions under the framework of WTO rules, this paper puts forward the following policy suggestions for China's new round of pilot work of expanding full-cost insurance and income insurance for grain crops:

First, continue to promote full-cost insurance for rice and wheat and optimize it into full-cost insurance with subsidies that can be regarded as "green box" measures; Second, continue to implement income insurance for corn, and strive to explore "full coverage, non-specific" staple grain income insurance; Third, strengthen the understanding and application of relevant WTO rules. At the same time, the central government should strengthen the guidance of local full-cost insurance and income insurance; Fourth, expand the subsidy structure of policy agricultural insurance and improve the agricultural reinsurance system; Fifth, build a multi-level agricultural insurance system to meet the differentiated insurance needs of farmers.

Compared with previous studies, this paper expands in the following three aspects: Firstly, it clarifies the differentiated "return box" rules and support level measurement rules of subsidies involved in full-cost insurance and income insurance under the framework of WTO, and expands the previous literature on China's staple grain agricultural insurance from a new perspective. Secondly, using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, this paper qualitatively studies and judges the "return to box" attribute of the main grain full-cost insurance and income insurance subsidy in China's pilot, deduces the support level estimation formula suitable for China's agricultural income insurance subsidy according to the text of the agricultural agreement, and quantitatively evaluates the adaptability of the international rules of China's pilot corn income insurance subsidy. Thirdly, based on the expected utility theory, this paper constructs a model to evaluate the domestic implementation effect of China's main grain full-cost insurance and income insurance, and discusses the possible impact of the implementation of China's main grain full-cost insurance and income insurance policies on domestic farmers' income, government expenditure efficiency and national food security. It can not only try to evaluate the expected impact of the policy agricultural insurance system scheme with more scientific analysis methods, but also help to enrich the research method system of China's policy agricultural insurance system, and provide useful enlightenment for follow-up research.

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